

University of Saida Dr MOULAY Tahar

Faculty of Law and Political Sciences

Department of Public Law



Algeria's National Security Strategy in a Changing Security Environment: Internal Threats and External Challenges

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master
Degree in Political Sciences
Specialization: International Relations

Presented by:

Benaoumeur Roudaina Nour El Houda

Supervised by:

Dr. Ali Elottri

Board of Examiners

Pr Ahmed Chikhoui	President	University of Saida
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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my friend and brother, Brahimi Habib Allah, may Allah have mercy on him and to all the martyrs of the nation, and may Allah have mercy on them and grant them spacious gardens in Paradise.

Praise is to Allah who bestowed upon us the blessing of intellect and provided us with strength and will. Praise is to Allah who granted us patience, and praise is to Allah for His guidance, the Almighty.

I dedicate this work to myself, who walked steadily on paths that were not easy; to that spirit that bore burdens and stumbled, but rose and fought with the certainty that Allah's support was sufficient.

I dedicate this achievement to you, for you were the first in the journey of patience, steadfastness, and perseverance to my companion on this journey, to my support, to the lifeblood of my existence, to the one who sacrificed everything and strengthened me, to the one who illuminated my path in the darkness of my days, to the one who instilled in my soul and heart determination and the refusal to surrender to my dear mother Fatima to the one whose brow was adorned with sweat and who dedicated his life to my education and to bringing me to this level to the one who sacrificed what was precious and spared nothing; to my father, Miloud to my sister, my friend and the love of my heart,

For all the help she never withheld to my beloved grandmother, the pulse of tenderness, whose prayers were my success and who was the balm for my wound and to my beloved sister, whose presence I wished to share in my joy, but distance separated us. This work is dedicated to my aunt **Aicha**, and to my bestie **B.F.I.KH** to everyone who supported and helped me along this path, and to everyone whose name I may not recall. Finally, I ask Allah to make this graduation a good beginning for my life.

Thanks and appreciation

All praise and thanks are due to Allah, the Ever-Living, the Self-Sustaining, from beginning to end. We embarked upon this journey only through His facilitation, reached its conclusion only through His guidance, and achieved our goals only through His grace.

We thank Allah and pray that He, the Exalted, makes this work purely for His sake.

I extend my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Professor **Ali Elottri**, for his gracious acceptance of supervising this work, and for his advice, guidance, tireless effort, patience, continuous follow-up, encouragement, support, and unwavering dedication. I ask Allah to reward him abundantly.

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Finally, I thank the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, and all the professors of political sciences at **Saida University**, for the knowledge and wisdom they have imparted to us throughout our studies.

Finally, I ask Allah Almighty to grant success and guidance to everyone, and may Allah reward our esteemed professors for their hard work and dedication.

List of Abbreviation and Ipandeces

AIS	the Islamic Salvation Army
ANDI	National Investment Development Agency
ANEM	National Employment Agency
ANJEM	National Agency for Micro-Credit Management
ANSEJ	National Agency for Support of Youth Employment
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BRICS	Brazil , Russia, India, China, South Africa
CENTIF	Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières
CISSA	Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FIS	the Islamic Salvation Front
FSG	Frontier Services Group
GGF	Groupements des Gardes-Frontières
GIA	the Armed Islamic Group
GSPC	Group for Preaching and Combat
IMF	the International Monetary Fund
ISGS	the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIA	Armed Islamic Movement
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OCRIEST Central Office for Combating Illegal Immigration and the Employment of Undocumented Foreigners

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

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SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

UAE United Arab Emirates

UN United Nation

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The concept of security has undergone fundamental transformations in contemporary political and strategic thought as a result of the structural changes experienced by the international system since the end of the Cold War, and the accompanying decline of symmetrical military threats and the rise of new, complex, and asymmetrical forms of them. Thus, security is no longer limited to the military dimension or defense related to the protection of the state's territorial borders; rather, it has become a comprehensive and multidimensional concept, encompassing political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and human domains.

This transformation has necessitated a reconsideration of traditional approaches to security and has led to the emergence of new conceptions, including human security, societal security, and the security of non-military issues, within a world characterized by increasing interdependence and overlap between internal and external threats. In this context, the state's security strategy has become concerned with managing a complex threat environment that goes beyond the logic of military deterrence toward strategic foresight and proactive response, especially in light of the growing role of non-state actors, the spread of transnational terrorism, organized crime, illicit activities, and irregular migration, as well as the security repercussions of economic and social crises along with weak governance.

The complexity of this security environment increases in states that belong to fluctuating geopolitical spaces or are located in fragile regional contexts, which largely applies to the case of Algeria. Algeria is considered one of the states with strategic specificity in its regional and international environment, due to its geographical location that places it at the heart of multi-level interactions, combining the Maghreb, the Mediterranean, the African, and the Sahel-Saharan spaces. Moreover, its vast geographical expanse and the length of its land borders, particularly in the south, have placed it in direct contact with regions suffering from deep structural fragility and political and security instability, foremost among them the African Sahel region.

This location has contributed to making Algerian national security closely linked to the dynamics of regional security, such that any security deterioration in its immediate environment is reflected in its internal stability. Since its independence,

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Algeria has faced multiple security challenges; however, the most serious has been the phenomenon of terrorism experienced during the 1990s, which constituted a harsh experience that reshaped the national security doctrine and reinforced the centrality of internal security in Algerian strategic thinking. This experience enabled Algeria to develop effective mechanisms in combating terrorism, combining a hard security approach with political solutions, which contributed to restoring relative stability.

However, these internal successes coincided with a rapid deterioration in the regional security environment, which brought the issue of national security back into focus from a more comprehensive and complex perspective at the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly following the events of the Arab Spring and the repercussions of the Libyan crisis. North Africa and the African Sahel region have witnessed profound security transformations, manifested in the collapse of certain states, the weakening of their institutions, the spread of weapons, and the rise of armed groups and transnational terrorist organizations. The Sahel region has become one of the most dangerous hotspots of instability in the world due to the overlap of factors such as state failure, ethnic conflicts, economic marginalization, and foreign interventions, making it a constant source of non-traditional security threats.

These threats are particularly dangerous for Algeria, given that the Sahel region represents a strategic extension of its national security, and its southern borders have become an open space for illicit flows, including terrorism, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and drug trade, in addition to the increasing waves of irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa. This reality has generated dual challenges affecting, on the one hand, Algerian national security, and on the other hand, raising issues related to human security, migrants' rights, and Algeria's international image.

In light of these developments, it is no longer possible for the Algerian security strategy to remain confined to the logic of border protection. Rather, it is required to shift towards a broader approach based on understanding the sources of threats in its regional environment and addressing them through multiple tools, including diplomatic action, regional security cooperation, and a developmental approach, alongside the traditional role of the military institution. However, this transformation has encountered a set of constraints that have long formed the core of Algeria's

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security doctrine, foremost among them the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign States, the rejection of foreign military presence, and adherence to political solutions in case of conflicts.

Nevertheless, the escalation of non-state threats and the occurrence of pivotal security events, such as the In Amenas attack in 2013, revealed the limits of the traditional security approach and prompted a gradual revision of the national security doctrine to allow for greater flexibility in line with the nature of emerging threats. This process culminated in the constitutional amendment of 2020, which authorized the participation of the People's National Army in missions outside national borders within the framework of international legitimacy, reflecting a qualitative shift in Algeria's perception of its regional security role and its transition from a position of threat management to one seeking to contribute to shaping regional security.

In this context, the issue of balancing internal threats—related to political stability, social cohesion, and economic development—and external challenges arising from the unstable security environment in the regional neighborhood emerges as the core of Algeria's contemporary security strategy. This issue raises profound questions regarding Algeria's ability to reconcile the constants of its foreign policy with the requirements of a changing security environment, as well as the effectiveness of the mechanisms it employs in confronting complex security threats.

Today, Algeria faces a complex security environment characterized by the overlap of internal and external threats, the rise of non-traditional phenomena, and the fragility of the security situation in neighboring countries, particularly in the African Sahel. Events such as the Tiguentourine attack in 2013 have highlighted the limitations of traditional security approaches and called for a reassessment of the national security doctrine. Accordingly, Algeria seeks to maintain its national security by balancing internal and external threats, while reconciling the traditional principles of its security doctrine with the requirements of responding to non-traditional threats, especially in light of the aforementioned evolving security dynamics.

Given the nature of the topic and the interconnectedness of its security, political, and strategic dimensions, the importance of this study lies in its attempt to understand

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the various challenges facing Algeria and analyze its mechanisms for dealing with them in light of current regional and international transformations.

Importance of the Study

The importance of this study is not limited to its applied aspect alone, but extends to its scientific and cognitive aspect, which contributes to enriching academic studies related to the topic

Scientific Importance

This study holds particular scientific importance as it contributes to enriching the field of security studies within the discipline of political science and international relations, especially through a comprehensive analytical approach to the Algerian security strategy in a changing regional and international context. It also seeks to establish a link between theoretical security literature—both traditional and modern—and practical applications in the case of a pivotal state in North Africa and the Sahel region, namely Algeria.

Furthermore, the scientific importance lies in attempting to move beyond a partial approach that focuses on a single dimension of security, by analyzing the interaction between internal threats and external challenges in shaping the Algerian security strategy. This allows for a deeper understanding of the transformations that have affected the national security doctrine, particularly after the constitutional amendment of 2020.

Practical Importance

The practical importance of this study stems from the close connection of its subject to the real transformations taking place in Algeria's security environment, and the direct challenges this imposes on strategic planning and the formulation of national security policy. The study aims to provide an in-depth analytical reading of the complex threats facing Algeria, enabling a more precise understanding of the adaptation mechanisms adopted by the state in confronting a regionally unstable and volatile security environment.

The study also derives its applied value from providing a reference framework that can be used to assess the effectiveness of currently embraced security approaches,

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by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the Algerian security strategy and evaluating its capacity to respond to evolving threats, particularly in the Sahel-Saharan space.

Finally, the results of this study contribute to supporting academic debate on national security issues and may serve as a useful tool for researchers and students interested in security affairs, by offering structured academic material on the Algerian experience in managing security threats, thereby enhancing the accumulation of applied knowledge in the field of strategic studies within the Arab and African context.

Topic Choice

The motives for choosing this topic are embodied in a set of objective justifications related to the nature of the problem and its current dimensions.

Objective Justifications

The choice of this topic is based on a set of objective considerations summarized in:

1. The rise of non-traditional security threats in the Sahel region, which pose a risk to Algerian security.
2. The significant transformations experienced by the Algerian security strategy, especially after approving the participation of the army outside national borders.
3. The growing academic and political interest in issues of regional security in North Africa and the Sahel.
4. The need to study the interaction between internal and external factors in shaping the national security strategy.

In addition to the objective justifications, there are also subjective and personal considerations that led to the choice of this topic and research into its various aspects

Subjective Justifications

As for the subjective reasons, they include:

1. Personal academic interest in security issues and strategic studies within the field of international relations.
2. The conviction of the importance of addressing sensitive national issues from an objective scientific perspective.
3. The ambition to contribute, even in a limited way, to enriching the national academic debate on national security issues.

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4. The desire to specialize in the future in the field of security and strategic studies, and to consider this research as a first step in building an integrated research path in this field.

In an effort to encompass the various aspects of the topic and analyze its theoretical and applied dimensions, this study seeks to achieve a set of fundamental objectives.

Objectives of the Study

This study aims to achieve a set of objectives, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Analyzing the evolution of the concept of security and the security strategy in Algeria in light of regional and international transformations.
2. Identifying the nature of internal threats and external challenges facing Algerian national security.
3. Highlighting the determinants of the formulation of the Algerian security strategy and its main core foundations.
4. Studying the impact of instability in the African Sahel region on Algeria's security and strategic choices.
5. Shedding light on the transformation brought about by the 2020 constitutional amendment in Algeria's national and regional security role.
6. Evaluating the effectiveness of the Algerian security strategy in confronting non-traditional security threats.

Previous literature

Sohailia Samah's study, "The Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats" (2023), demonstrates how Algeria has practically adopted a broad security approach. The study analyzes the shift in Algerian strategy from a traditional focus on regional defense to a comprehensive defense strategy that seeks to "protect its national interests, ensure its national security, and secure its borders." It explains that the nature of the new "asymmetric" threats facing the country has necessitated this shift.

Mustafa Merini's thesis, "Border Area Management Strategy in Light of New Security Threats: A Case Study of Algeria" (2022), complements the previous point by focusing on the spatial dimension of expanded security. It specifically examines

Algerian border regions as a convergence point for transnational threats. This study moves from the narrow concept of "border security" (preventing military incursions) to the broader concept of "border area management," indicating the adoption of a developmental and preventative approach, rather than solely a deterrent one.

Luis Martinez's paper, "Security in Algeria and Libya After 9/11" (2003), documents the pivotal moment following the 9/11 attacks and analyzes how this event influenced the perception of the nature of the threat. Martinez points to a fundamental paradox: before 1991, Algeria's military arsenal was designed to counter "external military aggression," but the country found itself mired in an internal civil war with armed Islamist groups, a threat for which its military doctrine was ill prepared. Martinez argues that the major turning point was Algeria's (and Libya's) realization of the nature of the "internal threat"—namely, "Islamist violence"—which overshadowed the traditional concept of an external threat. After 9/11, armed Islamist movements were "redefined" not only because of internal tensions but also as an "international threat."

The problem of the topic Algeria today faces a complex security environment characterized by overlapping internal and external threats, the rise of unconventional threats, and the fragile security situation in neighboring countries, particularly in the Sahel region of Africa. These transformations have revealed the limitations of traditional security approaches, prompting Algeria to reconsider its security doctrine to ensure the preservation of its national security and to adapt to regional and international changes. Hence, the following central question arises:

To what extent does Algeria adopt an effective security strategy in addressing both internal and external threats?

Sub-questions

1. How has the concept of "security" evolved from the narrow, traditional concept of protecting the state from military threats to broader, multi-scalar concepts (societal, economic, environmental) encompassing individual and collective security? How does this evolution affect the understanding of the security threats facing Algeria?
2. To what extent have the military-security mechanisms, compared to the political, economic, and social mechanisms adopted by Algeria within the framework of its

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"comprehensive approach," succeeded in containing internal threats and eliminating their root causes?

3. How has the Algerian security strategy addressed the challenges of regional instability and foreign interventions in its strategic depth in the Sahel? How have global economic challenges impacted the funding sources and sustainability of this strategy?

Central Hypothesis

Algeria's security strategy relies on a hybrid model that combines hard and soft power tools. However, its effectiveness in countering internal threats is eroded by external challenges, most notably the deteriorating regional environment and global economic pressures, necessitating a continuous alignment between the constants of its security doctrine and the variables of its strategic environment.

Sub-Hypotheses

1-The shift in the security concept towards multi-sectorial hybrid threats has led Algeria to adopt a comprehensive approach that reconciles the preservation of national sovereignty with the requirements of human and societal security.

2-The comprehensive approach has succeeded in militarily deterring internal threats, but it has relied solely on political and socio-economic mechanisms that have temporarily absorbed tensions without addressing their structural roots.

3- The erosion of neighbouring states and the transformation of foreign interventions into a strategic reality present Algeria with the dilemma of diminishing influence in its surrounding region, despite its adherence to a non-interventionist, strategic depth approach.

4-Energy market instability and external economic vulnerability undermine the reinter resources that fund social stability, thus necessitating the strengthening of economic, food, and water security as a prerequisite for stability.

Methodological Framework

This research adopts a descriptive-analytical approach as its primary methodology to monitor and analyse the various internal threats and external challenges facing the Algerian security strategy. The research also employs a case study approach, examining the Algerian strategy in the Sahel region of Africa as a

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model of strategic depth. Furthermore, content analysis can be utilised to examine official discourses, reports, and national security charters, with the aim of extracting the fundamental principles and pillars of the Algerian security doctrine

Conceptual Framework

1. National Security: A complex, dynamic state encompassing the military-political dimension (sovereignty and independence of decision-making), the societal dimension (national cohesion), and the economic dimension (relative self-sufficiency in energy, food, and water).

2. Security Threat: An issue that has been "securitized" and presented as an existential danger to the state or society, justifying a departure from normal political procedures and the use of exceptional measures. It is distinguished from "danger" (potential harm) and "challenge" (a non-existential test situation)

3. Security Strategy: The sum of preventive, deterrent, and remedial plans adopted by the state at the national and regional levels to protect its vital interests, based on the tenets of its doctrine

4. Security Doctrine: A system of fixed principles stemming from the state's identity and history, which determines how it views sources of threat and how to deal with them.

5. Strategic Depth: The vital extension of a state's security beyond its political borders, which applies to Algeria's view of the Sahel region as its first line of defence

Securitization is the process of "securitizing" issues that are not inherently security-related (such as water scarcity or migration), transforming them into existential threats that justify exceptional measures. The security dilemma is a situation in international relations where a state seeks to enhance its security, but this pursuit is interpreted as a threat by other states, leading to increased tension and instability. Desecration is the process of shifting an issue considered a threat from the exceptional security and military sphere to the general political sphere, where it is more resolvable and manageable

Theoretical Framework

This study employs a synthetic theoretical framework that integrates:

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- **Realism**, which focuses on the concepts of the "security dilemma," the "state as a central actor," and "international anarchy." For example, realism explains Algeria's insistence on the principle of non-intervention and its rejection of foreign military bases on its territory as rational behaviour for a self-reliant state in a turbulent regional environment, fearing that the presence of major powers will destabilize it. The security dilemma also explains why some neighbouring states might view Algeria's strengthening of its military capabilities on its borders as an act of aggression. Hostile, fueling a regional arms race.
- **Institutional Liberalism:** Use it to explain Algeria's involvement in regional initiatives (such as the Field States mechanism) and intelligence and diplomatic cooperation. However, point out its limitations: the weakness of regional institutions in the Sahel limits cooperation, thus returning the state to a pragmatic "self-reliance" approach.
- **Constructivism:** To analyse how the "state identity" inherited from the revolution (sovereignty, rejection of tutelage) shapes the foundations of its security doctrine, leading it to perceive issues such as foreign interventions and internal strife as existential threats.

The Critical School: A tool for critical evaluation that allows you to pose a profound methodological question throughout your research: Does the Algerian security strategy merely reinforce "state and regime security," or does it extend to enshrining "the security of the individual"? This provides a tool for critically evaluating the effectiveness of development and reconciliation

European Schools as a Methodological Framework (Combining Copenhagen, Wales, and Paris):

The Copenhagen School: The fundamental methodological framework for analysing the "securitization process," "how threats are created": "Algeria has undertaken a process of the successful securitization of 'terrorism' in the military sector and 'sedition' in the societal sector has allowed for the exceptional mobilization of resources and the implementation of exceptional policies such as reconciliation. This explains how political and social issues have been transformed into matters of national security.

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The Paris School (Political Sociology of Security): This will be used to highlight the daily "practice" of security by state apparatuses (army, police) at the borders and within the country, as a form of "surveillance" of the turbulent, globalized domestic space

Study division the nature of the study and the need to cover all aspects of the subject necessitated dividing this memorandum into three main, interconnected chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study, addressing fundamental concepts related to security and security strategy, as well as the most important theoretical approaches that explain them. The second chapter examines the reality of internal threats facing Algeria and their repercussions on the national security environment. The third chapter is devoted to studying the external challenges threatening Algerian security, analyzing various regional and international risks and transformations and their impact on Algerian national security.

This concludes with a presentation of the findings and a general conclusion to the study.

Chapter One: The Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of the Study

Chapter One: The Theoretical and Conceptual Framework of the Study

Security strategy is considered one of the most important tools that states rely on to ensure their survival and protect their vital interests in an international environment characterized by complexity, instability, and the multiplicity of threat sources. With the profound transformations that the international system has witnessed, security is no longer simply a military issue; rather, it has become a comprehensive concept that includes political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental dimensions. This change has been reflected in the nature of the security strategies adopted by states, particularly those facing internal challenges and increasing external pressures, such as Algeria. .

Therefore, defining the fundamental concepts related to Security and Security strategy, as well as identifying the theoretical frameworks that influence state behaviour in this area, is of great importance for understanding the foundations of Algeria's Security approach and its mechanisms of adaptation to various threats. Lack of conceptual clarity and a precise theoretical framework can lead to divergent interpretations of Security phenomena and their implications. Therefore, this chapter aims to establish the theoretical and methodological foundation of the study by reviewing the main concepts related to Security, strategy, and threats, in addition to addressing the most prominent approaches and theories in Security studies and international relations, thus allowing for an in-depth analysis of the nature of Algeria's Security strategy and its internal and external determinants.

I.1. The Concept of Security and Its Development

The concept of security is one of the fundamental principles in political science and international relations, as it plays a central role in ensuring the survival of the state, stability and the protection of vital interests. Initially, security was closely linked to the military dimension and the defence of sovereignty. However, transformations in the international system have led to an expansion of this concept to include political, economic, social, human and ecological dimensions.

This section aims to clarify the concept of security and trace its development from the traditional perspective to modern approaches.

I.1.1. Definition of Security

The concept of security is difficult to limit to a single definition, as it is a dynamic concept that evolves according to historical, political and economic contexts, as well as different theoretical perspectives. Defining security requires examining its origins, development and relationship with related concepts, which contributes to building a clear theoretical framework for its study.

I.1.1.1. Linguistic Definition

“Protection of a person, building, organization, or country against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries: The station was closed for two hours because of a security alert.

30 demonstrators were killed in clashes with the security forces over the weekend.

The tighter security measures/precautions include video cameras throughout the city centre.

The students were deported because they posed a threat to national security.

The banks must tighten security against fraud. The most dangerous criminals are held in maximum-security prisons (= prisons that are as difficult as possible to escape from)”.¹

The concept of security refers to a state or condition characterised by stability and reassurance, requiring several dimensions. It signifies freedom from deficiencies and threats, meaning the achievement of modern physical safety, and it indicates the absence of fear and anxiety among individuals. It extends, by definition, to include employment, by guaranteeing against job loss, which is considered a security function.

On the other hand, it denotes ongoing guarantees or pledges and the fulfilment of obligations, such as surety or mortgage. It also refers to investment instruments that prove ownership, such as bonds and shares.

Because it is broad, it refers to comprehensive protection taken against various threats, such as espionage, crime, or other dangers, whether these security measures are collective or organizational. Finally, it is linked to the ability to meet basic needs in

¹ Cambridge dictionary .n.d.. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/n.p> Accessed April26, 2026

a stable manner, such as the necessity of permanent housing, which is considered social or economic security.¹

“The activities involved in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc. national/homeland security (= the defence of a country) airport security officers security against something the bars are to provide security against break-ins. They carried out security checks at the airport. The visit took place amidst tight security (= the use of many police officers). The security forces/services (= the police, army, etc.) A high/maximum security prison (= for dangerous criminals)”²

I.1.1.2 Terminological Definition

From a terminological standpoint, security is the essential condition for the growth and prosperity of social life. It constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for the success of all forms of human activity, whether agricultural, industrial, or economic. Moreover, it is indispensable for preserving the state's existence and ensuring its independence. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, security is defined as "the protection of a nation from the threat of coercion by an external power."

Henry Kissinger defines security as any action through which a society seeks to preserve its right to survive.

Robert McNamara linked security to development, arguing, "Security is development," emphasizing the organic relationship between economic, social, and political development and the provision of protection. He further noted that true security stems from a state's deep understanding of the sources that threaten its capabilities and its ability to confront them in a way that allows for the development of those capabilities in both the present and the future. Researchers have also distinguished between two types of security:

1-Negative security, which refers to the avoidance of threats and dangers, often driven by fear.

¹ Merriam-Webster .n.d.. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/.n.p>, Accessed April 26, 2026

² Oxford learner's Dictionary n.d. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/n.p>, Accessed April 26, 2026.

2-Positive security, which involves proactive efforts to achieve rights, improve living conditions, and secure the future¹.

Security can also be classified into comprehensive.

3- (general) security: which encompasses all aspects of human life, including social, economic, political, cultural, military, and informational dimensions.

4-Specific security: which focuses on the technical and practical aspects of sciences security, such as the protection of individuals, safeguarding information, securing facilities and locations, and ensuring the safety of events and activities.²

“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile... and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life, is one of the difficulties of the concept”³

The concept of security is elusive and open to many different interpretations, One of the broadest and the most abstract definitions is summed up succinctly by Arnold Wolfers: “...security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values ...they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name”⁴

I.1.1.3.The operational definition

Based on the preceding definition, the concept of security, within the framework of this study, refers to an integrated system of policies, strategies, measures, and procedures adopted by the state through its various institutions—security, military, political, economic, and social—to protect individuals and groups, as well as the state's various tangible and intangible components. It also aims to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence in national decision-making, while ensuring political, social, and economic stability. In this context, security also encompasses the

¹HaelAbd al-MawlaTashTosh, *National Security and Elements of State Power under the New World Order*, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Al-Hamid Publishing and Distribution House, Amman, 2005, p. 12

²Muhammad Ghalib Bakzadeh, *Security and Conference Security Management*, Dar Al-Fajr, Cairo, 1990, p. 31.

³Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century” *International Affairs*, 67.3 (1991), pp. 432-433.

⁴ Hiroshi Ohta The Interlinkage of Climate Security and Human Security: The Convergence on Policy Requirements Prepared for Conference on “Climate/Security” At University of Copenhagen Copenhagen, Denmark, 9 March 2009 p 4

state's ability to prevent potential threats and risks, manage them when they occur, and mitigate their negative effects, whether these threats are internal or external, conventional or unconventional, military or non-military. This is achieved through mobilizing available resources and coordinating efforts among various formal and informal actors.

I.1.2. Security threats definition

The concept of security threats is a cornerstone of security studies and international relations, given its close connection to state stability, societal security, and the continuity of institutions. In contemporary thought, security is no longer confined to the traditional military dimension but has expanded to encompass political, economic, social, and technological aspects. Consequently, the nature of threats has evolved, becoming more complex, multidimensional and dynamic

Understanding security threats requires, first, examining their linguistic meaning, and then exploring their conceptual definitions as formulated by researchers within various theoretical and analytical frameworks

I.1.2.1. Linguistic Definition of Threat: The term "threat" in English carries a rich and multifaceted meaning, as evidenced by major reference dictionaries:

Merriam-Webster defines a threat as "An expression of intent to cause harm, injury, or damage; something which, by its nature or relation to another, threatens the safety of a person or group."¹ The Oxford English Dictionary offers a broader definition, stating that a threat is "A statement of intent to cause pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action to someone for the purpose of revenge or intimidation; a person or thing which is likely to cause harm or danger."²

The Cambridge Dictionary emphasizes both the expressive and pre-emptive dimensions of a threat, defining it as "An allusion to something unpleasant or violent, especially an allusion to violence or harm; a person or thing which is likely to cause harm or danger."³ Taken together, these definitions demonstrate that the linguistic

¹ Merriam-Websteropcit. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/n.p>, Accessed April22, 2026.

² Oxford learner'sDictionairesopcit. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/n.p>, Accessed, April22, 2026.

³ Cambridge dictionaryopcitAccessed. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/n.p>, April22, 2026.

meaning of a threat is not limited to a verbal warning, but extends to any situation, action, or entity that involves the potential for harm or damage. It is a danger or serious consequences, or it embodies them. It includes a subjective element (the intention to harm or express it) and an objective dimension (the actual ability to cause harm or the likelihood of it occurring), making it a concept that links language, perception, and reality.

I.1.2.2. Terminological Definitions of Threat

Definition of terms, many scholars have addressed the concept of security threats. These definitions have been diverse and varied due to differences in perspectives and schools of thought to which each researcher belongs, in addition to differences in historical periods as well as contexts through which this perspective has been examined. Below is an introduction to some of the definitions that have addressed this concept:

Richard Ullman's commentary: A threat to national security is an act, series of actions, or events that, in a short period, seriously undermine the quality of life of a nation's citizens, or severely limit policy options by the national government, or private agencies and non-governmental organizations¹

Barry Buzan defines a security threat as any threat to a state's institutions with ideas or material capabilities against another state and that threat can be external or internal².

The Czech researcher Jan Eichler considers threats as the expression of an intention to harm an actor (individual, group or government). He further argues that threats require the presence of the following elements:

It must create a feeling of fear and dread.

It must include the ability to observe, whether directed at the government itself, its citizens, or neighbouring countries. In this case, the threat receives political impact. For example, security instability and threats in Algeria's neighbouring countries - especially Libya - put Algeria in a state of alertness, caution, and preparedness to face potential threats from these regions.

¹Dr.SobhiQansoua et al., *Asymmetric Security Threats and Their Implications for the G5 Sahel Countries*, African Studies Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4, Part C, October 2023, p. 402.

²Barry Buzan. People, states, and fear: agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Reports Maines of International Studies University of Warwick, second edition, 1983, page 75.

Risk level, which refers to the nature of the threat (potential, real, or latent). The more serious the threat, the more rapid and effective a response is required from the threatened.

Terry Diebel views intimidation as an active and effective action by a government to influence the behaviour of another state. For such a threat to be successful, several elements must be present, most notably the credibility, seriousness, and capabilities associated with the risk. He also identifies three main characteristics of a threat: level of risk, probability of harm, and time¹.

I.1.2.3. The Operational definition

Indicates that a security threat refers to any event, activity, or phenomenon that may directly or indirectly affect national security, the stability of state institutions, and the safety of individuals and society. This applies regardless of whether its cause is internal or external, intentional or the result of natural or social conditions. A complex and multidimensional phenomenon require a practical, operational, and strategic understanding to ensure its effective management. Security threats are characterised by their dynamic nature, as their forms and methods change according to political, social, and economic transformations, as well as changes in the regional and international environment. In addition to the traditional military concept of threats, security threats also include non-conventional actions such as cyber-attacks on critical national infrastructure, economic threats resulting from sanctions or economic warfare, and propaganda and media campaigns that undermine trust in state institutions and create confusion among citizens.

In the case of Algeria, examples include terrorist threats against civilians and state institutions during the security crisis of 1992–2004, as well as threats from armed groups and organized crime and their negative impact on political and social stability. These problems are exacerbated by the economic and financial difficulties stemming from fluctuating oil prices and heavy reliance on natural resources. External threats also manifest as persistent pressure from certain regional and international powers, including political interference, influence on economic decisions, and cyber-attacks aimed at disrupting critical information systems. In light of these circumstances, the

¹Jarash Adel, PhD researcher at the Higher School of Political Science, Algeria. Issue No. 1, 2017, of the *Journal of Political Science and Law*, one of the publications of the Arab Democratic Center.n.p

need for national security management to adopt a multidimensional strategy that integrates military deterrence, cyber security, and economic and political measures is paramount. Security threats are assessed based on their potential to disrupt essential state functions, undermine public security and individual well-being, or cause significant economic and social losses. This assessment considers the temporal dimension of threat dynamics, as threats may escalate over time, necessitating proactive and effective prevention and response plans. The assessment includes determining the level of risk, whether immediate—requiring urgent intervention—or long-term, requiring systematic strategies and cooperation among various government sectors, security agencies, and civil society.

We conclude that security encompasses all military, political, economic, social, and technological dimensions, and is not merely the absence of a military threat.

I.1.3. Similar Concepts to Security Threats

There is a reciprocal relationship, when interpreting the concept of security, it is necessary to identify the sources of threat when a "security risk" is perceived. This necessitates measures aimed at achieving security and that are consistent with actual or potential security risks or threats. Accordingly, there are several concepts similar to security threats, including:

A- Danger: Ulrich Beck, in his book "The Danger Society," defines danger as harm that threatens the security of individuals, the environment, and human groups. It is imminent or has already occurred and can be contained if it does not escalate. Beck also believes that dangers have intensified and diversified with technological and scientific development, and the effects of globalization have increased, becoming characterised by their rapid spread from one region to another. There is also a relationship between the concepts of threat and danger. The similarity between the two lies in the fact that each represents a form of insecurity. A danger is considered to have a known source and its timing can be predicted (albeit to a certain extent), while a threat is of unknown source and timing, which complicates the possibility of addressing it¹.

¹Sabah balla, threat of security Political EncyclopediaPublished on 08_09_2019 n.p

B- Challenge: The word "challenge" is linguistically derived from the Arabic word "threat," meaning challenge. In Arabic, it is said, "So-and-so challenged so-and-so about something specific," meaning he challenged him to a contest in that matter. The English equivalent of "challenge" is "Challenge," the German "Herausforderung," and the French "Défi." British English dictionaries indicate several meanings for challenge. It refers to something difficult that must be chosen and requires strength and skill. It is also an invitation to competition and confrontation, such as when someone proposes a duel with another, and so on. It is also defined as: "Problems or difficulties that a state faces that limit or hinder its progress, and constitute an obstacle to achieving its security, stability, and vital interests, both individual and collective. These problems are difficult to avoid or ignore, and may begin or end with the disappearance of the reasons for the challenge, without reaching the level of a threat." A challenge and a threat can also be distinguished by their respective scopes. The form a challenge takes falls within the realm of soft security, while a threat falls within the realm of hard security. The difference between the two lies in the fact that a threat is direct, involving the use of military force or intimidation. A threat has a direct impact on security, while a challenge leads to direct damage to national security in the medium to long term. From this, we can conclude that there are several factors that influence the identification of security threats

I.1.3. Definition of threat

1-Nature of the threat: This refers to its type or its political, economic, social, and military dimensions.

2-Location of the threat: This includes its direction and geographical proximity or distance, whether direct or indirect, and its extent and impact on multiple countries or a specific country.

3- Time of the threat: This refers to its current or future impact, its duration, and whether it is constant or variable.

4- Degree of threat: This refers to its strength and severity.

5- Resource mobilization: This is related to the size, severity, and intensity of the threat. Resources and efforts must be mobilized to mitigate its impact, as Barry Buzan outlined in his sectorial analysis of security threats.¹

I.1.3.1.Types of Security Threats: There are many classifications of security threats. Some classify them according to the source of the threat into internal and external threats, while others classify them according to the type of threat into traditional and non-traditional. The following highlights the types of security threats:

1- Actual Threats: These are actual threats where a state faces the risk of the use of military force or the threat of its use.

2- Potential Threats: These refer to actual reasons that could endanger the security of the state, but, which do not reach the stage of using military force to resolve the conflict.

3- Latent Threats: These are actual reasons for conflict between two or more states, but which are not apparent.

4- Perceived Threats: These are threats that are not apparent.

This classification is considered a traditional classification. Modern classifications of security threats include:

1- Political Threats: Political threats encompass the security of the state, society, and its ideological and institutional structure. This type of threat includes the spread of armed conflicts, whether between or within states, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growth of violence, terrorism, and organized crime.

2- Economic and social threats: The economy is one of the most important foundations for building strong nations and societies. Therefore, any harm to it leads to weakened development and economic growth, widespread poverty and unemployment, and a lack of necessities for a dignified life, such as healthcare, thus contributing to the spread of diseases and epidemics. From a social perspective, there is the issue of illegal immigration and the refugee problem, which can affect national identity and relations between the sending and receiving countries.

¹ Ibid

3- Environmental threats: Environmental problems represent one of the most significant modern threats and vary from country to country due to climate. These threats include desertification, drought, and various types of pollution.

I.1.3.2 The Nature of Security Threats:

1- Symmetrical Security Threats: This term refers to the traditional pattern of threats characterized by their interstate and military nature, and similarity in the actors involved. An example is a military threat between State A and State B, such as the mutual threats of force between North and South Korea. A military threat involves one state mobilizing its forces on the borders of another, deploying its fleet, conducting reconnaissance flights, and employing all forms of military demonstrations intended to instil fear in that state, threatening it with war to force it to submit to its demands.¹

2- Asymmetrical Security Threats

The expansion of the concept of security is a direct result of the emergence of new risks and threats on the international stage, threats that transcend military ones. This represents a shift from traditional to non-traditional threats—in other words, threats with unclear definitions. These threats do not originate from political entities (states) but are of unknown origin. They are known as asymmetric or non-conformist threats, and they occur between actors of unequal power. This type of threat is often a means for the weaker party to compensate for a lack of resources. The weaker party employs various methods and means to exploit the weaknesses of the stronger party. Several features characterize asymmetric threats:

1. they are non-military in nature and witnessed a rise in the post-Cold War era. They primarily threatened industrialized nations, which had largely escaped the threat of traditional (interstate) war.
2. They originate from non-state actors, making it difficult to pinpoint their source.
3. They affect the security of all actors and entities (regions, states, societies, and individuals).
4. They are linked to the South (or originate from the South) after the threat from the East subsided. This leads to the conclusion that the bipolarity of threat persisted after

¹ ibid

the end of the Cold War, but its direction changed. While the Cold War saw an "East/West" dynamic, it subsequently became "North/South."

5. They typically take the form of a danger before becoming a threat. While a threat is usually defined and causes direct harm, a danger, on the other hand, is "vague, ambiguous, immeasurable, and doubtful."

It can be said that the transformations affecting the subject of security have altered the concept of security threats. Threats have shifted from hard military threats targeting states as units of analysis to soft threats affecting the economic, environmental, social, and political sectors. This necessitates finding new ways to address and understand them. Effectively dealing with security threats requires identifying their source, nature, structure, and severity. The approach to addressing security threats varies depending on a state's capabilities and its position within the international system.¹

I.2.Theoretical Approaches to Security:

The concept of security occupies a central place in the fields of political science and international relations. It has witnessed remarkable development over time, driven by changes in the international system and the evolving nature of threats. Security is no longer understood within its narrow, traditional framework, limited to protecting the state from military aggression. Rather, it has become a multidimensional concept encompassing political, economic, social, environmental, and humanitarian aspects. This transformation has contributed to the emergence of a wide spectrum of theoretical approaches seeking to interpret the concept of security and identify its sources or mechanisms, each according to its intellectual foundations and ideological frameworks. These approaches are divided into several categories: traditional schools, such as realism in international relations; modern schools; and critical and contemporary approaches. Based on the objective of this study, we will examine the most important of these theoretical approaches, analyse their intellectual foundations, and evaluate their impact on the concept of security and its applications in the international context.

¹ Ibid

I.2.1 Traditional approaches: Most studies in international politics consider the state to be the most important unit of the political system. States vary in terms of their material, human, cultural, and value-based capabilities. Among these is realism,

I.2.1.1. Traditional Realism Core Principles:

- 1-The international system is anarchic; no central authority (world government) exists.
- 2-The state is the sole actor in international relations, acting rationally and cautiously. National interest is above all else; state security is its essence.
- 3-The pursuit and use of power is the core of security policy; military force is the main instrument.
- 4-The structure of the international system determines state behavior; an imbalance of power leads to war as a corrective tool.
- 5-Distrust between states; each state develops its military capabilities.
- 6-War is inevitable and necessary.
- 7-Peace has a negative meaning (mere absence of war¹).
- 8-The threat is material and objective, countered by developing military.
- 9-capabilities. Security is defined as the state's safety and survival.
- 10-The arms race leads to a "security dilemma" (mutual fear²).

Key Thinkers and Their Ideas: Thucydides: The arms race and increased military power lead other states to feel threatened, igniting wars (e.g., the war between Athens and Sparta). **Niccolò Machiavelli:** Politics takes precedence over morality and religion; the end justifies the means; preserving and strengthening the state is the primary goal because power is the essential guarantee of its survival.

Thomas Hobbes: Humans live in perpetual conflict; security is achieved through an absolute sovereign power resulting from a social contract; wars persist due to the anarchic nature of the international system.³

Carl von Clausewitz: War is a continuation of politics by other means; conflict stems from the clash of interests between states.

¹ibid., p. 26.

² Ali Madouni, *State-Building Claims in Africa and Their Implications for Security and Stability*, PhD Dissertation in Political Science and International Relations, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Mohamed Khider University of Biskra, 2013–2014, p. 60.

³ Ibid., pp. 61–62

Hans Morgenthau: National interest is the essence of politics; state survival depends on power and the balance of power; excludes morality or trust in international organisations; the struggle for power is a constant feature.

Raymond Aron: The balance of power maintains stability; distinguishes between internal power (state governs through violence) and foreign policy (chaos and multiple power centres).¹

Neorealism / Structuralism Core Principles and Qualitative Shift (1979, Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Politics"):

1-Shift from focusing on human nature to focusing on the **structure of the international system** as the primary determinant of state behavior.

2-The international system is anarchic, forcing states into self-help and relentless pursuit of survival.

3-State behavior is not explained by leaders' intentions or internal characteristics, but by the distribution of power in the international system (especially among major powers).

4-Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity due to clarity of power centers and reduced likelihood of miscalculation.

5-Power is not an end but a means to achieve security and ensure survival; it includes multiple dimensions (economic resources, demographic capabilities, political stability).

Fundamental difference from traditional realism:

1-Traditional realism: causes of conflict lie in human nature and the human drive for power.

2-Neorealism: causes of conflict lie in the nature of the international system itself.²

Branches of Neorealism
1. Defensive Realism – Robert Jervis
 1-States seek an appropriate level of power without excess.
 2-Excessive armament leads to a "security dilemma" that destabilises.
 3-States tend to adopt defensive strategies and maintain a balance of power.
 4-Excludes international cooperation or the role of institutions in mitigating conflicts.

¹Ibid., p. 63.

²Dr.SalimCheikhawi, Lecture Notes on Security Theories, previous reference opcit, pp. 53–55.

2. Offensive Realism – John Mearsheimer

- 1-International anarchy and lack of trust drive states to strive for maximum power.
- 2-The ultimate goal is hegemony to ensure security.
- 3-Conflict is the dominant characteristic; cooperation is limited and temporary.
- 4-Possessing the greatest possible power (especially military) is the true guarantee of survival.¹

I.2.1.2. Liberalism Core Principles:

- 1-The state is not the sole actor; there are organisations, institutions, and individuals.
- 2-Security transcends military aspects to include social, cultural, and economic dimensions.
- 3-Focus on the principle of **interdependence**: free transactions and mutual benefit.
- 4-Relies on **democratic peace theory** (emerged in the 1980s): democratic expansion at the international level directly enhances international security.²

Ken Booth: The balance of power has gradually shifted toward economic success rather than military dominance.³

Key Concepts: Collective security: An alternative to the realist approach, based on coordinating efforts among states and actors within "global civil society" to achieve international peace.

Democratic peace (Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 1795) : Democratic states tend to avoid wars with each other and spread democratic values to achieve international stability (republican systems, reducing conflicts, non-interference, rejecting espionage and assassination).**Andrew Moravcsik:** Economic cooperation and trade are less costly and more effective means of achieving interests without war or coercion.

¹Ibid., pp. 56-57-58-59-60-61-62.

²AyoubMansar, "The Evolution of the Concept of Security in International Relations: From National Security to Collective Security to Human Security," Al-Ma'rifa Journal for Studies and Research, no. 3, March 2023, p. 149

³Prof. Halima Haqqani, Concepts and Theories of International Security, academic lecture notes, specialization: International Relations, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, University of Algiers 3, p. 25–26

Institutional Liberalism Core Principles:

1-Achieving international security depends not only on military power but primarily on the role of international institutions in organising cooperation and reducing anarchy.

2-Institutions contribute to: providing information, reducing transaction costs, enhancing credibility of commitments, and encouraging cooperative behaviour.

3-Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Robert Axelrod: The concept of **complex interdependence** – deepening economic and trade relations between states reduces the likelihood of conflicts and promotes peace.

4-Based on: multilateralism, cooperative security (dialogue, transparency, realist diplomacy).

5-Expands security to include economic and environmental dimensions and the role of non-state actors¹.

Structural Liberalism / Democratic Peace Theory Core Principles:

1-The nature of political systems (especially being democratic) is a key factor in achieving international security.

2-Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett (building on Immanuel Kant): Democratic states do not wage war against each other and tend to resolve disputes peacefully through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.

3-Attributed to: commitment to democratic values, respect for human rights, influence of public opinion on decision-makers, and strengthening cross-border economic and cultural relations. 4-This approach does not deny the influence of strategic interests and power, but emphasises that expanding and consolidating democracy internationally contributes significantly to stability and building lasting peace.²

I.2.2.Critical trends, as a result of the shortcomings of interpretive and positivist perspectives that succeeded in providing a comprehensive theoretical framework for the phenomena of international relations, especially the concept of security, have led to the emergence of new trends and approaches that pay great attention to the idea of social construction and focus on the role of culture, values and ideas in international

¹Salim Cheikhawi, Lecture Notes, opcit, pp. 70–71-72

²Saleha Kababi, “Security Studies between the Traditional and Modern Approaches,” Journal of Human Sciences, Faculty of Political Science, University of Constantine 3, Algeria, no. 38, December 2012, p. 238

relations. This has posed a challenge to both the realist and liberal schools. The

I.2.2.1 constructivist approach: Constructivism in international relations is one of the most prominent modern theoretical approaches that has reshaped the understanding of international politics since the late 20th century. Its philosophical and social roots lie in a long intellectual heritage that extends through the works of **Immanuel Kant**, **John Locke**, **Émile Durkheim**, and **Max Weber**, who established the idea that social and political reality is a construct resulting from human interaction and not a fixed given.

Constructivism emerged as an independent trend in international relations during the 1980s and crystallized more clearly after the end of the Cold War through the contributions of a group of its most prominent pioneers, most notably **Nicholas Onoff**, **Alexander Wendt**, and **Friedrich Cartoschuel**. Onoff's book, "**A World of Our Own Creation**" (1989), is considered a foundational work that established the idea that the social and political world is a product of human interactions.

Alexander Wendt, considered the father of constructivism, solidified the theory's position through his famous 1992 article, "**Anarchy Is What States Create**", and his book, "**Social Theory in International Politics**" (1992), in which he emphasized that international structures are socially deliberative, not merely material, and that the identities and interests of states are not It is not predetermined but rather constructed through social interaction. According to this view, constructivism rests on two fundamental premises: first, that the structure of the international system is formed more from shared ideas than material forces, and second, that the identities and interests of actors are socially determined, not natural or fixed. Constructivism also sees the state as the basic unit of analysis, but not the only actor, as it also includes international and non-governmental organizations. It asserts that the structure consists of two elements: a material element, represented by the distribution of power, and a social element, represented by values, norms, and laws.

Constructivism is based on the premise that international politics is not understood solely through material factors, as in realism and liberalism, but also through ideas, identity, culture, discourse, and social norms. These elements play a significant role in shaping the behaviour and interests of states. Wendt provides a telling example of this

through nuclear weapons, explaining that their danger lies not only in their physical existence but also in the social context that determines their meaning. Britain's nuclear weapons are considered less of a threat to **the United States** than **North Korea's** due to the difference in social relations. Constructivism also adopts a critical perspective on rationalist models such as neorealism and neoliberalism, rejecting the "**billiard ball**" conception that neglects the internal dimension of actors, and emphasizing the necessity of analyzing what exists within the state. Ideas and Identities: In this context, identity is a pivotal concept because it defines national interests and guides foreign policy. For example, European identity has led to the integration of European states, and Atlantic identity has brought Britain closer to the United States. Constructivism also views the relationship between individuals and society as interactive and reciprocal, where each influences the other, as **Nicholas Onoff** explained in his concept of a world of our own making. Consequently, national interest is not fixed but will be shaped and changed according to the social and identity-based context. Ideas also play a fundamental role in defining interests. In the constructivist approach to security, developed by researchers such as **Marta Vimont**, **Emmanuel Adler**, and **Barry Buzan**, security is viewed as a social and cognitive construct determined by the perceptions of decision-makers, not solely by material factors. This approach emphasizes that ideas, values, and norms can be more influential than military force, and that security can change with shifts in thinking patterns and identities. The importance of concepts like securitization and the Copenhagen School, which views security as a social process based on interaction and negotiation among actors, is also highlighted. This allows constructivism to offer a deeper explanation of post-Cold War phenomena related to identity and conflict. Interior.¹

I.2.2.2. Critical theory is a developed extension of cognitive thought, linked to the Frankfurt School, which included prominent thinkers such as **Theodor Adorno**, **Marx**, **Horkheimer**, and Herbert Marcuse. It was also influenced by the work of **Jürgen Habermas** and later developed in the field of international relations through the contributions of researchers such as **Andrew LeckieLinklater**, **Robert Cox**, **MarkerHoffmann**, **Kate Kraus**, **Michael Williams**, and **Richard Duane Jones**. This

¹ Salim Cheikhawi, Lecture Notes, opcit, pp83-84-85

fluid theory claims to critique the foundations of traditional theories like realism, arguing that the latter conceals ideological dimensions that promote hegemony. It seeks to uncover these dimensions and build a deeper understanding of international reality based on different epistemological and ontological foundations. Critical theory rests on the premise that security is not an objective given but a social construct formed through discourse and interaction. **Ken Booth**, who argued that security is what we create, emphasized this and that threats vary according to context and identity. It also shares with constructivism, particularly that of **Alexander Wendt**, the idea that social reality is shaped by shared ideas and that identities and the interests of actors are constructed. Socially, however, critical thinkers go further, making the individual, not the state, the primary reference point for security. They advocate for achieving human and global security by focusing on issues such as poverty, the environment, health, and justice. Critical theory rejects neorealist tenets such as anarchy and fixed national interest, considering them social constructs rather than absolute truths. It argues that threats are manufactured through political discourse that reflects the interests of elites and produces a binary opposition, like the bee versus the other. In this context, thinkers like **Marc Hoffman** and **Andrew Linke Leiter** call for building a global ethical system that transcends state-centricity. Critical theory redefines security by linking it to liberating individuals from threats, asserting that the state can sometimes be a source of danger, as Kate Kraus and Michael Williams demonstrate, focusing on non-traditional threats such as poverty and the environment. They consider security changeable because it is a product of social policies and discourses.¹

I.2.2.3. Feminist theory and feminist approaches stormed the academic field of international relations in the late 1980s, at a time when discussions were taking place, or at the beginning of what **Joseph Lebed** called the postmodern era, and most of them were positioned on the postmodern or speculative side of this discussion. Feminist approaches in international relations focus on analysing the status of women in the world and revealing the reasons for their marginalization in a field that, as Jean Pittman points out, is one of the most male-dominated fields, which prompted **Sinita**

¹Ayoub Mansar, "The Evolution of the Concept of Security in International Relations" opcit p152

Enlow to pose her famous question: Where are the women? Feminists seek to broaden the scope of analysis to include concepts such as gender, class, race, and identity, considering gender a social construct that defines roles and relationships, rather than a fixed biological given. **Spike Peterson** and **Martin Griffiths** emphasized this. The feminist project has developed through three stages: exposing male bias in the field, integrating women into the analysis, and finally, reconstructing theory based on the concept of gender as a central analytical tool that reveals bias in concepts such as power and security. Feminist approaches are diverse, most notably liberal feminism, which advocates for equal rights and highlights the role of women; Marxist-socialist feminism, which links the oppression of women to the capitalist system and patriarchal structures; feminism based on the view that women's experiences provide a deeper understanding of global politics; postmodern feminism, which rejects the traditional male-female dichotomy and criticises the dominance of male discourse; and postcolonial feminism, which links the status of women to the legacy of colonialism and global inequality, with **Gayatri Spivak** being one of its most prominent figures. In general, these approaches agree that gender is a fundamental element in understanding international relations and in analysing issues such as security and war. Integrating women's experiences with the pursuit of greater equality and rebuilding international knowledge on a more inclusive and equitable basis is required.¹

I.2.3 European schools:

I.2.3.1 Copenhagen School:

The Constructivist Shift in Security Studies

The Copenhagen School is one of the most significant contributors to non-traditional security studies in the field of international relations. Founded by **Barry Buzan**, **Ole Wæver**, and **Jaap de Wilde**, it redefines the concept of security not as an objective condition, but as a social construction. This shifts the debate from “What is security?” to “How is security enforced?”

The central idea in his theory is the concept of “**securitization**,” the process by which actors, both state and non-state, present particular issues as existential threats

¹Adila Mohamed El-Taher, “The Feminist Approach to International Relations,” Political and Legal Notebooks Journal, University of Algiers, no. 12, January 2018, pp. 201–209.

that require extraordinary measures and justify deviations from normal political processes. Origin and Purpose.

The Copenhagen School emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to the limitations of traditional approaches to security, especially after the end of the Cold War. This approach primarily links security to military strength and state survival.

Instead, the Copenhagen school, drawing on a constructivist perspective, seeks to broaden the concept of security by asking how certain issues constitute security threats. Their seminal work, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998), lays the theoretical foundation, focusing on the political and discursive processes through which threats are constructed.¹

Securitization Theory

Securitization theory is central to the **Copenhagen School's** contribution, challenging the view that threats are objective and fixed. Instead, he sees security as a constructive act, mediated through discourse. A problem becomes a security threat not because of its nature, but because it is presented as such by an actor and accepted by an audience.

Buzan and Weaver identify three main elements of the securitization process: Posing an existential threat².

Take emergency measures to combat this threat.

Improving the adoption of extraordinary measures outside the normal political framework. Thus, the theory highlights the importance of language and discourse in security policy, where discursive framing plays a crucial role in mobilizing support for specific measures. Speech Act Theory and Its Relation to Securitization

The concept of securitization is closely related to the theory of speech acts, which originated in the work of **J. L. Austin** and was further developed by **John Searle**.

A speech act means that uttering a statement is an action. In the context of securitization, declaring an issue a security threat is an act with political consequences. However, this practice is only successful if the target audience accepts it. For example, classifying terrorism, pandemics, or climate change as security threats influences

¹ Madhavigrag Copenhagen School: The Constructivist Shift in Security Studies 8 june 2025n.p

² ibid

resource allocation and justifies the use of extraordinary force. If the public rejects this separation, the securitization process will fail.¹

Politicization vs. Securitization

The Copenhagen School distinguishes between two main concepts:

Politicization: The natural inclusion of issues in public debate and decision-making.

Securitization: Taking issues out of the normal political sphere and placing them in an emergency context reduces democratic oversight and strengthens the power of the executive branch.

The Copenhagen School warned of the dangers of excessive securitization, such as silencing dissent and suppressing civil liberties. Therefore, it advocates de-securitization, meaning the return of issues to the political framework as often as possible.

Sectorial Approach to Security:

One of the most important contributions of the Copenhagen School has been the adoption of a multi-sectorial approach to security, which goes beyond the military dimension to include:

1-Military Sector: State armed defence.

2-Political Sector: The stability and legitimacy of the political system.

3-Economic Sector: Resources, markets, and financial stability.

4-Societal Sector: Identity, culture, language, and religion.

5-Environmental Sector: Threats arising from environmental degradation
this approach allows for a broader and more complex understanding of security threats and their relationships.

The Role of Public and Functional Actors The success of the securitization process depends not only on the actors that pose the threat but also on its public acceptance. Without this recipient, securitization cannot take place. Agents such as the media, NGOs, and civil society also play an important role in shaping discourses and influencing the level of acceptance of these processes.

¹ Ole weaver Securitization and Desecuritization in on security, edited by Ronnie D.lipschutz new York:Columbia university press 1995 p08.09

Civil society needs to be participatory. Therefore, it is better to promote public debate rather than resort to external measures¹

The Regional Dimension of Security:

1 A Comprehensive Approach to Regional Security

The Regional Dimension of Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Security
Traditional security studies have neglected the regional context of security problems. Therefore, analysing security at this level is one of the most important contributions of **Barry Buzan**, who considers the regionalization of security a relational phenomenon. Since security is relational, the national security of any state cannot be understood without understanding the international framework of indivisible interdependence. Professor **William Thompson** defined regional security as comprising three elements: internal and external recognition of a group of states as members of a contiguous region;

The size of this entity, which is determined by the accumulated capabilities of the constituent units

Some perspectives also view regional security as the policy of a group of states belonging to a particular region, which seeks to form a military organization to prevent any foreign power from intervening in that region. Regional security, therefore, seeks to achieve a number of objectives, ranging from defending the constituent units of the region through the development of military capabilities to the voluntary acceptance of integration within this region through a unified will to confront aggression. Accordingly, regional security refers to the security of a group of interconnected states, and the security of any member cannot be achieved outside the regional system. Furthermore, the regional security system is based on regional agreements between a group of states located in the same region and bound by specific ties. Regional security revolves around the security of a group of interconnected states, where the security of any member cannot be achieved outside the regional system.²

To facilitate the analysis of security in a regional context, **Buzan** used the term "regional security complex," which he defined as: "a group of states whose security

¹ ibid

²Mohamed Hamchi, Introduction to European Schools in Critical Security Studies, Algerian Journal of Human Security, No. 6, July 2018, University of Oum El Bouaghi.p352.353

concerns are so closely intertwined that it is practically impossible to consider the security of one state in isolation from the security of another." **Barry Buzan** defined the regional security complex in 1983 as "a group of states whose security concerns are so closely intertwined that their national security situations cannot be considered in isolation from one another." He reaffirmed this definition in the second edition of his book in 1991, focusing on the essential characteristic of this concept: the presence of a high level of threat accompanied by mutual fear among two or more core units.¹ This is a theory of the regional security complex, which primarily addresses the dynamics of the military and political sectors where threats proliferate and expand. Due to the shrinking distances, these threats now extend to global powers, leveraging their immense capabilities that have facilitated their penetration of subsystems, while there are fewer intervening powers at the subsystem level. To analyse regional security, **Buzan** argues that relations between states can establish a broad network of friendships and alliances with those who share a sense of fear. He considers ethnic ideology, historical affiliations, and the balance of power as crucial factors in the friendship/enmity dynamic. Thus, regional security complexes are defined by varying patterns of friendship and enmity among their constituent units. A key factor in defining any security complex remains the level of threat and mutual fear between two or more states. According to, **Buzan, and Weaver**, a regional security complex comprises states or other units that possess a sufficient degree of interdependence to form a cohesive chain that distinguishes it from neighbouring security regions. A key characteristic of regional security clusters is their susceptibility to historical factors, ranging from long-standing animosities to cultural and civilizational convergence. Geographical proximity also plays a pivotal role in fostering security interactions, which manifest themselves across the military, political, social, and environmental sectors.² As **Locke and Morgan** explain, the regional level has become central to security issues in the post-Cold War world, where international interactions are characterised by both conflict and cooperation. Most states manage and define their

¹BoustilaToufik, The Copenhagen School and the Transformation of the Concept of Security toward a New Analytical Framework, Algerian Journal of Security and Development, No. 13, July 2018, University of 8 May 1945 Guelma.p 181

² Barry buzan and ole weaver Regions and Powers The Structure of International Security Cambridge university press 2003 p47

security relationships within a regional, rather than a global, context. From this perspective, regional security revolves around the security of a group of interconnected states, as the security of any member cannot be achieved outside the regional system.¹

I.2.3.2. Paris school: According to **Didier Bigo**, this school of thought focuses its analyses on the institutional level rather than political actors by including the so-called security professional's approach, which considers security as a government technology shared by a set of agencies and institutions. Rather than focusing on speech acts, it emphasizes practices and the changing nature of threats and the appropriate ways to deal with them. This new, evolving nature of threats has led to the interconnectedness and interdependence of many different functions that can play an effective role in security functions, such as gendarmerie, police, customs, intelligence, counterespionage, information technology, surveillance systems, law enforcement activities, etc.

Researcher within the framework of research programs developed by French postmodern philosophers. They introduced a variety of professional techniques, mainly focusing on the functional aspects of the work of security personnel across different state agencies. These techniques enable security personnel to adopt modern and advanced methods to deal with various security threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, illegal immigration, and so on. This approach has been implemented in practice, especially in European Union countries, including France, contributing to enhanced safety and security in these nations. The Paris School changes the prevailing view of security in three ways:

- 1- Instead of analysing security as a concept, the Paris School proposes a Foucaultian (referring to philosopher Michel Foucault) approach to security as a technique of government.
- 2- Instead of considering the intentions behind the use of force, it focuses on the impact of power games.
- 3- Rather than focusing on speech acts, it emphasizes the practices of the masses and the contexts that enable and constrain the development of specific forms of

¹BoustilaToufik, The Copenhagen School and the Transformation of the Concept of Security toward a New Analytical Frameworkop.cit p354

government. The Paris School attempted to link internal security with external security, and its proponents strongly criticize the traditional distinction between them. Didier argued that the field of security is not based solely on the application of force and coercion, but rather on the ability of actors to produce information and data upon which security realities and strategies are built. According to the Paris School, security is not only a subjective reference, but also a technique of government, and this is the ability to perform surveillance¹.

The Concept of Maintaining Public Order

The Parisian school of thought emphasizes lower levels of security (security personnel) and therefore addresses the concept of maintaining public order (police and various security agencies), considering it crucial to achieving and maintaining security regardless of government strategy. Because police are on the front lines directly confronting security threats, they possess more effective field experience and can respond more quickly. The Concept of the Security Boundary The security boundary is a transnational space created by the integration and collaboration of internal and external security agencies. Deeper globalization and increasing cross-border threats make it difficult to separate the internal from the external environment. This necessitates the coordination of security personnel in different countries within the security boundary (international police coordination, intelligence sharing, etc.) and the creation of effective security institutions that transcend national borders (e.g., Interpol or Europol). Didier Bigot argued that the security boundary depends not only on the use of force and coercion but also on the ability of security actors to produce and exchange information—critical information for determining national security strategy.²

The Panopticon Model and the Society of Surveillance according to Michel Foucault, a French thinker... The concept of a surveillance society, applied by those in power, is based on the Panopticon model designed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. This model is an architectural model of a prison, designed so that guards can watch prisoners without the prisoners seeing them (i.e., prisoners are unaware of being

¹Sagur, Hisham, Security: A Conceptual Study in Light of Theoretical Approaches. Journal of Law, Issue 7, 2016, p245.246

²Elotri Ali. (n.d.). Academic handout for second-year Master's students in Political Science – International Relations. Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Dr.MoulayTahar, Saidan.p

watched). This situation allows for the permanent enforcement of discipline based on continuous surveillance (even though in reality, it does not exist). Foucault developed this concept and called it "the study of surveillance," which provides a high level of security while reducing the cost and burden of continuous surveillance (for example, by reducing the number of police officers). Building on Bentham and Foucault's Panopticon concept, the Scottish sociologist David Lyon proposed the concept of surveillance and "electronic eyes," where the state uses technology to install closed-circuit television cameras in cities and public areas to maintain security and monitor behaviour, allowing officials to be ubiquitous without physical presence. The assumption of permanent surveillance -----> Continuous control.¹

I.2.3.3. The Welsh School, also known as the Aberystwyth School, emerged within the British academic tradition of international relations with the establishment of the first Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth in 1919. However, its formation as a distinct intellectual and theoretical current truly began in the 1950s through the British Committee for International Political Theory, where thinkers such as Charles Manning and Martin White contributed to its initial foundations. This was before Roy Jones coined the term "English School" in a 1981 article. The school has passed through four main phases. The first phase (1959-1966) was associated with the establishment of the Committee and the emergence of foundational works such as Butterfield and White's "The Investigation of Diplomacy," which focused on the international system and diplomatic relations. The second phase (1966-1977) was characterised by Martin White's contributions to state systems and the structure of anarchic society, with an emphasis on concepts such as non-intervention. The third phase (1977-1992) saw the school's interests expand to include issues of international society and human rights through the works of figures like Paul Watts and Vinson. The fourth phase, from 1992 to the present, continues to this day. The school of thought underwent restructuring, giving rise to a new generation of researchers within what is known as the New English School²

¹ ibid

² Sabah Balla, "The Welsh School of Security Studies," Al-Mawthouqiya Al-Siyasiya Journal, published 09 December 2022, Op. Cit

The Welsh School of Critical Security Studies, through figures like Ken Booth and Richard Jones, interpreted the concept of security to encompass humanity, not just the state. It viewed non-military threats, such as poverty, environmental degradation, and human rights violations, as more serious than traditional threats because they directly affect humanity and transcend national borders. This approach drew upon the influence of Frankfurt School thinkers like **Jürgen Habermas** and **Max Horkheimer**, as well as **Gramsci's** ideas. This led to the development of a critical approach that broadened and deepened the concept of security, linking it to political and social structures and incorporating multiple actors instead of confining it to the state. This perspective also aimed to politicize security rather than securitize issues, focusing on **Ken Booth** concept of emancipation. This conception sought to liberate individuals from political, economic, and intellectual constraints to achieve justice, freedom, and human well-being as a fundamental goal of security¹

I.3.Security strategy:

Security strategy is a fundamental pillar upon which states rely to confront various threats and dangers affecting their national security and political and social stability. With the complexity of the contemporary security environment and the diversification of threat sources, achieving security is no longer limited to the military dimension alone. Rather, it now requires a comprehensive vision based on strategic planning and the utilization of various political, economic, social, and security capabilities. Based on this, this study aims to define the concept of security strategy and its importance.

I.3.1. The concept of security strategy is fundamental in security studies due to the multiplicity of theoretical approaches and the different perspectives on its definition and objective. Traditionally, security strategy has been associated with the military sphere. However, current international transformations have given rise to a broader concept, making it a general framework for coordinating international policies and procedures to confront various threats. Accordingly, this study seeks to clarify the concept of security strategy and its importance in maintaining state security and stability.

¹Bousti El-Tawfiq, Lectures on the Study of International Security, opcit, p. 337

I.3.1.1. The linguistic definition of strategy: The concept of strategy has evolved and diversified according to its development over time. Therefore, strategy is defined linguistically. The term strategy exists in various European languages, including Greek and Latin. In German, we find *Strategie*; in Russian, *strategiya*; and in Hungarian, *stratégia*. When we say *stratosagein*, it is the same term for strategy, divided into two parts, meaning army. By moving forward and connecting the two ends of the term *stratos* or again, we get *strategos*, which means general. The verb *strategô* means leader or commander, while the adjective derived from it, *strategikos* (plural *strategika*), means the functions and work of a general in the military sense of the word, and it signifies the qualities possessed by a general. Strategy is the art of leading the army, or more broadly, it is the art of leadership.¹

I.3.1.2. The terminology reveals the definition of strategy across different time periods and spatial factors, and its evolution has not remained static.,

The Western school defines it as the art of employing force in battles as a means to gain or achieve the objective of war. For example, it is the broad measures used to move forces to the decisive point under the most favourable conditions and can be called the science of command. For example, it is the art of employing battles as a means to achieve the objective of war.

For example, Raymond Aron defines it as the command and direction of all military operations, while diplomacy is the management of relations with other countries, with strategy and diplomacy being subordinate to policy. As for the American concept of strategy, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff defined it in 1959 as the art and science of using a nation's armed forces to achieve national political objectives using force or the threat of force. In 1969, ten years later, it was redefined as the art of using political, economic, psychological, military, and propaganda forces whenever necessary, in both peace and war, to provide maximum support for international policies in order to increase the possibilities and desired outcomes or to reduce the likelihood of defeat.

André Beaufre: The art of dialogue of wills, which uses force to resolve disputes.²

¹ Salah Niouf, Introduction to Strategic Thought, Arab Open Academy in Denmark, Faculty of Political Science, December, p. 9

² Samira Bast, The Algerian Strategy for Combating Terrorism (1999–2014), Master's Thesis in Political Science and International Relations, specialization: Strategic and Security Studies, University of Algiers, Faculty of

The Eastern School: The correct strategy is one that ensures delaying operations until the enemy's morale collapse allows for a decisive blow to be easily delivered. Mao Zedong: It is the study of the laws of the overall situation of war.¹

The Arab School: The Egyptian school is the highest field in the art of war, studying the nature, planning, preparation, and management of armed conflict. It is a practical, theoretical, and scientific approach that examines the issues of preparing and employing the state's armed forces in war, based on the foundations of military policy.

It also includes the activities of the supreme military command aimed at achieving the strategic objectives of armed conflict to defeat the enemy. The Iraqi school of thought defines strategy as the art of preparing, deploying, and using armed forces, or threatening to use them, within the framework of a comprehensive strategy to achieve policy objectives. It is noteworthy that the term "strategy" has been associated with warfare and the military field since its inception. However, the rapid pace of political, economic, demographic, social, and military changes, as well as technological advancements, has given rise to new issues and threats, including organized crime, international terrorism, environmental problems, and ethnic conflicts.

All of this has necessitated a swift response from all parties to such challenges through the development of a strategy that aligns with the complex and multifaceted nature of these new and escalating phenomena. Consequently, new definitions and concepts of strategy have emerged, tailored to specific circumstances and specialized fields, without neglecting the military sphere. Some define it as a long-term policy for achieving specific goals using the most effective means to accomplish those goals. It is also the science and art of achieving supreme security objectives through the optimal use of available resources, as well as the art of achieving supreme security objectives through the optimal use of political, economic, and social capabilities to address social ills or deviant phenomena².

The concept of strategy is central to political and social studies due to its close connection to the process of guiding individual and collective action towards

Political Science and International Relations, Department of International Relations, April 2014 (1435 AH), p. 23.

¹ Ibid p24

² Ibid p25 or further information, see: Amer Mesbah, Theory of Strategic and Security Analysis of International Relations, Cairo: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Hadith, 1st edition, 2010, p. 19.

achieving specific goals within complex and variable environments. This concept has undergone significant development, no longer limited to the military sphere but extending to political, economic, social, and security fields, thus broadening its scope and implications. Strategy is fundamentally based on identifying the overarching goals that a state or society seeks to achieve, then studying the surrounding reality, analysing available capabilities and resources, evaluating different alternatives, and selecting appropriate methods. It thus represents a rational and conscious process based on scientific analysis and accurate knowledge of reality, while considering the time factor, the potential for change, and uncertainty. Strategy is also closely linked to policy. Policy defines the general goals and overarching directions, while strategy determines the means and methods to achieve those goals. Planning is a subsequent implementation phase that aims to translate strategy into practical, implementable plans and programs by defining procedures, distributing roles, allocating resources, and setting implementation timelines. Therefore, the relationship between policy, strategy, and planning is one of integration and interdependence; none can be separated from the others. An effective strategy is not based on rigidity but requires a high degree of flexibility. The ability to adapt to internal and external changes is crucial. While fundamental goals remain constant, methods and approaches evolve according to the demands of reality. The importance of a gradual approach to achieving objectives, coupled with continuous evaluation and monitoring, is paramount. This allows for correcting errors and overcoming difficulties. Strategic planning acquires particular importance as an organizational tool aimed at directing efforts and resources towards achieving security, stability, and development.

I.3.2. The pillars and elements of security strategy:

A security strategy is based on a set of pillars and elements that determine its effectiveness and ability to achieve its objectives. The success of any security strategy depends on the accuracy of threat diagnosis, the clarity of security objectives, and the integration of the means adopted to confront them. Therefore, this section addresses the most prominent pillars and elements upon which a security strategy is based, focusing on the various tools, actors, and participants involved in its implementation.

These components and requirements can be summarized as the means of employing capabilities to achieve the set objectives in a set of interconnected elements. Foremost among these is the precise definition of the strategic objective to be achieved, whether it is a single objective or an integrated system of sub-objectives that all converge on the main objective, as defined by the general policy that drives the strategy's implementation. Developing a strategy also requires gathering and analysing documented information related to the objective and its various circumstances in order to understand its nature and encompass its various dimensions, thus paving the way for effective confrontation. Furthermore, comprehensive knowledge of the available or necessary resources and capabilities is essential in formulating any strategy. The selection of methods and technologies used must be based on scientific principles to ensure their effectiveness.

Human resources are no less important than material resources, and a well-defined understanding of these is crucial for a sound security strategy. With available human resources and working to qualify and train them to enable them to manage strategic work efficiently, with a clear definition of the responsibilities of decision-makers and implementers, the success of strategic work depends on the presence of human elements capable of acting flexibly and effectively in various circumstances and situations. The strategy also requires a clear vision of the actions and procedures that must be implemented in order to reach the goals and achieve the expected results, in addition to establishing an interactive and integrated relationship between the strategy planners and those responsible for its implementation, which ensures a unified vision and incentives and facilitates the transition from theoretical conception to practical and realistic application. Strategic requirements also include an analysis of the financial budget required for its implementation, including expenses for equipment, compensation, and emergency reserves, as well as the development of a phased time plan that shows the stages of achieving the main goal and the sub-goals. This also means adopting mechanisms for continuous evaluation and follow-up to measure the level of achievement, in addition to field verification of the extent to which the achieved results are consistent with the set goals. These requirements are necessary to move from the theoretical conceptual stage of public policy to the

implementation stages, which in turn depend on a special technique that will be discussed later.¹

Based on the foregoing, and given the preceding definition of strategy and its requirements, it becomes clear that it is essential to understand the conditions that must be met in a peaceful strategy. In this context, **Dr. Ali El-Din Hilal** identifies a set of fundamental principles, most notably:

Clarity of objectives, as an effective strategy cannot be formulated with vague or incoherent goals. Objectives must be characterized by clarity, integration, internal consistency, and non-contradiction. They must also be realistic, achievable, and commensurate with available resources and capabilities, thus enhancing the chances of success. Furthermore, strategies should be based on the specificities of national regulations, rather than simply replicating ready-made models that are not applicable to the local context. Rationality and specialization are also crucial, as the strategy should be based on scientific and rational choices in linking means and objectives, relying on accurate information and statistics. Sustainability is paramount, as the strategy does not address immediate, situational problems but rather represents a long-term guideline. Binding nature is essential; the strategy must be binding on the entities responsible for its implementation, even if it is merely a recommendation, reflecting its seriousness and its issuance by a legally competent authority. Finally, flexibility is necessary, enabling them to adapt to unforeseen changes such as crises, disasters, and wars, while providing suitable alternatives for various eventualities. Therefore, a strategy is not... It is not a binary idea or choice, but rather a systematic approach to thinking that allows for the analysis of reality and changing events, their classification according to importance, and the selection of the most effective means to achieve goals. Each situation has its own strategy that cannot be generalized or applied to other, different contexts.²

¹Fadeldeliou and AtefKleih, Security Strategy: Its Types, Techniques, and Requirements, University of Constantine 2, p. 60

² Ibid p-p-p 60-60-62

I.3.3. Types and Levels of Security Strategy

Security strategy is the intellectual and practical framework that governs how a state utilizes its resources and instruments of power to achieve its national security and protect its vital interests in both peace and war. Security strategies are classified in various ways, depending on the perspective from which they are viewed. They are sometimes classified according to the nature of the strategic action (their types), and other times according to their scope and reach (their levels). This study aims to outline the most prominent types of security strategy and then analyse their progressive levels,

I.3.3.1. Types of Security Strategy:

Security strategies are divided into several main types, according to their objectives and the nature of the relationship with the adversary:

1. Deterrence Strategy

Deterrence strategy is defined as an attempt to influence the calculations of other actors to prevent them from engaging in undesirable behaviour by convincing them that the cost of such behaviour will outweigh any potential gain.¹ This strategy is based on the assumption that decisions are made according to a rational cost-benefit analysis, and that this analysis can be manipulated from the outside by increasing the cost element. The deterrence strategy aims to maintain the status quo and persuade the adversary to continue its current peaceful behaviour.² This strategy emerged particularly during the Cold War as a cornerstone of nuclear relations between the superpowers, and its importance has continued in the post-Cold War era.³

2. Compellence Strategy

Compellence is the strategy opposite to deterrence. While deterrence seeks to prevent a change in the status quo, compelling aims to force the adversary to change its existing behaviour and compel it to take action it would not have done without the

¹ Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence," in *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (London: Routledge, 2009), p83.

Lebow defines deterrence as "an attempt to influence other actors' assessments of their interests, aiming to prevent undesirable behavior by convincing the party considering such behavior that its costs will outweigh any potential gains."

² National Defense College, *Strategic Issues: Desired Effects of National Power* (Abu Dhabi: NDC, 2016), deterrence section.

³Lebow, "Deterrence," opcit 83–84

threat of force.¹ This strategy uses economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to coerce the other party into altering its course. This strategy was evident in the 2022 Ukrainian crisis, where some analyses advocated adopting a comprehensive coercive strategy toward Russia, combining military force and information operations to weaken internal political control²

3. Defensive Strategy

The defensive function is the primary function of military power; it aims to protect the state and its society from external aggression. It is based on two main functions: repelling an attack and minimizing damage should one occur³ Strategic literature has developed the concept of defence to include three sub-strategic patterns: repelling, deterrence by punishment, and assertive disarmament⁴ The defensive strategy is generally easier to achieve than the offensive strategy, as both belligerents can more easily achieve their objectives on the defensive side compared to the offensive side.⁵

4. Offensive Strategy

The offensive strategy is based on initiating the use of force to change the status quo or impose control over the adversary. It adopts three sub-strategic patterns: imposition of control, compellence, and exhaustion.⁶ This strategy requires superiority in resources and capabilities and is often fraught with high risks. Strategic literature emphasizes that the offensive use of military force may simultaneously combine more than one of the six main patterns of force use (defence, deterrence, coercion, demonstration, attack, and other miscellaneous uses).⁷

5. Preventive Strategy

Preventive strategy is based on a proactive logic that seeks to prevent threats before they materialize. It differs from deterrence in that it does not wait until the adversary is in a position to pose an actual threat, but rather takes the initiative to deny them the

¹ Ibid p83.*Lebow compares deterrence with compellence, noting that compellence “uses the same tactics to persuade another party to take an action it would not otherwise have taken.”*

² Frank G. Hoffman, “America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, April 29, 2022.

³ David Jordan et al., *Understanding Modern Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 61–80.

⁴ Stephan Fruehling, “Offense and Defense in Strategy,” *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 5 (2009) p 465

⁵ Ibid p466

⁶ Ibid p 465

⁷ David Jordan et al., *Understanding Modern Warfare*, p61–80.

The authors classify the uses of military force into six categories: defense, deterrence, compellence, demonstration, offense, and miscellaneous uses.

ability to threaten in the first place. The United States explicitly adopted this type of strategy in the 2002 National Security Strategy document, which included various policy tools encompassing diplomacy, deterrence, and pre-emptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction programs.¹

6. Grand Strategy: Its Types and Manifestations

At the level of Grand Strategy, Robert J. I identified seven patterns of strategies that a great power can adopt: Dominion, Global Collective Security, Regional Collective Security, Cooperative Security, Isolationism, Containment, and Selective Engagement. These patterns reflect varying degrees of international commitment and the use of military force, and differ in their views on how to deploy military power to support foreign policy objectives in peace and war.²

I.3.3.2. Levels of Security Strategy

Security strategy operates on multiple levels that differ in scope and the nature of the issues they address. These levels can be examined from two complementary perspectives:

Levels of Analysis

Barry Buzan is considered one of the most prominent theorists who presented a multi-level analytical framework for the concept of security; Security analysis is divided into three main levels: the individual level, the national/state level, and the international level.³ **Buzan**, in collaboration with **Ole Weaver**, added a fourth level, the regional level, which mediates between the state and the international system, through his theory of "regional security complexes."⁴ This level gains importance in the post-Cold War world, where regional patterns of security have become more significant than ever.⁵

Buzan's analysis of levels is coupled with sectorial analysis; he identified five sectors of national security: military, political, economic, social, and environmental.⁶ This

¹Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), p 82–120. Art discusses preventive strategy within the tools available to the United States in the context of the 2002 National Security Strategy.

² Ibid p82–120

³ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* chap. 4. Op cit 70-130

⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* op cit p.1-564

⁵ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, op cit 70-130

⁶ Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, op cit chap. 4.

interrelationship between levels and sectors leads to a comprehensive analytical framework that enables an understanding of contemporary security complexities.

The Hierarchy of Strategy:

Drew and Snow present a clear hierarchical structure of security strategy levels extending from the highest strategic apex to the field-level operational level:¹

1. Grand National Strategy

Located at the apex of the strategic pyramid, this focuses on defining the state's ultimate goals and how to achieve them using all instruments of national power, not limited to military means alone. These instruments include diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools.² It is typically formulated as a "National Security Strategy" document issued by the highest political authority in the state.³

2. Military Strategy Representing the second level of the pyramid, this translates the objectives of the Grand National Strategy into actionable military goals and determines how the armed forces will be used to achieve those goals. Military strategy differs from grand strategy in that it is limited to the military sphere and its instruments, while grand strategy coordinates all instruments of national power.⁴ Military strategy includes essential elements such as nuclear deterrence, naval strategy, and counterinsurgency operations.⁵

3. Operational Strategy

Operational strategy forms the vital link between the strategic and tactical levels in the field. It coordinates all military efforts in the theater of operations to achieve the established military objectives. Operational strategy organizes joint and combined military campaigns and transforms strategic objectives into a coherent series of battles and engagements.⁶

¹ Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1988).

² Drew and Snow, Making Strategy, section on "Grand National Strategy."

³ NikaChitadze, "Geopolitics, National, and Military Strategy," in Handbook of Research on Foreign Policy and National Defense (IGI Global, 2023), p 27–39.

⁴ Drew and Snow, Making Strategy, section on "Military Strategy."opcit

⁵ "Lecture 2 – The Levels of Strategy Flashcards," Brainscape.

⁶ Drew and Snow, Making Strategy, section on "Operational Strategy."opcit

4. The Tactical Level

This is the lowest level of the strategic hierarchy. It deals with how to manage direct engagements on the ground and employ smaller units such as companies and battalions, taking into account the terrain, the skills of the fighters, and their morale.¹

In conclusion, it is clear from the above that security strategy is a complex phenomenon with multiple types depending on the objectives it aims to achieve (deterrence, coercion, defence, offense, prevention). Its levels range from the analytical (individual, national, international, regional) to the executive (grand strategy, military, operational, tactical). Understanding this interplay between types and levels is a fundamental requirement for formulating a comprehensive and effective security strategy.

In conclusion, this chapter has laid the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the study by addressing the evolution of the concept of security, which has transcended its traditional military dimension to encompass broader human, social, and economic dimensions. It has also presented theoretical approaches to security, ranging from realism and liberalism to critical perspectives. Furthermore, these perspectives have been linked to the concept of security strategy as the tool for translating theoretical concepts into policies and implementation plans, thereby ensuring a balanced relationship between objectives and means within a constantly changing and complex security environment. Thus, this chapter has provided the necessary framework upon which the methodological and applied analysis in the following chapter is based.

¹ Lecture 2 – The Levels of Strategy Flashcards,” Brainscape.opcit

Chapter two:

Algeria's Security Strategy in the Face of Internal Threats

Chapter two: Algeria's security strategy facing internal threats

Internal security is a top priority and occupies a central place in Algerian public policy, given the country's historical experience, particularly during the "Black Decade," and the profound shift it brought about in understanding threats and how to address them. Today, internal threats are more complex and multifaceted, no longer limited to traditional military or security dimensions, but extending to political, social, economic, and media dimensions, such as terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, illegal immigration, and cyber threats. In this context, Algeria has worked to develop its security strategy gradually and systematically by restructuring its security apparatus and strengthening its specialized institutional capacities, both in terms of coordination among security agencies and through the proactive use of deterrence rather than relying solely on it.

The state has also adopted a comprehensive approach linking security and development, recognizing that addressing the root causes of internal threats cannot be achieved through security measures alone, but also requires addressing the social and economic dimensions that fuel these threats. The importance of studying Algeria's security strategy in the face of internal threats lies in understanding the nature of the transformation that the national security system has undergone and how it has adapted to regional and international changes, as well as analysing the effectiveness of this strategy in achieving internal stability and maintaining national security. Therefore, this chapter aims to present a conceptual framework for internal threats, then analyse the features of Algeria's security strategy, focusing on its tools and mechanisms, and finally evaluate its effectiveness in confronting current threats.

II.1. Traditional threats to Algerian security

The traditional threats to Algerian security are manifested in the geopolitical challenges, terrorism and organized crime imposed by a turbulent regional environment.

II.1.1. The concept of Traditional threats and their characteristics

Hard threats are among the most prominent issues that have preoccupied security research, given their close connection to state stability and its ability to protect its sovereignty. This threat has remained a powerful presence throughout history, particularly in light of escalating regional and international conflicts and tensions. The importance of this topic lies in the questions it raises about the nature and characteristics of these threats, and the extent of their impact on national security policy. Therefore, this study aims to highlight serious threats and clarify their most important features within the context of a broader understanding of contemporary security transformation.

II.1.1.1. Traditional threats: are among the most prominent security challenges facing nations, due to their direct link to sovereignty and stability. This presentation aims to define them and outline their key characteristics to understand their nature and how to address them.

“The hard threat is the use of military force to impose will and secure interests. The objective of this type of threat is the occupation of territory. The hard threat relies primarily on physical and logistical methods. This threat is characterized by several features, most notably its cowardly behaviour, its attempts to overthrow regimes, its open hostility towards the enemy, its occupation, and its annexation of land. The emergence and historical development of this threat can be traced back to the era of old colonialism, where attempts to impose will, dominance, and secure interests were

made through the use of armies, killing, land occupation and annexation, and the establishment of colonies.”¹

II.1.1.2. Threat characteristics

Certain features that reflect their persistent nature and seriousness to state security characterise traditional Threats. Chief among these is that they rely on the actual use of military force or the threat thereof, which makes them real and easily identifiable. They are also characterised by their source information, often originating from known states or armed actors, which facilitates attribution and assignment of responsibility. Furthermore, they are explicit and direct, seeking to impose will by force through confrontational actions such as war or military intervention, often aiming to control territory or overthrow political regimes. Instead, these threats rely on traditional tools such as the military and weapons, making the means of combating them primarily dependent on a state's military and security capabilities.

Another characteristic is their rapid impact, with immediate and clear effects compared to indirect threats. They are also closely linked to the logics of conflict and power that characterize traditional international relations.

II.1.2. Types of hard threats

II.1.2.1. The Concept of Terrorism:

Terrorism is not a phenomenon of this era; rather, it has been linked to the existence of humankind and human societies, spreading in various forms and manifestations throughout history. However, the organized and widespread practice of terrorism is associated with the rise of the nation-state and is not limited to a specific region or area. Many countries have suffered from it, as terrorism is no longer merely a local phenomenon or one of regional influence, but has transcended these boundaries to become a global phenomenon. The phenomenon of terrorism is shrouded in much ambiguity. As a concept, it raises numerous problems in terms of its definition and control. As a criminal act, it presents difficulties in its legalisation due to the

¹Ali Akbar Ahmadian, *Soft War: A Study of Threat Methods and Means of Confrontation*, QiamCenter for Cultural Studies, 1st ed., Islamic Maaref Network, May 2013.p11

multiplicity of its forms and organizations, its motives and objectives, its causes and dimensions. Consequently, confronting it has become hostage to multiple and varied criminal policies at the levels of criminalisation, punishment, and criminal procedures. This leads to some confusion and ambiguity, creating several problems in dealing with it. Adding to the complexity is the fact that the phenomenon of terrorism has always been susceptible to political manipulation, whether at the level of international relations or at the level of internal interactions within a single state. The use of its concept is often linked to value-based, ideological, and political biases.¹

There are many definitions and numerous attempts by scholars to define the phenomenon of terrorism, which amounts to tens of definitions. However, what we conclude from these definitions is that terrorism is any act or behavior based on the organized use of violence or the threat of it, whatever its motives or purposes, that is carried out in implementation of an individual or collective criminal project and involves terrorizing and intimidating citizens through assassination, torture, kidnapping, detention, causing material and moral damage to society, and endangering public property and national resources. In other words, any behavior is incompatible with legal and constitutional legitimacy.

The phenomenon of terrorism in Algeria cannot be understood as a sudden event or a product of the political moment following the suspension of the electoral process in January 1990. Rather, it is a phenomenon whose roots extend far back, specifically to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Algeria witnessed the birth of the first armed terrorist entity, the Armed Islamic Movement (**MIA**). Its ideological and organizational trajectory laid the foundations for the escalating violence that reached its peak in the 1990s.² Armed violence was a tool chosen by religious political groups from the outset, and not merely a reaction to a political decision. This study traces the evolution of these groups from the initial core established by **Mustafa Bouyali**, through the

¹Lakhdar Moussaoui, Regional Stakes of Algerian National Security, Master's Thesis in Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and Information, Department of Political Science and International Relations, International Relations specialization, University of Algiers 3 (Dely Ibrahim), Academic Year 2009–2010, p54

²Sid Ali Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria: From the First Clandestine Cells to the Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," Algerian Journal of Social and Human Sciences 9, no. 1 (2021) p 1025

successive phases of the Armed Islamic Movement (**MIA**), the Islamic Salvation Front (**FIS**), the Armed Islamic Group (**GIA**), and the Islamic Salvation Army (**AIS**), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (**GSPC**), and finally, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (**AQIM**). **Early Roots (late 1970s – 1982)** The roots of terrorism in Algeria date back to the late 1970s, not to the disruption of the electoral process in 1990.¹ **December 1982: Establishment of the first armed terrorist entity, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), led by Mustafa Ben Habib Bouyali.**² **7–8 November 1982: First major operation: seizure of explosives from the Cap Djinet (Boumerdès) quarry.**³ **Escalation of Operations (1985)** **22 August 1985: Robbery of a national public works company in Ain Naadja** **26–27 August 1985: Attack on the police academy in Soumaâ (Blida), killing a security officer.**⁴ **21 October 1985: Assassination of 4 gendarmes in the Larbaâ region (Blida Province)**⁴ **End of the First Phase (1987)** **3 February 1987: Mustafa Bouyali killed by security forces.** **1989: Presidential amnesty (after constitutional amendments following the October 1988 events) allowed some former MIA members to reappear in new formations**⁵ **Founding of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (1989–1991)** **7 March 1989: Establishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as a political party by: Abbas Madani, Ali Belhadj, Sahnoun, Ben Azzouz, Fakih, Merani, Imam Abdelbaqi.**⁶

The party was an umbrella for multiple currents, dominated by the hardliner **Ali Belhadj**.⁷ **Impact of Afghan Returnees (1979–1989)** Returnees from the "Afghan

¹ Luis Martinez, "Security in Algeria and Libya after September 11," Euromesco Papers, no. 22 (May 2003) p 1

² Ibid p 1031

³ Lakhdar Moussaoui, Regional Stakes of Algerian National Security (Master's thesis, University of Algiers 1, 2013) Op. Cit, p 57.

⁴ Ibid, p 57

⁵ Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria" op cit p1033

⁶ Houssam Hamza, "Algeria and Security Threats in the Sahel: Perceptions and Mechanisms of Response," Arab Policies, no. 21 (July 2016) p 79.

⁷ Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria," op cit p1035. Its founder, Abbas al-Madani, defined it as follows: "It is a front because it confronts challenges and because it possesses a broad spirit encompassing actions and fields. It is the front of the Algerian people in all its categories and across its vast territory, open to trends and ideas that achieve cohesive unity through the richness of diversity. It is a unity of shared destiny, and it is Islamic in name because it has an Islamic content, an Islamic methodology, and an Islamic historical function. Islam is the goal we adopt as a model for expression and reform, and from it we draw the reason for our existence. As for salvation, it is represented in the missionary function as the salvation of faith, a salvation that leads to the straight path and prevents misguidance, as well as in its historical, economic, social, cultural, and civilizational functions. It is salvation for all."

Jihad" brought combat experience and extremist ideology, forming the nucleus of later armed groups.¹

The **Arabisation** policy under President **Houari Boumediene** helped create fertile ground for the spread of Islamist discourse, coinciding with an influx of Egyptian teachers influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.²**Peak of the Crisis: Disruption of the Electoral Process (1992)****December 1991:** FIS wins the first round of legislative elections.³**11 January 1992:** Army (High Security Council) decision to suspend the electoral process and force President **Chadli Bendjedid** to resign, considered by armed groups as a "declaration of war".⁴**Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (1992–2002)****October 1992:** Founding of the **Armed Islamic Group (GIA)** led by **Abdelhak Ayada (Abu Adlane)**.⁵**Doctrine of takfir:** Targeting all segments of society (women, children, elderly); slogan: "No dialogue, no truce, no peace".⁶

Key leaders:**Djamel Zitouni (1994–1996):** Accused of the massacre of the seven monks of Tibhirine Monastery.⁷**Antar Zouabri (1996–2002):** The most ruthless, witnessed massacres in **Beni Messous, Bentalha, Rais**. 1997 alone: 554 terrorist attacks and 6,443 victims.⁸**Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) (1994)** 1994: Establishment of the **Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)** as the military wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).⁹**Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (1998)** 1998: Split of the **Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)** from the GIA led by **Hassan Hattab (Abu Hamza)**, rejecting the targeting of civilians and focusing attacks only on symbols of the state and security.¹⁰**National Reconciliation Phase (1999–2006)**

¹ Luis Martinez, "Security in Algeria and Libya after September 11," Euromesco Papers, no. 22 (May 2003) p 1

² Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria" op cit p 1028

³ Samir Katt, The African Dimension in Algerian National Security and Defense Policy (PhD diss., Mohamed Khider University – Biskra, 2017), 87

⁴ Ibid p 88

⁵ Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria" op cit p 1038

⁶ Ibid p 1038

⁷ Ibid p 1040

⁸ Ibid p 1041

⁹ Katt, The African Dimension, op cit p 90.

¹⁰ Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria" op cit p 1040

April 1999: Election of President **AbdelazizBouteflika**.¹³ July 1999: Civil Concord Law.¹

29 September 2005: Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which ended the conflict with the AIS, but the GSPC rejected reconciliation.²Birth of **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)** (2006–2007)September 2006: GSPC pledges allegiance to al-Qaeda.³Transformed into "**Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**" led by **Abdelmalek Droukdal (Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud)**, becoming a regional branch of an international organisation stretching from Algeria to Mali, Niger, and Mauritania.⁴Major Operations (2003–2013)

2003: Kidnapping of 32 European tourists in the Algerian Sahara (**Djanet/Illizi** operation) for a ransom of millions of euros.⁵19 August 2008: Car bomb attack on the gendarmerie school in **Isser (Boumerdès)**, killing 43 people.⁶17 June 2009: Ambush in **Mansoura (BordjBouArreridj)** targeting a security convoy, killing 24 military personnel.⁷30 June 2010: Attack on the Mali-Algeria border in **Tinzaouatine**, killing 11 gendarmes.⁸5 April 2012: Kidnapping of 7 Algerian diplomats (including the Consul General) in **Gao**, northern Mali.⁹29 June 2012: Suicide car bombing at the National Gendarmerie headquarters in **Ouargla**, killing 2 and injuring 3.¹⁰**The In Amenas Incident (January 2013)** – Unprecedented Security Earthquake**16** January 2013: An AQIM battalion led by **MokhtarBelmokhtar** carried out a complex operation at the **In Amenas (Tiguentourine)** gas field in southeastern Algeria.¹¹32 armed men crossed from Libya and seized the gas complex, holding

¹ Samira Baset, *The Algerian Strategy for Combating Terrorism* opcit,p 135.

²Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Alegriaopcit ,p 1045.

³Mustafa MeriniBorder Areas Management Strategy under New Security Threats: The Case of Algeria. Master's thesis, University of ZianeAchourDjelfa, 2021–2022. p 67.

⁴martinez, "Security in Algeria and Libya,"opcit p 2.

⁵Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria,"opcit p 1046

⁶ Ibid p1046

⁷hamza, "Algeria and Security Threats in the Sahel,opcitp 85.

⁸ Ibid p 86

⁹Hamiti, "Islamist Terrorism in Algeria,"opcit p1047

¹⁰Baset, *The Algerian Strategy for Combating Terrorism*,opcit p 136

¹¹EzzeddineNmiri, "Implications of the Tiguentourine Incident on National Security (A Study of Mechanisms and Stakes)," *Journal of Legal and Political Research* 7, no. 1 (2022)p39.

hundreds of workers (including about 130 foreigners).¹Algerian special forces intervened for 4 days; over 40 hostages were killed.²**Shift to Ransom Economy and Organised Crime**Groups adopted kidnapping of foreigners for millions of euros in ransoms, along with bank robberies and drug trafficking, making them less dependent on donations and more independent and resilient.

II.1.2.2. Organized crime is a criminal phenomenon perpetrated by groups that primarily use violence for their criminal activities and aim for profit.

They may operate within a country's territory or carry out criminal activities outside their territory, or have connections with similar organizations in other countries.

A-The United Nations definition:

“Article 2. Use of terms For the purposes of this Convention: (a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;”³

B-Money laundering, according to Article 2 of Law 05/01, is defined as any transfer or movement of property, with the perpetrator's knowledge that it is proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit source of those assets in order to evade the legal consequences of their actions. Legal scholars have identified three major stages in the money laundering process, which can occur separately or simultaneously: investment, concealment, and integration.⁴

C- Arms smuggling and trafficking The Sahel region has become a pivotal area for transnational organized crime. Political conflicts in the region's countries, power struggles, and state weakness have transformed the region into a major hub for

¹ Ibid p 39

²Ibid p40

³ United nation CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO Annex I Article 02 page 05

⁴ Ben Ahmed, Abdelmoneim, Transnational Organized Crime and Its Applications to Crimes in Algerian Legislation, Journal of Law and Human Sciences, University of Djelfa, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 15, 2012pqge 345.

smuggling, which in turn facilitates arms operations. Sometimes, networks control these arms smuggling operations, as evidenced by the case of **Barhous Mohamed El Hadj "Bettou,"** a notorious arms dealer who controlled the arms trade in the Algerian Sahara, smuggling weapons from Sahel countries across the southern borders.

The escalation of the conflict in northern Mali has contributed to the volume of arms trade and its flow into the region. This is a consequence of the conflict in Libya, where the Libyan regime opened its arms depots, leading to looting, stockpiling, and subsequent smuggling across borders by criminal or terrorist organizations into the Sahel. The quantity of weapons circulating in the Sahel region exceeds 80 million pieces. The smuggling routes include:

- from Niger to Mali and then Algeria, or directly from Niger to Libya and Algeria.

- From the Horn of Africa towards Chad, and from Chad towards other countries in North Africa.

- More recently, following the Libyan crisis, the smuggling routes have shifted from Libya towards the Sahel countries and then eastward and southward towards Algeria.¹

“The crime of human trafficking is defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of one or more persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position, exploitation of a position of vulnerability, or by giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation includes, in particular, the exploitation of prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, or the exploitation of others in forced labour, slavery, and practices similar to slavery, servitude, or organ removal. The giving or receiving of payments or benefits for the sale, transfer, or acquisition of a child for any purpose or in any form is also considered human trafficking.”²

¹Merini, Mostafa, Border Areas Management Strategy under New SecurityThreatsopcit p32

²AamerJawhar, “Procedural Provisions of the Crime of Human Trafficking in Light of Law 23-04,” Journal ofLegal and Social Sciences, University of ZianeAchour of Djelfa (Algeria), vol. 8, no. 3 (September 2023),page273

D-Drug trafficking is one of the most serious threats facing Algeria, given its direct impact on national security and social stability. This is reflected in the large quantities of drugs seized annually, indicating the expansion of smuggling networks, particularly along the Algerian-Moroccan border, a major transit point, especially considering Morocco's status as one of the world's largest producers of cannabis. Security reports also indicate a significant increase in smuggling activity, with geographical variations in its spread within the country. This reflects the nature of the routes employed by these networks, in addition to the exploitation of certain border regions, particularly in the south, as transit points for drugs within transnational organized crime networks heading towards Europe. The danger of this phenomenon is not limited to security concerns alone; it extends to economic and financial dimensions, as drug trafficking is linked to other illicit activities, most notably money laundering and the reinvestment of proceeds to support illegal activities¹.

In parallel, there is a worrying rise in drug use within Algerian society, particularly among young people, leading to serious social consequences such as a surge in addiction-related crimes like theft, murder, and kidnapping, thus deepening the threat to public safety. Furthermore, the enormous profits from this trade have become a significant source of funding for criminal networks, including some terrorist groups; further complicating security challenges and reinforcing the link between organized crime and regional security threats².

II.1.3 The Impact of Armed Threats on Algerian Internal Security

Due to its geostrategic location at the heart of the Maghreb, region and its vast land borders exceeding 6,700 kilometres, Algeria faces unprecedented security challenges ranging from terrorism and transnational organized crime to arms and drug trafficking and money laundering. These criminal phenomena are no longer limited to threatening national sovereignty or border security; they have transformed into multidimensional crises that are eroding the very fabric of society and the state.

¹Houssam Hamza, "Algeria and the Security Threats in the Sahel: Perceptions and Mechanisms of Response," Arab Policies Journal, no. 21 (July 2016)

²Merini, Mostafa, Border Areas Management Strategy under New Security Threats, opcit p32

Security Aspect Security repercussions

1. **Arms smuggling** resulting from the security chaos in Libya and the proliferation of weapons there, leading to a flow of arms into the Sahel and Sahara regions, creating a security vacuum exploited by terrorist groups and smuggling networks, threatening the safety of citizens and limiting the state's ability to provide basic services.¹
2. **Drug speed:**

A-General Directorate of National Security statistics for 2024: 141,356 drug-related cases processed, involving 157,744 individuals.²

B-National Gendarmerie statistics for 2024: 15,516 acts related to drugs and psychotropic substances recorded, a 25% increase from the previous year.³

C-Algeria's transformation from a transit country to a consumer country.

D-Unofficial estimates: over one million drug users, most of them youth.

E-Alarming rise in deaths due to drug overdoses.⁴

3. **Social repercussions** A-Family disintegration (increased divorce, children running away, domestic violence).⁵

B-Increased crime (theft, assault to finance addiction).

C-Spread of mental and physical illnesses (depression, psychosis, liver disease, heart disease).

D-Disengagement from education and work, increased dropout rates and unemployment, and drift towards organized crime networks.⁶

¹ Hakim Ghrib, "Organized Crime and Its Repercussions on Algerian National Security," *Al-Haqiqa Journal for Social and Human Sciences* 17, no. 4 (December 2018): 1, 4–5.

² General Directorate of National Security (Algeria), *Statistics of Processed Cases 2024* (Algiers: General Directorate of National Security, 2025), cited in reliable media reports.

³ National Gendarmerie Command (Algeria), *Annual Report 2024* (Algiers: Ministry of National Defense, 2025), cited in reliable media reports.

⁴ *Illegal Weapons... A Dilemma Deepening the Libyan Crisis*, Asharq Al-Awsat, October 28, 2025.

⁵ "Algeria: Alarming Rise in Deaths Due to Drug Overdoses," Asharq Al-Awsat, December 4, 2025.

⁶ SouadNahija, "The Repercussions of Drug and Arms Trafficking on Algerian National Security," *Strategic Studies and Political Research* 2, no. 1 (2023): 92, 98.

4. **Economic Aspect Economic Threats (ranked in descending order) Money**

laundering crime, which led to Algeria being placed on the FATF "GreyList" in October 2024 due to "deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing system," resulting in¹:

A-Complicated international financial transactions: Increased scrutiny from international correspondent banks, raising costs and slowing transfers.

B-Reluctance of foreign direct investment: International investors avoid countries on grey lists due to legal and reputational risks.

C-Higher borrowing costs: Algeria may have to pay higher interest rates to borrow from international markets.

2. Domestic repercussions of money laundering (distortion of the national

economy): A-Increased administrative and financial corruption: Illicit funds used to bribe public officials and obtain public contracts illegally. B-Devaluation of the national currency: Capital flight pressures the Algerian dinar, increases demand for hard currency, and accelerates inflation. C-Unfair competition: Shell companies linked to money laundering networks offer unreasonably low prices, eliminating legitimate small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).²

Economic and Legal Measures Issuance of new legal frameworks to combat money laundering and terrorist financing:

A-Executive Decree No. 25-101 of March 12, 2025, concerning procedures for freezing and/or seizing funds and assets linked to money laundering and terrorist financing offences.

¹ Financial Action Task Force (FATF), "Statement on Algeria's Classification on the Grey List" (October 2024).

² Fares Ahmed, "The Risks of Money Laundering on Algerian Economic Security," Algerian Journal of Political Economy 1, no. 1 (2019): 34–36.

Establishment of a national Financial intelligence unit : National Financial Information Processing Authority (CENTIF), to receive and analyses declarations regarding money-laundering operations.¹

Security Measures

1-The Algerian armed forces are working to secure the vast eastern borders in light of the flow of weapons from Libya.²

2-Countering asymmetric threats (difficult to predict) with complex strategies.³

II.2. Unarmed Threats

II.2.1. The Soft Threatdefinition:

A soft threat is defined as the use of soft power tools to influence the values, beliefs, and cultural structures of the targeted society in order to impose will and achieve interests. This type of threat focuses on changing national identity and distorting the image of the political system in the minds of individuals. The soft threat relies on indirect means that are gradual, imperceptible, and extractive, and encompass multiple fields such as culture, media, politics, and society. Its emergence is linked to the era of globalization and post-colonialism, where hegemony is exercised through symbolic and intellectual influence rather than military control. Its consequences include the reshaping of values and norms within society, and changes in patterns of thought and behaviour, which, in the end, may lead to a weakening of national loyalty or even to instances of civil disobedience.⁴

II.2.1.1. Characteristics of the Soft Threat:

Relies on soft power (culture, media, and values).Its impact is indirect, gradual, and imperceptible.Targets values, beliefs, and national identity.Seeks to distort the image

¹ Official Gazette of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, "Executive Decree No. 25-101 on Procedures for Freezing and/or Seizing Funds and Assets," no. 23 (March 12, 2025).

² Illegal Weapons... A Dilemma Deepening the Libyan Crisis," Asharq Al-Awsat, October 28, 2025.

³ Hakim Ghrib, "Organized Crime and Its Repercussions on Algerian National Security," Al-Haqiqa Journal for Social and Human Sciences 17, no. 4 (December 2018), Op. Cit, P1, 4-5.

⁴Ibidp 12-13

of the political system. Encompasses multiple domains (cultural, social, and political). Is linked to globalization and post-colonialism. Focus on long-term influence. Targets both individuals and elites. May lead to behavioural changes, even civil disobedience.

II.2.2. Types of soft threat:

The 1990s in Algeria marked a foundational moment in shaping the state's security doctrine, not only because of the armed confrontation with terrorist groups, but also because this period revealed the nature of modern threats, which were no longer limited to military factors. These threats had become complex and interconnected, rooted in the social, economic, and environmental fabric, and fuelled by regional and international interactions.

II.2.2.1. Illegal migration from the Sahel to Algeria:

Illegal migration is no longer merely a humanitarian or economic issue. The flow of illegal migrants from the Sahel countries (**Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad**, etc.) to Algeria has gradually transformed from a simple, transient human flow into a complex and persistent security threat. Since the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 and the proliferation of armed groups in the Sahel region, Algeria has become both a destination for stability and a transit point.¹ This has exacerbated the security challenges that began in the 1990s, but which have evolved and become more complex, now encompassing demographic, economic, social, and terrorist dimensions that threaten national sovereignty and internal stability. In the 1990s, migration from the Sahel to Algeria was not on the scale we see today, but it had begun to emerge with the partial disintegration of the Malian state following the **Tuareg** rebellion (1990-1995) and with the influx of refugees fleeing the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thousands of migrants entered Algeria across its vast desert borders (more

¹ Ali Bensaâd, "Le Sahara et les migrations transsahariennes," in *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve des migrations*, ed. Ali Bensaâd (Aix-en-Provence: IREMAM, 2009), 45

than 800 km with Mali and Niger), seeking work in the construction and agriculture sectors in the south, or with the aim of crossing to Europe.¹

During that period, the Algerian authorities treated the phenomenon primarily as a humanitarian and economic issue, as they were preoccupied with the Black Decade. However, its connection to crime soon became apparent: the smuggling networks that transported weapons and fuel across the Sahara began transporting people as well, a fact confirmed by early reports on organized crime in the Sahel.² Thus, the 1990s sowed the first seeds of a threat that would later escalate.

The Transformation into an Existing Security Threat (2000-2011) with the beginning of the millennium and especially with the influx of migrants from West Africa fleeing poverty and conflict, Algeria became a destination for them. Cities like **Tamanrasset**, **In Guezzam**, and **Ghardaia** began hosting large communities from **Mali** and **Niger**, creating pressure on local services (health, housing, education) and sparking social tensions with local residents who felt they were competing for already scarce job opportunities.³

From a security standpoint, terrorist cells (such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, and later al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) began exploiting the same smuggling routes, blurring the lines between illegal immigration, kidnapping for ransom, and drug trafficking. Researchers, who have noted that «illegal immigrants» sometimes become human shields or conduits for explosives, have confirmed this.

The Security Crisis After 2011: Migration as a Fuel for Terrorism and Organized Crime The fall of the **Gaddafi** regime in 2011 marked a dangerous turning point, as it opened the floodgates of Libyan arms depots, and weapons poured into the Sahel region, bolstering the capabilities of armed groups.⁵ Since then, human trafficking networks have become more organized and violent, and are used by groups such as the

¹IBID46

²AbdelkaderAhmadi, Transnational Organized Crime in the Sahel Region (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2012), , <https://www.caus.org/eb/ar/book>, accessed April 27, 2026.

³ Hayat Belkacemi, "Irregular Migration of Algerian Youth: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Social Sciences, University of Oran, no. 20 (2018), p120

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara to finance their operations. In some cases, desperate migrants are forcibly recruited into these groups.¹

Algeria has also transformed from a transit country to a partial destination country, with thousands of undocumented migrants settling in cities in the south and centre, posing unprecedented socio-economic challenges: the proliferation of the black market, child labour, and human trafficking. A 2020 United Nations report described the Sahel-Sahara region as a “mixed migration highway” (economic migrants, refugees, and fighters).²

II.2.2.2. Protest Movements: Between Identity and Sovereignty

Both the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (**MAK**) and the Islamist **Rachad** movement represent two examples of threats that arose from internal problems but quickly became linked to external agendas that threatened national sovereignty.

A. The MAK Movement: From Cultural Demands to Separatist Struggle

The MAK terrorist movement the roots of the struggle trace back to the Berber movement, which emerged in the 1980s demanding recognition of the Berber language and culture. Its most prominent manifestation was the "Berber Spring" of April 1980. However, the movement underwent a radical transformation, particularly after the outbreak of the "Black Spring" in April 2001, which resulted in the killing of the young **Massinissa Guermah** by the National Gendarmerie. This assassination sparked a shift from peaceful cultural demands to a radical political discourse. This trend culminated on June 30, 2001, with the founding of the "Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia" (**MAK**), led by **Ferhat Mehenni**, with its headquarters in Paris³The movement exploited the popular unrest in Kabylia, supported by media outlets and the political rhetoric of external pressure groups, to raise the banner of "self-

¹ Mohamed ChafikSahraoui et al., “The Phenomenon of Irregular Migration in Algeria: Causes and Effects,” Journal of Human Sciences, University of Adrar, 2018, p150.

² International Organization for Migration (IOM), Mixed Migration in the Sahel and Sahara Region (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2019), NO PAGE

³RabahLounissi, “The Movement for Self-Determination of Kabylia: Emergence and Discourse,” Journal of Research and StudiesNO PAGE

determination" and demand full independence in 2010—an unprecedented step in the history of modern Algeria. The movement officially adopted the option of independence and changed its name in October 2013 to the "Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia." The Algerian state considered this a departure from the national consensus and a violation of its territorial integrity. The Algerian National Security Council classified the movement as a "terrorist organization" in 2021, accusing it of being behind the devastating forest fires that swept through the Kabylie region in the summer of 2021.¹

B-The Rachad Movement: Opposition through the Gateway of Religion

The emergence of the Rachadterrorist Movement abroad in the aftermath of the cancellation of the electoral process (1992), it was founded in April 2007 and brought together former Islamists who were close to the Islamic Salvation Front, and opposition academic figures. Among them are **Mourad Dhina, Mohamed Larbi Zitout, Mohamed Samraoui, Abbas Aroua, and Rachid Mesli**. One of the movement's most prominent founders (its general coordinator) is **Mourad Dhina**, a former leader in the Islamic Salvation Front (**FIS**), who was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison. The movement states on its website that it "seeks to contribute to a radical change in Algeria, to break with the political practices that have prevailed since independence and to liberate the Algerian people from all forms of tutelage. A democratic movement prohibits all forms of extremism, exclusion, and discrimination, and adopts a non-violent approach to bringing about change. The movement's charter defines its values and principles." Through its targeted media and its discourse that blends religion and politics, the movement has managed to penetrate segments of the youth population, calling for the "overthrow of the regime" under the guise of reform. This penetration has worried Algerian security decision-makers, not only because the movement has been classified as a "terrorist organization," but also because it

¹“What Do We Know About MAK and Rachad Movements?” BBC News Arabic, August 19, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-58269903>, accessed April 26, 2026

represents a model of the "soft threat" emanating from cyberspace and social media networks. It made it difficult to contain it using traditional means.¹

II.2.2.2.1. The Political Vacuum: A Crisis of Legitimacy and the Birth of Violence

The decision to cancel the second round of the legislative elections in January 1992, followed by the resignation of **President Chadli Bendjedid** and the dissolution of the National People's Assembly, created an unprecedented political and constitutional vacuum. This vacuum was not merely a procedural crisis, but rather a collapse of the social contract established after the October 1988 uprising. This political vacuum was not limited to the institutional sphere; it extended to a "security vacuum" exploited by armed groups to expand into rural and urban areas, and a "vacuum of trust" between the state and society, as a large segment of Algerians considered the regime to have lost its legitimacy.

On the one hand, a large segment of Algerians who had voted for the Islamic Salvation Front felt that their democratic choice had been usurped, paving the way for the recruitment of thousands into the ranks of armed groups, which transformed from small factions into miniature armies by 1994.² On hand, the absence of legitimate institutions created a state of "political the other nihilism" where violence became the only language understood, while the scope for negotiated solutions shrank. This situation was exploited by external powers, some operating under the guise of "mediation" and others supporting specific factions, further complicating the security landscape. In this context, ordinary social and economic problems became fuel for the crisis. The absence of a political horizon facilitated the recruitment of disillusioned youth into armed groups and opened the door to multiple foreign interventions under the pretext of "human rights" or "combating terrorism," forcing Algerian security strategy to operate in a highly hostile and complex environment.³

¹Ibid.

²LahouariAddi, "The Army and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Algeria," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, nos. 89–90 (2000):PAGE 67–86, <https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.678>, accessed April 27, 2026.

³Ibid p 75-78

II.2.2.2.2. Economic, environmental, and social threats as major issues to national security

Economic, environmental, and social threats as a threat to national security: The aforementioned threats cannot be separated from their economic, environmental, and social context. Economically, the Algerian economy suffers from excessive dependence on hydrocarbons and remains hostage to them. With the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the country entered a severe financial crisis, exacerbated by the structural adjustment program imposed by the International Monetary Fund (1994).¹ This program led to the dismissal of hundreds of thousands of workers, the removal of subsidies on basic commodities, and a freeze on hiring, rendering the economy incapable of creating sufficient job opportunities. The collapse of oil prices (2014-2020) further aggravated the crisis, as the government resorted to austerity policies that intensified public discontent. This economic shock transformed unemployment into a mass phenomenon, making "economic exclusion" the primary driver of both armed insurgency and illegal immigration. Young people were no longer seeking "political change" as much as they wanted "a chance at a life," which rendered any security strategy inadequate unless accompanied by radical economic solutions².

Unemployment and poverty in the Sahel region (where unemployment exceeds 25% in **Mali** and **Niger**) continue to drive young people toward the "dream of the North." However, Algeria, which also suffers from youth unemployment (11.8% in 2023 according to the National Statistics Office), finds itself unable to absorb these newcomers. This fuels populist, xenophobic rhetoric and creates tension in the southern neighbourhoods.³ On March 14, 2013, thousands of unemployed young people staged a massive sit-in in the city of **Ouargla**, called for by the "National Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Unemployed," demanding an end to

¹AbdelmDJidBouzidi, *Rentier Economy in Algeria* (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies), p

²Mohamed ChafikSahraoui et al., "The Phenomenon of Irregular Migration in Algeria: Causes and Effects," *Journal of Human Sciences*, University of Adrar, 2018n.p

³Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "The Protest Movement of the Unemployed in Southern Algeria," Situation Assessment, 2013, <https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Document-85A01B41N>, accessed April 27, 2026.

marginalization policies and the right to work in the oil companies that extract their region's wealth while they live in deprivation.

These protests quickly escalated into violent clashes with security forces, who used tear gas, resulting in the death of a young man from asphyxiation.⁵ These events revealed the depth of the social crisis in southern Algeria, where youth unemployment has reached record levels (21.5% for those under 35), creating a "ticking time bomb" that threatens social stability and fuels currents of protest and despair. Furthermore, the Algerian middle class, once the backbone of stability, has collapsed under the weight of inflation and declining purchasing power. This has affected the value system, with a "reinter economy" and a "black market culture" (trafficking) replacing productive work. This social disintegration has generated a sense of "not belonging," especially among young people who find themselves caught between a father who has lost his job and a state incapable of providing basic services, making them vulnerable to recruitment by protest or religious movements.¹

Security threats cannot be separated from the structural crises that have plagued Algerian society. On an environmental level, desertification poses an existential threat. According to studies, desertification covers more than 80% of Algeria's land area, causing the degradation of agricultural land, food shortages, widespread poverty, and forcing rural populations to migrate to cities.² This exacerbates the unemployment crisis and increases pressure on services, which is considered an "unconventional threat to security." Successive droughts and the worsening desertification phenomenon have led to the migration of thousands of rural families from marginalized areas (the high plateaus and steppes) to major cities. These environmental migrants have formed belts of poverty around cities, where informal settlements (such as the "**douars**" of **Biskra** or the new "**Kasbahs**" of Algiers) have become hotbeds of unemployment, crime, and extremism. Young people who have lost their land due to desertification and their opportunities in the city due to a lack of training have become easy prey for

¹"Renewed Protests Over Unemployment," Al Jazeera, September 29, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2013/09/29>, accessed April 27, 2026.

²²Samira talbi ,thesyrge of desertification in africa and its impact on food Security a case study of algeria journal of legal and politiqua research 9 no012024 p330

the rhetoric of armed groups, who offer them a "salary," "identity," and "weapons."¹ On the health front, the uncontrolled influx of migrants has led to the resurgence of diseases that Algeria had eradicated (such as malaria in **Tamanrasset** in 2019), creating a significant challenge. This poses a threat to public health and has burdened the local healthcare system. This health dimension, which was marginal in the 1990s, has now become an unconventional security threat.²

II.2.3. The impact of internal threats on Algerian national Security

Having detailed the most prominent threats facing Algerian security previously, we now seek to analyse the profound repercussions of these threats on the state and society. We maintain that these threats do not operate in isolation, but rather interact to produce complex effects. The most prominent of these repercussions are as follows:

1. **The overlap between illegal migration routes and the smuggling of weapons and fighters**, where terrorist groups (such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) exploit these routes to carry out terrorist operations inside Algerian territory, posing a direct threat to internal security.
2. **The MAK and Rachad movements**, following the 2021 fires, the Algerian army announced the "thwarting of armed attacks" linked to these two movements, confirming that the threat is no longer virtual but operational. This requires strengthening capabilities to combat ideological terrorism, especially in the digital sphere.³
3. **Illegal immigration from the Sahel countries**, which has strained the capabilities of the army and security forces on the southern borders, forcing the state to deploy more than 40,000 troops on its borders with Mali and Niger, creating a significant logistical and financial burden.⁴

¹ Ibid p 330-331

² Algerian Ministry of Health, Epidemiological Report 2020–2021: Imported Malaria in Southern Algeria (Algiers: Ministry of Health, 2021), accessed April 27, 2026, 22:29, <https://www.sante.gov.dz/actualite/3899-rapport-epidemiologique-2021n.p>

³ Algeria: Security Services Announce Foiling Armed Attacks Linked to MAK,” France 24, October 2021, , <https://www.france24.com/ar>, accessed April 27, 2026.

⁴ Raouf Farrah, Algeria’s Migration Dilemma: The International Migration and Human Smuggling in Southern Algeria (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, December 2020), p 12-14

4. **Decline in citizens' trust in the state's ability to provide security and development**, as manifested in the **2013 Ouargla protests** that revealed the state's inability to meet the demands of young people, paving the way for subsequent protest movements (such as the **2019 Hirak**), which expressed a deep rift between rulers and the ruled.
5. Classification of the MAK and Rachad movements as terrorist organisations **under** Executive Decree 21-2021.

II.3. Algeria's security strategy mechanisms in the face of internal threats:

Algeria faces security threats that pose a danger to its national security. Therefore, it seeks to develop a security approach through which it aims to combat them by securing national defence and confronting terrorist groups through political dialogue and legal means to achieve political stability, in addition to protecting and securing its land, sea and air borders to confront illegal immigration and putting in place mechanisms and preventive measures to confront organized crime, which is one of the most serious threats facing Algerian national security.

II.3.1 Military and security mechanisms

The armed terrorist groups that Algeria faces are not a traditional enemy. They have not been confronted using traditional methods. Therefore, the Algerian army has had to adapt to the tactics used by these terrorist groups, which are characterised by limited attacks against individuals, places or institutions, such as individual assassinations, ambushes, false roadblocks, planned raids and sabotage. These attacks rely on the element of surprise, brutality and heinous crimes that have a psychological impact. Since 1993, the People's National Army has been tasked with managing counter-terrorism and sabotage operations. An anti-terrorism coordination centre was established in Algeria, and specialized anti-terrorism units were created. Military units were restructured and reorganized to be highly capable of facing this new type of war, with specialized training and equipment and weapons adapted to the type of combat imposed by terrorism. For example, according to the order issued by the General Staff of the People's National Army on July 10, 1994, military divisions were transformed

into operational divisions to respond to new tasks. Specialised security units and agencies were established, including the Municipal Guard and self-defence teams. The Municipal Guard is a security apparatus present at the municipal level nationwide, under the authority of the governor of each province. It was created due to the significant increase in terrorist operations targeting villages and municipalities. Special self-defence teams were formed comprised of citizens who refused to cooperate with or assist terrorism.

These teams were equipped with the necessary weapons and equipment to defend themselves and others in the event of any terrorist attack. These teams have contributed to the arrest of many individuals involved in terrorist attacks. Establishment of Special Intervention Teams and Judicial Police Units: Special intervention teams and units were established within the National Gendarmerie and the People's National Army. They are trained to conduct dangerous operations, intervene in densely populated areas, and rescue hostages.

The role of the Judicial Police Units within the National Security Directorate is to gather intelligence related to terrorism and dismantle explosives¹. In recent years, especially from 2011 to 2017, the region has been characterised by numerous security threats, in particular the escalation of terrorism, the spread of armed militias, and the proliferation of weapons due to the crises in Libya and Mali. These crises significantly affected Algerian national security, prompting the army to adopt a defensive approach to border security.²

This included assigning several units of the People's National Army the task of protecting and monitoring the volatile borders, especially the eastern and southern regions, which are considered the main strongholds of terrorist groups trying to enter Algeria. The attack in Amenas on January 16, 2013 serves as a prime example. Furthermore, the People's National Army has adapted to the information age and

¹Dr samahSouhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats," *Al-Risala Journal for Islamic Studies and Research*, vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2023), University of Algiers 3, Algeria. **page 92**

²Dakhane, Nourredine, and Aidoun, El Hammadi, *The Path of Securing Algerian Borders between Unilateral Management and Regional Cooperation Frameworks*, Notebooks of Politics and Law, No. 14, 2016, p. 1.

globalization, and in recent decades has made significant efforts to integrate new media and communication tools into its security policy. Today, given the security data and information services provided by modern technologies, digitalization and geographic information, technology-based border security management is essential.

These resources are essential for monitoring the security situation along Algeria's borders, including the use of GPS and other systems for tracking locations, defining the borders and surrounding areas, monitoring population concentrations, and mapping and identifying major routes. The sub-regional connection between the regions and others, facilitates dealing with security issues at the borders and confronting and limiting border security threats in a more flexible and professional manner. All of this is based on what are called "smart border" systems: commercially available mobile surveillance, drone systems, thermal imaging devices and remote video surveillance tower systems, which provide support for the work of units tasked with protecting and securing Algeria's land borders and combating terrorism and various forms of organized crime, in particular trafficking.¹

A- Arms Smuggling

In recent years, arms smuggling has emerged as a serious threat, particularly with the spread of terrorism and the instability in neighbouring regions such as Libya. Despite intensified border surveillance, controlling illicit arms flows remains challenging due to the expansion of illegal arms markets.

The Algerian National People's Army established expert committees, including military and security specialists, to assess risks and prevent weapons from reaching terrorist groups. These committees include members from intelligence services and counter-terrorism experts

B-Combating Illegal Migration For a long time, Algeria lacked a comprehensive legal framework addressing illegal migration. However, with the growing scale of this

¹Merini, Mostafa, opcit. page 38

phenomenon, Algeria has adopted a range of legal, regulatory, and security measures. Due to the vastness of its land and maritime borders, Algeria has strengthened border surveillance through several security bodies, including:

Border Guards, under the Ministry of National Defence, responsible for protecting ports and preventing smuggling.

Gendarmerie Border Units (GGF), tasked with continuous monitoring of land borders.

Border Police, responsible for regulating entry and exit, and combating illegal migration, drug trafficking, and smuggling at ports, airports, and railway stations.

The General Directorate of National Security also established the Central Office for Combating Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking (OCRIEST), as well as regional investigation brigades tasked with tracking and dismantling criminal networks involved in illegal migration.¹

II.3.2. Political and legal mechanisms

Algeria has relied on numerous political and legal methods to combat and confront terrorism since the beginning of terrorist activity in Algeria during the crisis of the 1990s.

The High Council of State saw the necessity of adopting a policy of dialogue to contain the crisis. In 1993, the then-President, **Ali Kafi**, announced the necessity of pursuing a policy of dialogue, in which political parties condemning violence, terrorism, and crimes against the state, its symbols, institutions, and agents participated. Subsequently, Defence Minister **Liamine Zeroual** was appointed President in July 1993, declaring that the army supported the policy of dialogue and raising the slogan "Dialogue without exclusion." Following his important address to

¹Saada mokhtaria benmaghnia, the Security challenges of illegal migration in Algeria master's thesis, University of Dr. Moulaytahir, Saida, 2015, page 68

the Algerian people on Friday, April 15, 2011, President **Abdelaziz Bouteflika** outlined his vision for the political reform he wished to achieve.

He acknowledged the long-standing delay in realizing the freedoms demanded by Algerians, attributing the delay to the continued state of emergency since 1991 the cancellation of the electoral process.

The presidential initiative for political reform in Algeria was announced in April 2011 as a response to local and regional developments following the increase in popular protests. In Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, in what has come to be known as the "**Arab Spring**" wave, the announcement of the reform initiative comes in response to the demands of the Algerian political class, which has become increasingly urgent for internal change before it is too late.

This reform encompasses the media sector, the law on political parties, the electoral system, women's representation in elected bodies, incompatibility with parliamentary membership, and civil society organizations.¹

Legal mechanism the legal mechanisms adopted by Algeria to combat terrorism during the 1990s are among the most prominent tools of its criminal policy aimed at restoring security and stability.

Among these mechanisms was the so-called "Mercy Law" of 1995, which included a set of measures designed to encourage individuals involved in armed groups to repent and reintegrate into society. This law stipulated a number of measures, including the suspension of prosecution or the reduction of sentences, under specific conditions. The most important of these conditions were that the individuals in question were not involved in murder or rape; that they did not harm the physical or moral well-being of citizens; and that they did not commit acts of sabotage targeting public or private property.

¹Ibid 35-36

The law also required that the individuals in question voluntarily surrender themselves to the competent authorities, declare their permanent cessation of any terrorist or subversive activity, and surrender all weapons, explosives, and other equipment used in such activities¹.

However, the Algerian legislature recognized the limited effectiveness of some of these measures, particularly those outlined in Article 40 of Legislative Decree No. 92-03, which failed to achieve the desired results on the ground.

Consequently, more comprehensive legal measures were adopted, including Ordinance No. 99-12 on Civil Concord, which broadened the scope of amnesty measures to facilitate the restoration of security and strengthen national reconciliation. This ordinance also included similar measures, such as exemption from prosecution or reduction of sentences for those who repented, subject to specific legal conditions. This contributed to attracting a significant number of former militants and reintegrating them into society.²

The Law of Mercy paved the way for the Civil Concord Law, which emerged as part of the Algerian state's efforts to restore stability after the years of the Black Decade. The Civil Concord Law was enacted in 1999 under number 99-08, as a reform project approved by President **Abdelaziz Bouteflika** upon assuming power that same year, primarily targeting Islamist armed groups in Algeria.

This law includes a series of legal measures aimed at achieving national reconciliation, including enabling armed individuals to return to society and their homes, provided they surrender their weapons and renounce armed activity. The legislature also established mechanisms for dealing with those involved in terrorist acts, granting exemptions from prosecution or reducing sentences, depending on the nature of the crimes committed. This law aimed to provide a suitable solution for individuals involved in terrorist and subversive acts by offering them the opportunity

¹ Dr samahSouhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats op citp92

²Merini, Mostafa, Border Areas Management Strategy under New Security Threats,opcit page36

for civic reintegration into society. To benefit from these measures, individuals must notify the competent authorities of their permanent cessation of terrorist activity, appear before them, surrender their weapons, and acknowledge the acts committed.¹

In Algeria National reconciliation is a legal project launched by President **Abdelaziz Bouteflika** with the aim of rebuilding peace and stability within Algerian society after the security crisis the country experienced during the 1990s, particularly following the events of 1991.

In this context, a presidential decree was issued on August 14, 2005, calling for a popular referendum on the draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. The draft received broad approval from the Algerian people, which contributed to mitigating the effects of what became known as the "Black Decade. «The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, issued in 2005, established a set of legal measures and mechanisms aimed at restoring security and peace.

It included a preamble and five main sections addressing various aspects of the crisis². To implement this Charter, several presidential decrees were issued in 2006, most notably: Presidential Decree No. 06-93, dated February 28, 2006, concerning compensation for victims of the national tragedy. Presidential Decree No. 06-94 of February 28, 2006, concerning state assistance to disadvantaged families whose members were involved in terrorism.

Presidential Decree No. 06-95 of February 20, 2006, concerning the declaration procedures stipulated in Article 13 of the Order relating to the implementation of the Charter. Presidential Decree No. 06-124 of March 27, 2006, specifying the procedures for reintegration or compensation for individuals who were subject to administrative proceedings due to acts related to the national tragedy. Conditions for Benefiting from National Reconciliation³

¹ Dr samahSouhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats op citp92

² Dr amraouikhadidja Civil harmony and national reconciliation are two mechanisms for achieving stability in Algeria" Journal of Legal and Economic Research 2, no. 1 (January 2020), p310

³Merini, Mostafa, Border Areas Management Strategy under New Security Threats:,opcit page37

The Algerian legislator has established a set of conditions for benefiting from reconciliation measures, the most important of which are:

1. Voluntary Surrender: Those involved must voluntarily surrender themselves to the competent authorities, without coercion, during the period from January 13, 2000, to February 28, 2006. This entails the cessation of legal proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance 06-01 dated February 27, 2006. The law also specifies the competent authorities for receiving these individuals, namely: Judicial authorities (the Public Prosecutor's Office, the State Prosecutor), Security services, judicial police, Algerian diplomatic and consular missions abroad.

2. Renouncing Armed Activity and Surrendering Weapons: Individuals who are still engaged in armed activity must renounce it and surrender their weapons as proof of their desire to reintegrate into society and comply with the law.

3. Commitment to Non-Return to Criminal Activity: Registering with the competent authorities constitutes a formal undertaking not to return to terrorist or subversive acts.

Combating the Financing of Terrorism In the context of strengthening national reconciliation, the Algerian legislature has emphasized the criminalization of the financing of terrorism. Article 87 bis 4 of the Penal Code stipulates that anyone who glorifies or finances terrorist acts shall be punished with imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, in addition to a fine ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 Algerian dinars. In some cases, the penalty may reach temporary imprisonment, as it is considered a serious crime.¹

Algeria's Efforts in Combating Organized Crime and Security Threats

Algeria has undertaken significant efforts to combat various crimes that threaten its security and stability, particularly drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and related transnational criminal activities. In this context, Algeria ratified several international conventions aimed at combating organized crime.

¹Khadija Amrouai, "Civil Security and National Reconciliation as Mechanisms for Achieving Stability in Algeria), p 311-312

Among these is the United Nations Convention of 1988 against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), which Algeria ratified in April 1995. Algeria also ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) of 2000.

Following the ratification of these conventions, Algeria amended its Code of Criminal Procedure through Law No. 04-14 of November 10, 2004. Article 8 bis stipulates that public prosecution does not lapse by limitation in cases of felonies and misdemeanours related to transnational or national organized crime, corruption, or embezzlement of public funds.

In 2004, Algeria criminalized money laundering and adopted a legislative policy to combat both money laundering and the financing of terrorism. This was reinforced by the Law of 2005 on the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, which considers any act of providing or collecting funds, wholly or partially, for committing such crimes as a punishable offense.

Algeria recognizes that organized crime in all its forms constitutes a major threat to national, economic, and social stability. Therefore, combating it requires shared international responsibility, given the transnational nature of these crimes and their links to drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and terrorist activities.

In this regard, Algeria acknowledges that United Nations conventions, along with bilateral agreements on cooperation and extradition, provide essential legal tools for international collaboration. Addressing security threats, particularly in the Mediterranean region, requires strengthened bilateral and multilateral cooperation¹.

Mechanisms of Security Cooperation Ministers of Interior agreed on several measures to enhance cooperation in combating organized crime, including strengthening cooperation between security services to combat organized criminal

¹Kamal rouabhi ,new Security threats in the mediterranean and théier implications for algerian national Security master's thesis,university of Mohamed boudiaf,M'sila,2018page72

activities establishing joint border patrol systems and coordinating investigations. Exchanging visits, communication methods, and operational expertise. Sharing intelligence on criminal networks, their movements, methods, routes, and sources of funding. Intensifying efforts to combat human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children. Enhancing identification and forensic analysis to track and apprehend criminals and bring them to justice

Combating illicit trafficking in drugs, psychotropic substances, and chemical weapons through improved border control (land, sea, and air).

Conducting awareness campaigns on drug abuse and its harmful effects. Combating illegal arms trafficking through improved coordination and information exchange between security and police services.

Enhancing cooperation in investigative methods, particularly in tracking, freezing, and confiscating criminal assets.

Strengthening cyber security and combating cybercrime through specialized training and regular expert meetings.

Exchanging information on legislation, investigative techniques, and best practices in combating money laundering, in cooperation with Interpol and relevant international and regional organizations.

Fighting illicit trafficking in cultural property and works of art, as well as counterfeiting activities.¹

National Bodies Responsible for Digitalization and Cyber security in Algeria

Cyber security bodies are the cornerstone of protecting the national digital space. They are responsible for developing strategies and preventative mechanisms to counter cyber threats, as well as monitoring their implementation, adopting technical

¹ Ibid page 72-76

standards, and intervening in emergencies. These bodies also work in coordination with various sectors to ensure the security of information systems, protect data, and maintain the continuity of essential services. These bodies primarily include the National Agency for Digital Development, the National Authority for the Prevention of Crimes Related to Information and Communication Technologies, the National Authority for the Protection of Personal Data and the National Council for Information Systems Security.¹

“The Algerian legislator addressed the provisions of the National Agency for the Development of Digitalization through Law No. 19-317 establishing the agency... in order to build an innovative digital economy”.

“The agency also plays a central role in preparing policies and programs related to digitalization, as well as providing technical and logistical support to public administrations and local authorities to improve the efficiency and quality of digital services²The National Authority for the Prevention of Crimes Related to Information and Communication Technologies was addressed by the Algerian legislator through Law No. 09-04... It also obliges companies to take the necessary measures to protect users and information.³”

“The National Authority for the Protection of Personal Data was established under Law No. 18-07 concerning the protection of natural persons in the processing of personal data...including hacking, electronic fraud, and unlawful interference with data, and has contributed to establishing a legal framework for combating cybercrime.⁴”

¹Karimasmoudi and samarbelragui,cybersecurity in Algeria master's thesis,university of 8 may1945,Guelma,2025 page 51

²Algeria,presidential decree no 19-317 of november 26,2019,Establishing the National agency for the development of digitalization,officialgazette,no74 december1,2019

³Algeria,presidential decree no 09-04 of august5,2009, laying down special rules on the prevention and combating of crimes related to information and communication technologies,officialgazette,no47,amended and supplemented

⁴ Algeria, Law No. 18-07 of June 10, 2018, on the Protection of Natural Persons in the Processing of Personal Data, Official Gazette, no. 34 (June 10, 2018)

“The National Council for Information Systems Security was addressed under Law No. 20-05 relating to the establishment of a national system for information systems security....; strengthen trust in digital services, and guarantee the continuity of the state’s critical activities.”¹

II.3.3. Social economic mechanisms

In its fight against terrorism and in confronting security threats, Algeria has adopted a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach based on activating both economic and social mechanisms as two fundamental pillars within a preventive strategy aimed at drying up the sources of extremism and addressing its structural causes. This approach rests on the conviction that the phenomenon of terrorism does not arise solely from ideological or security motives, but is also linked to deep-seated economic and social imbalances, such as poverty, unemployment, marginalization, and social exclusion. This necessitates a comprehensive approach that goes beyond traditional security solutions.

Social mechanisms occupy a central place in Algeria's approach to combating terrorism, as they aim to address the deep roots of the phenomenon, which are linked to social vulnerability, marginalisation, and exclusion. These factors create a fertile ground for the spread of extremist ideology and the recruitment of individuals, especially young people. In this context, Algeria has worked to build an integrated social policy based on improving living conditions, promoting social justice, and consolidating social cohesion, thereby contributing to protecting society against various forms of deviance and extremism.

In the area of improving living standards, the state has focused on expanding housing programs in their various forms (social housing, subsidized housing, and rural housing) with the aim of eliminating housing insecurity and reducing social disparities, as housing stability is one of the most important factors for an individual's

¹Algeria, Decree No. 20-05 of January 20, 2020, Establishing the National System for Information Systems Security, Official Gazette, no. 04.

psychological and social stability. It has also worked to improve purchasing power through support policies and social transfers targeting low-income groups, ensuring a minimum standard of living and reducing feelings of economic exclusion. This approach finds its legal basis in the constitutional framework, particularly under the Algerian Constitution, which enshrines the social character of the state and stipulates its commitment to guaranteeing social protection and achieving justice among citizens. With regard to basic services, Algeria has prioritized the development of the health and education sectors, considering them fundamental pillars in human development. The network of healthcare facilities has been expanded, and health coverage has been improved, particularly in rural and border areas. This has been coupled with support for community health programs, ensuring that services are more accessible to citizens. The education sector has also been strengthened through the expansion of school enrolment, the improvement of the quality of education, and the integration of vocational training as a mechanism for integrating young people into the labour market. These efforts are supported by legal and regulatory texts, including the National Education Orientation Law, which enshrines the right to education and aims to cultivate informed and engaged citizens, as well as the Health Law, which regulates the healthcare system and affirms the citizen's right to treatment.¹ Therefore, it is clear that social mechanisms in Algeria are not limited to simply providing services or subsidies, but rather constitute an integrated system aimed at building a cohesive and just society, capable of resisting various forms of threat, including terrorism. They thus represent a fundamental preventive dimension that complements security and economic efforts, as achieving sustainable security remains contingent upon the state's ability to improve the living conditions of its citizens, strengthen their sense of belonging, and ensure their effective integration into all aspects of life.

¹AbdelkaderMouzouni, "The Economic and Social Mechanisms for Combating Terrorism in Algeria and Addressing Security Threats," Madar Political Journal 9, no. 2 (2025), p70-76

Strategy / Economic and Development Measures Major Development Programs and Plans

Economic Recovery Support Program (2001–2004) Supplementary Growth Support Program (2005–2009) Growth Consolidation Program (2010–2014) Five-Year Plan (2015–2019) Economic and Social Recovery Plan (2020–2024) These programs focused on: supporting public and private investment, developing infrastructure, revitalizing productive sectors, creating jobs, reducing unemployment, developing border and marginalized areas (by connecting them to the outside world and providing essential services such as water, electricity, and roads), and encouraging local economic activity.¹

Strengthening Regional Cooperation through Major Strategic Projects

Trans-Saharan Highway Gas pipeline Fibre optic networks.

These projects aim to achieve regional economic integration and enhance security through shared development.²

Employment Mechanisms and Agencies to Combat Unemployment

1. National Employment Agency (ANEM) Monitors labor market conditions (supply and demand) to achieve optimal integration between the two mechanisms. Advisory role in employment and training. Participates in the actual process of job creation.^[^2]

2. Support for Paid Employment Promotion (Employment Contract Schemes)
Three types of contracts: **Professional Integration Contract (CID)** : For graduates of short-term and long-term higher education. **Professional Integration Contract (CIP)** : For first-time job seekers who are graduates of secondary education and vocational training. **Training Integration Contract (CFI)** : For job seekers without training or qualifications, in various workshops]

¹Abdelkader Mouzouni, "The Economic and Social Mechanisms for Combating Terrorism in Algeria and Addressing Security Threats," Madar Political Journal 9, no. 2 (2025) p76-79

²Ibid p76-79

3. Pre-Employment Contracts Programme Aimed at unemployed university graduates, due to their increasing numbers and the scarcity of positions.

4. National Agency for Youth Employment Support (ANSEJ / now ANJEM) Provides subsidies (at low interest rates) from the National Fund for Youth Employment to those seeking to create investment projects that contribute to employing the workforce. Monitors youth investments, ensures compliance with terms and conditions, and provides assistance when needed.¹

5. National Unemployment Insurance Fund Aimed at unemployed individuals aged between 30 and 50. Strengthens communication with public employment services and municipal and provincial administrations. Reintegrates unemployed individuals legally entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Coordinates with financial institutions and the National Fund for Promotion and Employment to develop and create job opportunities, and provides assistance to businesses in difficulty to preserve jobs.²

5. National Investment Development Agency (ANDI) A public institution of an administrative and technical nature.

A fundamental tool for identifying existing investment opportunities and encouraging youth to invest through services and tax incentives.

Contributes to meaningful and comprehensive change in all aspects of economic and social life, aiming to increase growth rates, meet the needs of community members, and achieve greater social justice.³

Ultimate Strategic Objective

Improving living conditions, encouraging individuals to remain in their home countries and discouraging them from considering illegal migration, thus combating illegal immigration through economic means.⁴

¹¹SahnineHebri, "The Algerian Approach to Combating Irregular Migration," Journal of Legal and Political Research 2, no. 14, University of Dr.MoulayTahar, Saida, p.120-119

²²ibid p.120-119

³Ibid p.121

⁴Ibid p.121

In conclusion, this chapter demonstrates that Algeria's security strategy in combating internal threats is based on a comprehensive and integrated vision that takes into account the profound transformations affecting the nature of security risks in the modern era. These threats are no longer limited to traditional forms of armed violence or organized crime, but have expanded to include complex challenges with economic, social, and technological dimensions. This has necessitated a redefinition of the concept of national security to become more inclusive and expansive. The Algerian approach has shown a growing awareness of the need to address these threats from a multi-layered perspective, combining a deterrent dimension based on the vigilance and preparedness of security services with a preventive dimension aimed at addressing the root causes of instability by supporting development, reducing social inequalities, and strengthening social cohesion. The importance of using modern tools, particularly in the fields of cybersecurity and intelligence, has also become evident in order to keep pace with the evolving and increasingly complex methods of these threats.

Furthermore, the integration of roles among various actors, whether security institutions or civil bodies, reflects a trend toward a participatory approach to security, based on coordination, information sharing, and improved institutional efficiency. Developing the legal and regulatory framework is a fundamental element in supporting this strategy, ensuring a balance between security requirements and respect for rights and freedoms. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Algerian security strategy depends on its ability to continuously adapt to internal changes, anticipate various potential scenarios, and invest in human and technological resources. Security is no longer merely a temporary objective, but has become a dynamic and sustainable process closely linked to the path of comprehensive development. This strengthens the state's ability to maintain its stability and guarantee its security in the face of various current and future challenges.

Chapter Three:

External Challenges

Facing Algeria

Chapter Three: External challenges facing Algeria

Algeria faces a number of external challenges in its regional and international environment, which have become a growing source of concern for policymakers, given the rapid transformations in the international system and the rise of unconventional threats. The concept of national security is no longer limited to the protection of borders and territorial sovereignty; it now encompasses multiple dimensions involving interconnected political, economic, security and even technological factors. This makes the external environment a crucial factor in determining the level of internal stability of the state.

These challenges are particularly evident in a complex regional context, especially in the Sahel region in Africa, which is characterized by chronic security fragility and the proliferation of terrorist groups and transnational organized crime networks, including arms and drug trafficking and irregular migration. Furthermore, the ongoing crises in neighbouring countries, such as Libya and Mali, are increasing security pressures on Algeria and forcing it to adopt defensive and proactive strategies to counter these growing threats.

In addition, international geopolitical changes continue to pose challenges, due to the escalating competition between the great powers and the increasing foreign interference in regional affairs. This could affect the balances of the region and threaten the vital interests of the Algerian state. Furthermore, the economic threats linked to the volatility of world markets, especially in the energy sector, cannot be overlooked. These threats have a direct impact on economic security, which is a fundamental pillar of overall security.

Therefore, the study of the external challenges that threaten Algerian security is of the utmost importance. It allows us to understand the nature of the risks surrounding the state and contributes to the analysis of the adaptation and response mechanisms adopted by Algeria within the framework of its security and defence policy. From this perspective, this chapter aims to highlight the most prominent of these challenges, by attempting to deconstruct their different dimensions and anticipate their impact on national security in a changing international and regional environment.

III.1. External security and military challenges

Algeria faces external security and military challenges represented by the instability of the Sahel region and Libya, and the spread of terrorism and organized crime.

III.1.1 Transnational terrorism in the Sahel region

Transnational terrorism has become one of the most prominent security challenges facing the countries of the Sahel region of Africa, particularly **Mali, Niger, and Libya**. Several factors have contributed to transforming this region into a magnet for extremist groups, most notably state fragility, vast and difficult-to-control borders, and the availability of a fertile environment for organized crime. This paper aims to analyse the dynamics of transnational terrorism in these three countries, tracing its historical roots, the role of external factors in fueling it, and the most prominent active organizations. Historical Catalyst: The Libyan Crisis as the Initial Spark

Many researchers agree that the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the fall of the **Gaddafi** regime constituted a major turning point in the destabilization of the Sahel region. The collapse of the Libyan state security structure led to a massive influx of sophisticated weapons into the hands of armed groups and the return of thousands of **Tuareg** fighters who had served in the Libyan Islamic Legion to northern Mali. **Ricardo René Laremont** explains that Gaddafi's death dismantled the security structure that had brought some stability to neighbouring countries, leading to the emergence of fragile states in the Sahel region.¹ **Laremont** adds that after **Gaddafi's** death, **Tuareg** soldiers operating within the so-called "Islamic Legion" looted heavy weapons from ammunition depots in **Tripoli** and **Ajdabiya**, returning with them to Mali to launch a new rebellion in January 2012, which ultimately resulted in their occupation of major northern cities such as **Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu**.² Thus, the repercussions of the Libyan crisis were not confined to its geographical borders; rather, they were the decisive factor in igniting one of the most serious security crises

¹ Ricardo René Larémont, "After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2, no. 2 (2013): Art. 29, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bq>.

² Larémont, "After the Fall of Qaddafi," Art. 29.

Mali has witnessed, the consequences of which it continues to suffer today. These weapons did not remain in **Mali** alone, but rather spread across the Sahara to fuel hotspots of tension in **Niger** and **Burkina Faso**. Another study shows that the war in **Libya**, which began in February 2011, and the subsequent claims of independence in **Mali** in 2012, further complicated the security landscape in the **Liptako-Gourma** border region between **Mali**, **Niger**, and **Burkina Faso**.¹

III.1.1.1 Border Dynamics: From Economic Corridor to Terrorist Haven

The unique characteristic of the Sahel region lies in the nature of its geopolitical borders. Stretching for thousands of kilometres across the Sahara Desert, these borders are often beyond the control of the central state, resulting in what are known as “ungoverned spaces.” These porous borders serve as a lifeline for terrorist organizations, facilitating the movement of fighters and weapons, as well as the smuggling of goods to generate funding. In their study on "Transnational Insecurity in the Sahel," researchers **Nikasios AchoChik** and **Issiaka Diarra** argue that "the porosity of international borders along the Sahel region is an enabling variable for insecurity and instability in the country."²

They also point out that nomadic pastoralism, as a social heritage, played a vital role in the emergence of transnational networks that were subsequently exploited by armed groups.³ The concept of "ungoverned spaces" is clearly evident in the vast, uninhabited areas of Mali, which have become fertile ground for terrorist training and activities beyond the reach of state authorities. Another risk assessment for the western Sahel (including **Mali**, **Mauritania**, **Niger**, **Chad**, and **Burkina Faso**) indicates that this sub-region is heavily influenced by developments in neighbouring countries, particularly **Libya**, **Algeria**, and **Nigeria**. Recent events, such as the Arab Spring and its aftermath in **Libya** and **Egypt**, and the rise of **Boko Haram** as a regional terrorist

¹Marta Oliynyk-Domochko, "Transformation of the Security Situation in the Central Sahel after the Operation Barkhane," *Empirio*, 2025, 92-101, <https://doi.org/10.18523/3041-1718.2025.2.1.92-101>.

²NicasiusAchu Check and IssiakaDiarra, "Transborder Insecurity in the Sahel: Assessing Non-state Actors in Enabling Terrorism in Mali," *ScientiaMilitaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 82, <https://doi.org/10.5787/51-2-1418>.

³Check and Diarra, "Transborder Insecurity," 82.

threat, have exacerbated the insecurity already plaguing the region due to environmental problems, political instability, social tensions, and illicit trafficking.¹

III.1.1.2 The Jihadist Map:

Transnational Organizations in Mali, Niger, and Libya

The Sahel region has witnessed a worrying rise in the influence of transnational jihadist groups, most notably **Jama'atNusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)** and the **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)**.¹**Jama'atNusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)** Formed in March 2017, JNIM is an al-Qaeda-affiliated coalition comprising various factions in Mali, such as **Ansar Dine** and **KatibaMacina**. It has proven to be the most adaptable of the jihadist forces in the Sahel, steadily expanding its reach across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.² Its presence, particularly along the region's porous borders, has challenged state authority, displaced millions, and contributed to one of the world's fastest-growing humanitarian crises.³ The group's ability to spread across borders has not relied solely on the movement of fighters; it has thrived by embedding itself within existing local conflicts, exploiting ethnic tensions and socioeconomic injustices to establish a foothold and expand its control.

III.1.1.3. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which emerged in 2015, is characterized by the vast geographical reach of its operations. Its activities extend along 800 kilometres of Mali's eastern border with Niger's western border, as well as approximately 600 kilometres along Burkina Faso's eastern border with Niger. An analysis by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies indicates that nearly 90% of the group's attacks occurred within 100 kilometres of one of these borders, reflecting its deliberate strategy of exploiting border regions. The group was responsible for 42% of all deaths linked to Islamist militant groups in the Sahel in 2018, making it one of the most dangerous groups in the region.

¹ Carlos EcheverríaJesús, "Risks and Threats in the Western Sahel. Radicalization and Terrorism in the Sub-Region," *PaixetSécuritéInternationales – Journal of International Law and International Relations*, no. 3 (2015).

²"Who are JNIM, the group menacing Bamako and probing Nigeria?," *The Africa Report*, November 5, 2025.

³"What JNIM's Entry into Nigeria Means for Security in the Sahel," *HumAngle*, October 31, 2025.




Figure 1: Map of ISGS and JNIM Presence in the Sahel Region

<https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militant-islamist-violence-sahel/>




Figure 2: Map of North Africa and the Sahel Belt.

<https://www.earthdata.nasa.gov/news/feature-articles/big-small-fire-africa>

III.1.2. Transnational Organized Crime in the Sahel and its Impact on Algerian Security

The Sahel region of Africa faces complex and unprecedented security challenges. These challenges are no longer limited to traditional threats; transnational organized crime networks have become active and influential players in destabilising countries and threatening their national security. Due to a complex interplay of internal and external factors, the region has transformed into a fertile ground for diverse criminal activities, such as drug, arms, and human trafficking. This has had direct repercussions on Algerian national security, given the country's vast geographical expanse and porous borders. This study aims to analyse the phenomenon of transnational organized crime in the Sahel, focusing on **Mali**, **Niger**, and **Libya**, and to examine its multifaceted impacts on Algerian security. Finally, it evaluates the security strategy adopted by Algeria to address this challenge.

Understanding the growth of organized crime in the Sahel requires analysing the structural and driving factors that have created a conducive environment for it. Organized crime is a real problem for the countries of the Sahel region of Africa, especially given the security crises they suffer and foreign intervention in the region. All indicators point to the growth of this phenomenon, which has contributed to the spread of poverty, armed conflicts, and terrorism, particularly in the presence of failed states.¹ These factors can be summarized in two main points: **State fragility and weak border control**: The weak control of the central state over its vast peripheries is one of the most prominent structural characteristics of the Sahel countries. As one study indicates, the state “has not yet reached the level of a state that effectively guards its borders,” rendering it incapable of enforcing the law across vast areas that become safe havens for crime.² This structural weakness creates what researchers call “ungoverned spaces,” which facilitate the operations of transnational criminal networks. **Poverty and Economic Marginalisation**: Criminal networks have found fertile ground for

¹Mustafa Kraoua, “The Phenomenon of Organized Crime in the African Sahel and Ways to Confront It,” *AfakIlmiyya* 12, no. 1 (2020)p 526–527.

²Mansour Lakhdari, *The African Sahel and the Construction of Algerian National Security* (Algiers: National Publishing and Advertising Company, 2012), 52, cited in NawalBoumlik, “The Reality of Organized Crime in the African Sahel,” *African Readings* (2017)p 102.

recruitment and expansion in the dire economic conditions, poverty, and marginalization suffered by the region's populations. Illicit activities offer “quick riches” compared to the limited legal economic alternatives, driving many to join their ranks.¹**The Most Prominent Aspects of Transnational Organized Crime in Mali, Niger, and Libya**

Drug Trafficking: The Sahel has become a strategic transit route for drug trafficking, particularly cocaine from Latin America to Europe and Moroccan hashish to the Middle East. Academician **Nasser Amer** explains that “the topography, which provides ideal smuggling routes... makes the Sahel region of Africa a major international transit hub for drug trafficking.”² It is estimated that some 14% of cocaine destined for Europe passes through West Africa and the Sahel region.³

Arms smuggling: After 2011, stockpiles of weapons flowed from Libya into neighbouring countries, “enhancing the operational capabilities of criminals from Mali to South Sudan and beyond.”⁴ This unprecedented proliferation of weapons has fuelled local conflicts and strengthened terrorist organizations.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling: Countries like **Niger** and **Libya** have become major transit points for networks smuggling illegal migrants to Europe, a lucrative trade that exploits the desperation of young Africans⁵.

Smuggling and economic crime: These activities include smuggling subsidized goods (such as fuel and cigarettes), stolen vehicles, and money laundering, which undermines the region's fragile economies.⁶

¹ Ibid p 115-116

² Nasser Amer, “The Stakes of International Drug Trafficking Networks in the African Sahel and Their Implications for Algerian National Security,” *Algerian Journal of Political Studies* 8, no. 1 (2021) p 52–53.

³ Nawal Boumlik, “The Reality of Organized Crime in the African Sahel,” *African Readings*, December 2017 p127

⁴ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *After the Storm: Organized Crime across the Sahel-Sahara following Upheaval in Libya and Mali* (Geneva, November 2019), 5.

⁵ cheritiayah, *International Cooperation to Combat Organized Crime in the Sahel*, p 52–55.

⁶ Kraoua, “The Phenomenon of Organized Crime,” 530.

III.1.3 Armed Conflicts in the Sahel:

The Sahel region of Africa represents a highly complex geopolitical space that has, for over a decade, witnessed the serious repercussions of armed conflicts that have transcended national borders, becoming an existential threat to Algerian national security. Algeria, drawing its counterterrorism expertise from a firmly established security doctrine, is at the forefront of countries confronting this multifaceted threat. It operates according to a comprehensive strategy that combines diplomatic, military, and developmental dimensions, based on its constitutional framework and the principles of its foreign policy.¹

The Sahel region lies adjacent to the Maghreb countries and extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Horn of Africa. It possesses exceptional geopolitical importance due to its position as a bridge between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. However, this region, rich in natural resources (uranium, gold, and oil), suffers from extreme poverty, weak governance, and rapid population growth, making it vulnerable to various forms of conflict and terrorism.²

III.1.3.1. Libya: From "Failed State" to Arena of Foreign Influence and Direct Threats

No state has collapsed as rapidly as in Libya. The Libyan crisis, which erupted in 2011, marked a turning point in destabilizing the entire Sahel region. Following the fall of **Gaddafi's** regime, Libya transformed into a battleground, with internal forces and regional and international powers playing a central role.³ The overthrow of Gaddafi's regime did not lead to the complete eradication of the legacy of four decades of rule that entrenched tribal and clan logic. Instead, the Libyan people found themselves still trapped by tribal and clan dynamics, resulting in a clash between the constitutional institutions of the modern state and the traditional components of Libyan

¹Abdelkader Assi, "The Impact of Regional Threats on Security in Algeria," Master's thesis, University of Djilali Liabes, Sidi Bel Abbes, 2014p, 7–11.

²Mohamed Said Hegazi, "The Algerian Security Strategy in Resolving Conflicts in the African Sahel," *Abhath Journal* 5, no. 2 (2020): 6–25, at 12.

³Miloud Ben Gharbi, "The Repercussions of the Libyan Crisis on Algerian National Security amid Political Tensions in the Maghreb Regional System," *Qadaya Ma'rifiyya Journal* 3, no. 1 (2023)p 108–110.

society. This conflict escalated into armed confrontations between tribes, replacing dialogue¹

After NATO's military intervention in 2011, a significant institutional and security vacuum emerged, dismantling the legitimate monopoly on force. This led to major cities (**Misrata, Zintan, and Benghazi**) becoming politically and militarily independent entities.²In the absence of a central authority, Libyan territory has become a transit zone and a breeding ground for various forms of organized crime, particularly the proliferation and trafficking of weapons. This has led to an expansion of terrorist operations not only within **Libya** but also at the regional and international levels.³

Competing regional agendas have intersected in Libya, presenting Algeria with a significant challenge on the ground. **Egypt's** position focuses on securing its western border, which has led it to support **Haftar's** forces. **The UAE's** stance is analyzed as an active interventionist force seeking to thwart stabilization projects that do not align with its agenda. Algeria, for its part, operates on the principle of "Libya for Libyans" and rejects foreign intervention, considering Libya's stability an integral part of its national security.⁴

III.1.3.2. Conflict in Mali: Constitutes one of the most prominent direct threats to Algerian security, given the extensive shared border between the two countries, which stretches over 1,376 kilometres. According to academic analyses, the root of the Malian conflict lies in the "**Tuareg** independence question." The internal conflict in **Mali** is driven by the **Tuareg(Azawad)** quest for independence, aiming to establish their own entity separate from the central government in **Bamako**. This conflict has been influenced by a range of internal and external factors reflecting the struggle of global powers for control and influence in the region⁵.The conflict underwent a qualitative shift in 2012 when armed jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic

¹Mohamed Gharbi and Ibrahim Kalwaz, "The Repercussions of the Escalating Libyan Crisis on Regional Security and Algerian Security," Algerian Journal of Security and Development, no. 7 (2014)p 22–26.

²Mohamed Belil and FawziaKassi, "The Repercussions of the Libyan Crisis on Algerian National Security," Journal of Law, Society and Authority 13, no. 1 (2024)p 295.

³Hegazi, "The Algerian Security Strategy in Resolving Conflicts,"p 15

⁴Belil and Kassi, "The Repercussions of the Libyan Crisis,opcit p 302

⁵AbdallahRagadi, "The Issue of Tuareg Independence in Mali and Its Implications for Algerian Security," Journal of Social and Human Sciences 15, no. 31 (2014)p 217–218.

Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, exploited the political and security chaos that followed the military coup in Bamako to seize control of major northern cities (**Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu**). Researchers **Nikos Acho Chik** and **Issiaka Diarra** point out that "the porous nature of international borders along the Sahel region is an enabling variable for insecurity and instability," facilitating the expansion of these groups across borders into neighbouring countries.¹ Following the collapse of the Algiers Agreement and the ensuing open conflict, Mali is undergoing a dangerous transformation. In 2015, Algeria brokered the "Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation" between the Malian government and armed groups, an agreement that included extensive provisions for resolving the crisis in northern Mali.² A major turning point came after the 2021 coup, when the Malian military seized power and pursued a new policy aimed at "seeking sovereignty by distancing itself from traditional partners and turning to new players" (such as the Russian Wagner Group).³

In January 2024, the ruling military junta in Mali announced the "termination" of the 2015 peace agreement "with immediate effect," a move that Algeria described as causing it "deep regret."⁴ In April 2025, the dispute escalated

Sharply, culminating in **Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso** withdrawing their ambassadors from Algeria and closing their airspace to each other. Mali accuses Algeria of "maintaining contact with groups it considers terrorist on its borders" and of refusing to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, an accusation that Algeria vehemently denies⁵

III.1.3.3. Niger

Niger, which shares a border of over 956 kilometres with Algeria, making it a country of great sensitivity to Algeria's security, experienced a military coup on July 26, 2023, which overthrew the elected president, **Mohamed Bazoum**, adding a new dimension to the already complex security landscape in the Sahel region. This coup came in the context of a series of coups in the region, similar to those in **Mali** (2020

¹NicasiusAchu Check and IssiakaDiarra, "Transborder Insecurity in the Sahel: Assessing Non-state Actors in Enabling Terrorism in Mali," *ScientiaMilitaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023)p 82.

²Hegazi, "The Algerian Security Strategy in Resolving Conflicts," opcit p 18

³ Q&A: Causes and Implications of the Crisis between Mali and Algeria," *Al Jazeera*, April 8, 2025.

⁴"Algeria and Mali: Crisis between Algeria and Regional States, a Struggle for Influence and Regional Security," *BBC Arabic*, April 9, 2025.

⁵ Ibid

and 2021) and **Burkina Faso** (2022), thus constituting "new regional variables" that have affected Algeria's role in the region.¹ Following the coup in **Niger**, Algeria expressed deep concern about any foreign intervention and made intensive efforts to de-escalate the crisis and thwart any plans for military intervention in **Niger**, while supporting a return to constitutional order through dialogue.² The coup in **Niger** raised serious concerns among Algerian decision-makers, especially since "Algeria, which shares a border with Niger, considers stability in that country a matter directly linked to its national security."¹² Many analysts expressed concern that the deteriorating situation in **Niger** could lead to waves of terrorists and refugees entering Algerian territory.¹³ A major economic project for Algeria in the gas sector (the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline) was disrupted.³

The impact of the Sahel crises on Algerian security

2. Political and foreign diplomatic challenges Algeria faces external political and diplomatic challenges manifested in managing escalating regional crises, foreign interventions, and political pressures.

1-Erosion of Algeria's diplomatic role and regional mediation: The rise of new military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has undermined Algeria's traditional position as a regional mediator, forcing a reassessment of its geopolitical approach.⁴

"The new crisis in Mali is proving intractable, compelling Algeria to reassess the African geopolitical reality with determination and a proactive security vision."⁵

2-Diplomatic tensions: In April 2025, the dispute with Mali escalated sharply, leading to Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrawing their ambassadors from Algeria and closing their airspace to each other. Mali accuses Algeria of "maintaining contact with

¹Htehat, "New Regional Variables and Their Impact on Algeria's Role in the African Sahel," *Academic Journal of Legal and Political Research* 9, no. 1 (2025)p 751–754.

² "Military Intervention in Niger: Five Reasons Why Algeria Is Concerned," *Sky News Arabia*, August 25, 2023.

³ *ibid*

⁴ Implications of Tensions between Algeria and Sahel States on Regional Stability," *African Readings*, April 13, 2025, <https://qiraatafrican.com/28362>

⁵ "Algeria's Strategy toward Security Developments in the African Sahel," *Al Jazeera Center for Studies*, June 3, 2012.

groups it considers terrorist on its borders,” an accusation that Algeria vehemently denies.

3-Foreign interventions: Competing regional agendas in Libya (Egypt, UAE) have rendered Algeria’s diplomatic activity and its sole mediation insufficient to find a solution to the existing disputes between the warring parties.¹

Economic and Social Impacts:

1- Illegal migration and the influx of refugees from Libya and Mali into Algeria put pressure on infrastructure and local markets in border regions.²

2-The Shadow Economy and the Threat to the National Economy: Smuggling networks undermine the Algerian economy by flooding the market with contraband, financing domestic criminal networks, and facilitating money laundering.

3-Community security and social fabric: These activities fuel corruption, destabilize the political situation in countries, and erode trust in state institutions, thus facilitating the penetration of the social fabric.³

4-Costs of border security: Algeria incurs significant costs to maintain the security of its southern and eastern borders. The influx of smuggled weapons and the spread of organized crime networks require continuous military and security expenditures.

5-Disruption of economic projects: A major economic project for Algeria in the gas sector (the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline) was disrupted by the coup in Niger.

6-Humanitarian crisis: The presence of jihadist groups has displaced millions and contributed to one of the world’s fastest growing humanitarian crises, with spillover effects on Algerian border communities

¹ “Algeria’s Strategy toward Security Developments in the African Sahel,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, June 3, 2012.

²Karmout, “The Algerian Strategy,” opcit p 67–69.

³Nawal Boumlik, “The Reality of Organized Crime,” opcit p 200–204.

Security Repercussions

1-Direct and operational security: Algeria's vast borders with Mali, Niger, and Libya have become corridors for smuggling and infiltration, draining military and security resources. Repeated attempts to smuggle large quantities of drugs have been thwarted.¹

2-The Crime-Terror Nexus: This nexus represents one of the most serious challenges, as terrorist groups and criminal networks share common interests and smuggling routes.²

Smuggling cigarettes, drugs, and weapons provides funding for terrorist groups, while the latter provide protection for the convoys. This overlap further complicates the security landscape and prolongs conflicts.

3-Proliferation of Weapons and Terrorist Groups: Algeria views northern Mali as a direct extension of its national security, and that any collapse there could open the door for groups linked to al-Qaeda" to threaten its stability³

A-Studies have warned that the chaos in Libya has facilitated the flow of weapons and fighters towards the Sahel, including terrorist groups in Mali and Niger. ⁴B- A 2016 United Nations report stated that "the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 unleashed widespread chaos in Libya and a security vacuum that significantly contributed to the proliferation and smuggling of weapons to the Sahel and neighbouring countries, thus encouraging the emergence of terrorist groups in the region."⁵

4-Border Security Threats: Algeria's borders with Libya, Niger, and Mali extend for more than 4,000 kilometres, representing "a fragile and poorly controlled border strip due to limited resources and the desert geography of these areas."⁶5-Targeting of strategic and economic assets: This was exemplified by the 2013 In Amenas attack on

¹The Algerian Security Apparatus Deals with a 'Hostile Environment' along the Borders with Mali and Niger," Asharq Al-Awsat, December 23, 2024.

²Observatorio de Terrorismo, "Terrorism and Organized Crime: Arms Trafficking and Smuggling in North Africa and the Sahel," 2023, 2-4.

³The Algerian Approach in Mali: Betting on a Political Solution to Prevent Collapse," Ultra Algeria, May 2, 2025.

⁴Belil and Kassi, "The Repercussions of the Libyan Crisis," opcit p 300

⁵United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel, Document no. 2056, June 14, 2013, para. 23.

⁶Assi, "The Impact of Regional Threats," opcit p 9

energy facilities, confirming that Sahel-based terrorism is no longer a local threat but an existential one that can strike the heart of Algeria's economic and strategic security.¹

We summarize this reality by stating, "Algeria is among the countries that have suffered and continue to suffer from the repercussions of the volatile security situation in the Sahel, which has become a major source of crises that now threaten the very Existence of the nation-state."²

Algeria's strategy in confronting external security and military challenges: Political Strategies

1-Legal and Institutional Pillar (Criminal Policy): Algeria acceded to international conventions against organized crime, ratified numerous international and Arab conventions, and incorporated them into national legislation (laws against money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorism), providing authorities with necessary legal tools.³

2-Non-interference in internal affairs of states and self-management of regional security (Refus de toute intervention extérieure) — which explains Algeria's rejection of French military intervention in Mali (Operation Barkhane) and in the region.

3-Constitutional amendment of 2020: Article 31: Algeria may participate in peacekeeping operations within the framework of the UN, African Union, and Arab League (lifting the previous ban).⁴

Article 30: The People's National Army is responsible for defending the vital and strategic interests of the country.⁵

¹Dris-AïtHamadouche, Louisa. "Algeria and Security in the Sahel: A Critical Reading of a Paradoxical Approach." *Confluences Méditerranée* 90, no. 3 (2014)p 110

²Salim Belhadj, "The Reality of Security Threats in the African Sahel and Their Implications for Algerian National Security," *Journal of Legal Studies* 10, no. 2 (2024)p 553–581.

³Fatima Filali, "Criminal Policy to Combat Organized Crime in Algerian Legislation," *Journal of Legal and Political Thought* 9, no. 1 (2025)p 648.

⁴ Algerian Constitutional Court, "Constitution of 2020: Amendment Approved by Referendum of November 1, 2020," April 7, 2021, art. 31.

⁵Triaa, "The Constitutional Basis," *opcit* p 1095

Article 91 (paragraph 2): Troop deployment abroad requires parliamentary approval by a two-thirds majority of both chambers (ensuring transparency and democratic legitimacy).¹

4-Refusal of foreign military intervention: The Algerian security doctrine includes "the categorical rejection of foreign military intervention, the refusal to negotiate with terrorist organizations, the institutional criminalization of ransom payments, and opposition to any foreign military presence on its territory."²

Diplomatic Strategies

1-Regional and international cooperation: Exchanging information with other countries including the G5 Sahel countries, despite recent tensions. List of Algeria's ³, main partners:

- The European Union, • The United Nations.

The United States (in the areas of intelligence and counterterrorism, covertly)

- Neighbouring countries (Tunisia, Libya, and Niger) in certain security coordination efforts.⁴strengthening cooperation with security and judicial bodies, active participation in the African Union and United Nations.⁵

2-Mediation in conflicts: Pivotal role in mediating the "Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation" in Mali (2015) as a political solution to the crisis⁶.

3-Opposition to foreign military intervention in Libya and Niger.

¹ Constitution of 2020, art. 91 (para. 2) opcit

² A. Bouragba, "Algeria's National Security Doctrine: Sovereignty, Resilience, and Regional Challenges," *Annales de l'Université d'Alger* 39, no. 4 (2025)p226

³ Algeria's Pioneering Experience in Combating Terrorism and Extremism Praised by Africa," Algeria Press Service (APS), January 22, 2026, <https://www.aps.dz>

⁴ ArabiBoumediene and FawziaKassi, "The Algerian Security Approach in the African Sahel: Toward Activating the Principle of Humanitarian Diplomacy," *Arab Future Journal*, no. 456 (February 2017).

⁵ Constitution of 2020, arts. 31 and 91

⁶ Ben Achour and IbnBouziane, "Algeria's Comprehensive Agenda," opcit p 55

4- Building a "shared security doctrine" with neighboring countries (Mauritania, Tunisia) based on pre-emption and intelligence exchange, despite strained relations with coup regimes.¹

Security Strategies

1-Security and military pillar: Strengthening security presence on borders, monitoring illegal movements, preventing crossing of smugglers, drug traffickers, and illegal immigrants.²

2-Proactive deterrence / Active deterrence: Transition from "border security" to "active deterrence" by pre-empting threats in "blind zones" and neutralizing them before they spill over into the country.³A-Imposing a comprehensive technological blockade on the border strip (982 km with Libya) using an integrated system linking Algerian satellites with reconnaissance drones.⁴B-Updating rules of engagement: treating large smuggling convoys as direct hostile targets.

C-Military manoeuvres (e.g., "Volcano 2019" in Djanet) demonstrating the shift from monitoring to deterrence posture.⁵

3-Strengthening self-reliance: Securing defense and developing security and military plans to combat terrorism and organized crime at the national level, while strengthening the national army.⁶4-Pre-emptive deterrence and independence of military decision-making as fundamental principles of the Algerian security doctrine.⁷

5-The national reconciliation model: Drawing on its "pioneering experience" in combating terrorism and extremism, Algeria offers its expertise as a "model to be

¹ Confronting Security Threats in the African Sahel: The Algerian Approach," Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, accessed April 30, 2026, <https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/16637.aspx>

² "The Effectiveness of the Algerian Approach in Addressing Threats from the African Sahel," Algerian Ministry of National Defense website, accessed April 30, 2026. "

³ Algeria: Combating Transnational Organized Crime," Sawt Al-Akhar, accessed April 30, 2026.

⁴ Karmout, "The Algerian Strategy," 74

⁵ Ahlam Boukerboua, "Counterterrorism Mechanisms in the African Sahel within the Framework of Algerian Security Diplomacy," *Revue Académique de la Recherche Juridique* 12, no. 3 (2022) p 334–357.

⁶ Ibid p 100

⁷ Samah Souhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats," *Al-Risala Journal for Humanities and Research* 8, no. 2 (2023) p 89–90

emulated" in engaging the religious and societal dimensions to combat extremism at its roots.¹

Social Economic Strategies

1-National reconciliation model: Offering Algeria's "pioneering experience" in combating terrorism and extremism as a model to be emulated, engaging religious and societal dimensions to combat extremism at its roots.

2-Addressing root causes of crime: Support for development projects in neighboring countries to tackle poverty and marginalization.

3-Cutting off funding sources: Internationally calling to cut off financial flows that allow terrorist groups to operate, by strengthening financial monitoring and combating illicit smuggling networks.

4-Support for economic development as a complement to security: Development initiatives in neighboring countries to reduce prevailing risks (poverty and marginalization).²

III.2. External political and diplomatic threats

III.2.1. Political and Diplomatic Challenges Foreign Interventions in the Sahel Region

Since the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in 2011, the Sahel region of Africa has witnessed profound geopolitical transformations, making it an arena for competition among multiple international and regional powers. In addition to the security challenges posed by terrorism and organized crime, the political and diplomatic challenges have intensified due to increasing foreign interventions. These interventions include **NATO's** intervention in Libya, the French military intervention in Mali through Operations **Serval** and **Barkhane**, the expansion of the Russian Wagner

¹ AL24 News, "UN Security Council: Algeria Reaffirms Commitment to Sharing Expertise in Combating Terrorism," November 19, 2025, <https://al24news.dz> accessed April 30, 2026

²"The Algerian Approach to Security and Development in the African Sahel Region amid Rising Asymmetric Threats," *DirāsātwaAbḥāth* 16, no. 5 (2024)p 275.

Group and other private military companies, as well as the growing Israeli presence in Morocco, all of which have direct repercussions for Algerian security.

III.2.1.1. NATO's Intervention in Libya: The First Spark of Regional Destabilisation NATO's military intervention in Libya in 2011, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1973, marked a major turning point in the security landscape of the Sahel and Sahara region. Although the operation was launched under the banner of "protecting civilians," its results far exceeded its stated objective. A recent academic study indicates that "NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011, the French interventions in Mali and Niger, and the Russian presence through the **Wagner** Group, complicated the security landscape in the region instead of bringing stability."¹ This resulted in "the rise of new threats, most notably transnational terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration, which have made Algeria's southern borders increasingly vulnerable."² This intervention has created a highly volatile regional environment along Algeria's eastern and southern borders, with Libya becoming a "battlefield," posing a direct threat to Algerian national security. The 2013 terrorist attack on the energy facilities in Tiguentourine is a prime example of how foreign military intervention transformed the Libyan crisis from a local event into a comprehensive regional threat that deeply impacted Algeria's economic and strategic security.³ A study confirmed that "Algeria views any instability in its regional neighbourhood as a direct threat to its national security, as demonstrated by the repercussions of NATO airstrikes in Libya."⁴

III.2.1.2. The French Military Intervention in Mali: Operation Barkhane and Beyond

In January 2013, France launched a military intervention in Mali through Operation **Serval**, which later expanded into Operation **Barkhane**, spanning five

¹Younsi, "Foreign Military Interventions in the African Sahel and Their Impact on Algerian Border Security," *Abhath Journal* 10, no. 2 (2025) p 535–536.

²*Ibid* p 536–537

³Louisa Dris-AïtHamadouche, "Algeria and Security in the Sahel: A Critical Reading of a Paradoxical Approach," *Confluences Méditerranée* 90, no. 3 (2014) p 105–121.

⁴ArabiBoumediene and FawziaKassi, "The Algerian Security Approach in the African Sahel: Toward Activating the Principle of Humanitarian Diplomacy," *Arab Future Journal*, no. 456 (February 2017).

Sahel countries and deploying approximately 5,100 troops. This intervention was ostensibly presented as an effort "to help the Malian government regain control of its territory seized by armed groups and reassert its sovereignty." However, researcher **Debbak** explains that «France's true aim behind this military intervention was to protect its strategic interests in the Sahel region."¹ This intervention had a significant impact on Algeria's security perspective, as Algeria sought to "further secure its southern borders, especially given the growing security threats stemming from French policy in the region, the increased activity of various armed groups in Mali, and the expansion of transnational organized crime."² Malian Prime Minister **Choguel Koukalla Maïga** explicitly expressed the failure of this intervention, stating that "the intervention has effectively partitioned Mali, contributing to making our territory a haven for terrorists who have found refuge and regrouped."³

The withdrawal of French forces from Mali in 2022, and the subsequent termination of the UN mission (MINUSMA), created a security vacuum that other international powers rushed to fill. This further complicated the situation and exacerbated instability on Algeria's borders. A series of military coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) deepened this vacuum, distancing these countries from traditional axes of power and pushing them toward Russia.⁴

III.2.1.3. The Wagner Group and Other Private Military Companies in Libya: A Struggle for Influence on Algeria's Doorstep

The presence of the Russian **Wagner** Group in Libya since October 2018 has posed a new strategic challenge to Algerian security. UN reports have confirmed that "hundreds of mercenaries belonging to the Russian Wagner Group are fighting in Libya in support of military commander **KhalifaHaftar**," with their numbers

¹Dabbak, "The French Military Operation in Mali and Its Impact on Algerian National Security," *Journal of Research in Law and Political Science* 9, no. 2 (2024)p 136–137.

²Mohamed El-Amine, "French Intervention in Mali and Its Impact on the Algerian Security Vision of the Southern Borders," *Marafi Journal for Political and Legal Studies* 1, no. 2 (2022)p 22–23.

³Morgan Artyukhina, "Mali's PM Accuses France of 'De Facto Partition'; Says Operation Barkhane Helped Terrorists Regroup," *Sputnik News*, February 8, 2022.

⁴Htehat, "New Regional Variables and Their Impact on Algeria's Role in the African Sahel," *Academic Journal of Legal and Political Research* 9, no. 1 (2025)p 751–758.

estimated at between 800 and 1,000.¹ Media analyses indicate that the Wagner Group is considered "the Russian equivalent of the American company **Blackwater**," operating under a veil of "ambiguity" that allows Moscow to deny any official role in conflict zones.²

Thanks to this presence, Libya has become "**Wagner's** gateway for bolstering Russian influence in Africa," as Russia seeks to "expand its influence in Africa starting from Libya."³ The group's activities have gone beyond mere military support to controlling vital economic sectors, with its members exploiting "mineral contracts to pay mercenaries' salaries and finance their equipment."⁴ Researchers assert that Russia, through **Wagner**, is striving to build "an anti-democratic and anti-Western coalition capable of competing with the West," thus placing it in direct confrontation with strategic interests. Algerian.⁵

As for **Blackwater**, a confidential UN report revealed that its founder, **Erik Prince**, violated the arms embargo on Libya by deploying a force of foreign mercenaries equipped with attack aircraft and gunboats to eastern Libya at the height of a major battle in 2019.⁶ Investigations also uncovered the presence of Frontier Services Group (**FSG**), also founded by **Erik Prince**, operating in facilities belonging to the Libyan National Army.⁷ This complex network of Russian and American private military companies has turned Libya into an arena for "shadow wars," directly threatening Algerian security across its eastern border.

The Russian presence through the **Wagner** Group (later known as the Africa Legion) represents the most brutal and aggressive face of foreign intervention in Mali.

¹ "Leaked UN Report: Hundreds of Russian 'Wagner' Mercenaries Fighting in Libya," BBC News Arabic, May 7, 2020. accessed April 30, 2026

² Russian Intelligence or Private Company? The Reality of Wagner Fighters in Libya and Syria," Al Jazeera, May 28, 2020. accessed April 24, 2026

³ Jennifer Hollis and Maria Katamadze, "Libya: Wagner's Gateway to Expanding Russian Influence in Africa," DW, March 3, 2024. accessed April 28, 2026

⁴ Nayan Seth, "Assessing the Role of the Wagner Group in Africa," Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts University, September 13, 2023. accessed April 30, 2026

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Declan Walsh, "Erik Prince, Trump Ally, Violated Libya Arms Embargo, U.N. Report Says," The New York Times, February 19, 2021. accessed April 30, 2026

⁷ US Private Security Firms Allegedly Operated at Libyan Military Bases in 2024," Pravda, May 28, 2025. accessed April 30, 2026

Since its arrival in 2021, following the withdrawal of French forces, the group has become the ruling military junta's strike force, receiving substantial payments estimated at around \$200 million and being granted broad powers in mining areas.¹ The peak of tension with Algeria came in the bloody battle that took place in the border town of **Tin Zaouatine** in July 2024. In a well-executed ambush by the National Movement for the Liberation of **Azawad (MNLA)**, the **Wagner** Group and the Malian army suffered their heaviest losses since the group's deployment in Africa, with more than 80 Wagner fighters and dozens of Malian soldiers killed near the border.² This incident shocked Algeria, which found itself on the front line between the two sides of the conflict, prompting it to reinforce its military capabilities along the border and receive waves of displaced civilians fleeing the fighting. Algeria has considered the presence of "private armies," as it described them at the United Nations, a flagrant violation of international law, demanding sanctions against attacks targeting civilians.³ Despite Wagner's announcement of the end of its mission in June 2025 and the withdrawal of its personnel, a state of anxiety still prevails along the Algerian border, not only because of the immediate threat posed by remnants of the mercenaries, but also because of their heavy legacy: the proliferation of weapons, the deepening of sectarian tensions, and the weakening of the central state, which creates a security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations.⁴

III.2.1.4. Emirati Infiltration: The Emirati role in Mali is no longer limited to economic investment or humanitarian work, but has developed significantly to include influential military and security dimensions. Algeria views this encroachment with suspicion, considering the **UAE's** moves in Mali and Niger, which represent its "strategic depth," as aimed at encircling and besieging it regionally.⁵ Western

¹A. Younsi, "Foreign Military Interventions in the African Sahel and Their Impact on Algerian Border Security," *Abhath Journal* 10, no. 2 (2025)p 536.

²BBC News Arabic, "Details of the Attack that Killed Dozens of Wagner Fighters on the Algerian-Malian Border," July 29, 2024, 1.

³Younsi, "Foreign Military Interventions," opcit p 540.

⁴ Emirates Policy Center, "Withdrawal of Russian Wagner Forces and the Future of the Political-Security Situation," EPC, June 17, 2025, 3.

⁵Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, "The UAE in Mali and Niger: Algeria Concerned about 'Deploying Mercenaries,'" *Ra'y Al-Jadeed*, May 22, 2025, 2.

investigations, including a Pentagon report, have revealed the UAE's role in financing Wagner Group operations in Libya, a partnership pattern believed to have extended to the financial arena. The UAE benefits from the Russian group's expertise in managing proxy conflicts and securing economic interests, such as the gold trade, through which tons of the precious metal pass unregulated.¹ Observers believe the UAE's objective goes beyond merely undermining Algeria's traditional influence in the region. It extends to securing a strategic foothold on the African continent's flank by supporting the ruling military juntas in Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, and by offering "security roadmaps" that disregard the local aspirations of ethnic and social groups, thus fueling the cycle of violence instead of resolving it. This support enables these regimes to persist with their military options, disregarding the political solutions that Algeria has long advocated, such as the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement.²

III.2.1.5. The Turkish Footprint: Drones as a Tool for Expansion

Turkish intervention in Mali is more pronounced, focusing on the military-technical aspect, specifically through the **Bayraktar TB2** drones. These drones have proven effective in shifting the balance of power in several regional conflicts. The coup authorities in Bamako have received several batches of these drones since 2023, the last of which was six in January 2024. This move was seen as an attempt by the military junta to diversify its arms sources away from its traditional allies (France and Russia), and, on the other hand, a calculated Turkish step to bolster its influence in West Africa.³ The matter has not been limited to supplying weapons, but has extended to their actual use on the ground.

These drones have become a direct tool for igniting tension on the Algerian border. In late August, the Algerian army detected a drone of this type flying in a sensitive border area, forcing the Algerian Air Force to intervene with its **Sukhoi 30** aircraft and force it to withdraw.⁴ Algeria considers these movements a direct threat to its national security and a violation of its air sovereignty, as this advanced technology

¹Syrian TV, "The United States Accuses the UAE of Financing Russian Wagner Mercenaries," December 2, 2020, 1. accessed April 27, 2026

²Belhadj, "The Impact of Foreign Intervention," opcit p 7.

³Monte Carlo Doualiya, "Mali Receives a New Batch of Turkish 'Bayraktar' Drones," January 5, 2024, 1

⁴Nichan.ma, "Turkish Drones Rekindle Tensions between Mali and Algeria," September 3, 2024, 1

gives unstable military systems the ability to carry out offensive and reconnaissance operations near its borders without coordination, which increases the level of risk and the likelihood of unintended clashes.

III.2.1.6. The Zionist Presence in Morocco and its Repercussions for Algerian Security:

The normalization of Moroccan-Israeli relations, culminating in the Abraham Accords of 2020, constituted a dangerous strategic shift in the geopolitical landscape of North Africa and a direct threat to Algerian national security. A recent academic study examines "the impact of the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel in 2020 on Algerian national security, considering it a strategic shift in the geopolitical landscape of North Africa in general, and Algeria in particular."¹

This cooperation was not limited to the diplomatic sphere but extended to military and intelligence cooperation. In 2025, the third meeting of the Israeli-Moroccan Joint Military Committee was held, approving a "Joint Action Plan for 2026." This plan included "bilateral meetings and visits by Moroccan military personnel to Israeli army units, arms manufacturing companies, and key Israeli security institutions."² This qualitative development represented "a strengthening of the Israeli security presence in North Africa, constituting a strategic shift in the geopolitical balance."³

For Algeria, "the Israeli-Moroccan strategic military partnership will contribute to reshaping regional balances in North Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region, posing a threat and encirclement to Algerian national security."⁴ Another study considered that "the Israeli threat to Algeria also represents a threat to the Russian presence in North Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region," adding an international dimension to the regional conflict.⁵ This rapprochement is of particular concern to Algeria, given its historically

¹Rabbah, "Moroccan-Israeli Normalization and Its Implications for Algerian National Security," *Al-Naqid Journal for Political Studies* 9, no. 1 (2025)p 102–103.

² Moroccan-Israeli Cooperation Intensifies: What about Algerian National Security?" *Al Mayadeen*, January 13, 2026. accessed April 17, 2026

³ *ibid*

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ *Ibid*

strained relations with Morocco and its principled stance in support of the Palestinian cause and its rejection of the Israeli occupation. For normalization.¹

Repercussions of the threats

The threats are no longer theoretical; they have transformed into systematic and repeated attempts to infiltrate Algerian borders.¹-Systematic and repeated infiltration attempts **across** Algeria's southern borders, specifically in the **In Guezzam region** (bordering Niger and Mali), by heavily armed foreign militants aiming to carry out terrorist or reconnaissance operation²-Violation of Algerian national sovereignty in sensitive border areas with **Mali** and **Niger** as a result of these operations²

3-The transformation of the Sahel region (particularly Mali, Niger, and Libya) into a breeding ground for mercenaries and foreign fighters who move freely across borders, posing a structural threat to regional security.

4-Difficulty in controlling the Algeria-Niger border (1,374 km long) and the border with Mali, due to tribal intermingling, the vastness of the **Sahara Desert**, the chaos of weapons proliferation, and foreign interventions in **Mali and Libya** that are tearing apart the social and security fabric of the **entire Sahel region**.³

Algerian strategy¹-Principled rejection of foreign intervention **in the** Sahel-Sahara region:

A-Reaffirmation of the "rejection of all forms of foreign intervention" because experiences have proven their "utter failure."⁴B-Statement by **General Saïd Chengriha** (Algerian Army Chief of Staff): "Algeria rejects any form of foreign

¹ Algerian Discontent over Morocco's Normalization with Israel," DW, December 12, 2020

²Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, "The Algerian Army Announces the Elimination of Foreign Armed Elements Who Infiltrated the Borders," March 22, 2022, 1.

³ Al Jazeera, "'Borders Drawn by Camel Tracks': Understanding the Conflict in Mali and the Greater Sahara," May 2, 2026, 2.

⁴"Algeria Reaffirms Its Rejection of Foreign Intervention in the Sahel-Sahara Region," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, April 2, 2023.

intervention in the **Sahel-Sahara region**, because it is an approach that has proven its utter failure."¹

1. Political solutions and mediation in **Mali and Libya**: Reliance on preventive diplomacy and mediation, most notably the "2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in **Mali**" (the Algiers Agreement).²
2. Regional and bilateral cooperation with **Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Tunisia**: Participation in the "Joint Operational Staff Committee" (**Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger**).
3. A- An initiative aimed at "injecting new dynamism into counter-terrorism efforts" in the region, based on the principle that each country confronts the threat using its own capabilities.
 B- Security cooperation with **Mauritania and Tunisia** and the pursuit of a "common security doctrine" based on proactive measures and intelligence sharing.³
4. The comprehensive approach (security and development) in the Sahel countries: Four fundamental dimensions: respect for sovereignty, rejection of interference, encouragement of dialogue, and rebuilding the self-reliance of the region's countries economically, politically, militarily, and security-wise.⁴

¹"Algeria Rejects All Forms of Foreign Intervention under the Pretext of Counterterrorism in the Sahel-Sahara Region," RT Arabic, April 2, 2023.

²Mohamed JawadBemrah, "The Algerian Strategy to Confront New Security Threats in the African Sahel," Strategic Studies and Political Research 2, no. 2 (2023)p 81–82.

³ "Algeria Reaffirms Its Rejection of Foreign Intervention," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed

⁴The Algerian Strategy in the African Sahel: Toward a Regional Security Architecture," MadaratSiyasiyya 2, no. 4 (2018): 161–163



Figure 3: Map of Foreign Powers and Regional Actors in the Sahel
<https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Sahel-MIG-2018-900x600.png>

Regional Conflicts and Their Impact on Algeria: Algerian national security cannot be approached in isolation from the network of regional conflicts that encircle the country from the east, west, and south. Alongside the chronic hotspots of tension in the African Sahel, the Western Sahara issue and the associated Algerian-Moroccan conflict stand at the forefront of direct threats, given their existential nature and profound repercussions on the foundations of the state and society. This paper seeks to analyse these conflicts from the perspective of their impact on Algerian security, and then to deconstruct the foundations of the strategy adopted by Algeria to contain them.

The Algerian-Moroccan Conflict

1. The Historical Roots of the Conflict (1963-1972) the roots of the conflict go back to the colonial era and the immediate post-independence period. France demarcated the

western borders of Algeria (which was under occupation) and annexed the **Tindouf** and **Béchar** regions, areas that the Kingdom of Morocco considers a natural extension of its historical territory.¹ One year after Algeria's independence, the Sand War broke out in October 1963, a short but deeply impactful conflict.² The 1972 Treaty of Aguerid ended Morocco's official claims to **Béchar** and **Tindouf**, but it failed to build genuine trust.³ The dispute remained dormant, and then erupted again with the emergence of the Western Sahara issue, which became a bargaining chip in Algerian-Moroccan relations.⁴ Recent years have witnessed a dangerous escalation in the conflict, transforming it from a political dispute into something resembling a regional cold war. On August 24, 2021, Algeria announced the severing of diplomatic relations with Rabat, accusing it of committing "hostile acts."⁵ This break was accompanied by an unprecedented arms race, with Algeria raising its defence budget to record levels exceeding \$20 billion annually.⁶ The tripartite normalization agreement between Morocco, Israel, and the United States in 2020 also represented a direct strategic threat in Algeria's view.⁷ Since then, the two countries have entered a state of neither war nor peace, governed by a dynamic of "military deterrence at the expense of diplomatic solutions."

The Western Sahara issue is considered "one of the oldest and most complex regional conflicts on the African continent"; For Algeria, it is a "decolonization issue and a people's right to self-determination," while Morocco considers it a "matter of existence and national sovereignty."⁸ The issue has become a "powder keg threatening the stability and security of the North African region" after becoming "a source of worrying tensions between Algeria and Morocco at the level of the Security Council."⁹ The tripartite Madrid Agreement of November 1975 ended the Spanish

¹WalidBadran, "The Story of the Sand War between Morocco and Algeria," BBC News Arabic, October 8, 2025, paras. 4

²Ibid., para. 5

³ibid," para. 9.

⁴ Ibid para. 5

⁵International Crisis Group (ICG), "Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco," Report no. 247, November 29, 2024, 1–2

⁶"Algeria Strengthens Its Army to Face Regional Threats," ADF Magazine (published by U.S. Africa Command), May 13, 2025, para. 1.

⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Managing Tensions," 4–5.

⁸Monte Carlo Doualiya, "Mali Receives a New Batch of Turkish 'Bayraktar' Drones," January 5, 2024, 1.

⁹Nichan.ma, "Turkish Drones Rekindle Tensions between Mali and Algeria," September 3, 2024, 1.

colonial presence in Western Sahara and divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania.¹ This agreement was the culmination of the peaceful Green March organized by Morocco in the same year, which exerted enormous popular and diplomatic pressure on Spain.² This was followed by a fierce war between Morocco and the **Polisario** Front between 1975 and 1991, which ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire and the establishment of MINURSO to organize a referendum on self-determination, a referendum that has been stalled ever since.³ Views differ on the essence of the conflict. While Morocco considers it a matter of national sovereignty and proposes an autonomy initiative The expanded territory under its sovereignty is considered a final solution,⁴ while Algeria and the **Polisario** Front maintain that it is a decolonization issue that the United Nations must organize through a free and fair referendum.⁵ In a crucial development, on October 31, 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2797, which described the Moroccan autonomy proposal as a "realistic and credible solution," a move strongly rejected by Algeria, which considered it a departure from the UN Charter.

The Western Sahara issue is considered "one of the oldest and most complex regional conflicts on the African continent." For Algeria, it is a "decolonization issue and a people's right to self-determination," while Morocco considers it a "matter of existence and national sovereignty."⁶ The issue has become a "powder keg threatening the stability and security of the North African region" after it became "a source of worrying tensions between Algeria and Morocco at the Security Council level."⁷

Algeria's unwavering support for the **Polisario** Front, including its hosting of the **Tindouf** camps, constitutes a fundamental pillar of the Algerian position, leading

¹ The Madrid Tripartite Agreement: When Spain Divided Western Sahara," Al Jazeera, November 6, 2019, para. 3.

² The Green March: When Hassan II Mobilized 350,000 Moroccans to Liberate the Sahara," France 24, November 6, 2019, para. 2.

³ Zahra Menasri, "Algerian Foreign Policy and Regional Crises: A Case Study of Decolonization in Western Sahara and the Libyan Crisis," Al-Ustadh Researcher Journal for Legal and Political Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2022) p 108–109.

⁴ The Autonomy Initiative in Western Sahara: Legal and Political Dimensions and Scenarios for Conflict Resolution," True Studies, November 10, 2025, paras. 15–18.

⁵ Menasri, "Algerian Foreign Policy," opcit 110.

⁶ Algeria Strengthens Its Army to Face Regional Threats," ADF Magazine (published by U.S. Africa Command), May 13, 2025, para. 1.

⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Managing Tensions," opcit 4–5.

Rabat to describe Algeria as “an original party to the conflict and not a neutral mediator.”¹ UN Resolution 2797 (October 31, 2025), which deemed “autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty a realistic solution,” has complicated matters and increased pressure on Algerian diplomacy.²

1. The direct military and security threat: Algeria's 1,559-kilometer border with Morocco has, in recent years, become a "hotbed of intermittent crises concerning sovereignty and security."³ This border has witnessed serious security incidents, most notably the killing of three Algerian citizens in the disputed Western Sahara region (November 2021), which the Algerian presidency considered an "attack with sophisticated weaponry."⁴

2. The economic threat: The closure of the land border between Algeria and Morocco (indefinitely since 1994) has deprived both countries of substantial trade gains. Estimates indicate that "the severing of relations inflicts heavy losses on both economies," hindering Maghreb integration and impeding development efforts.⁵ Major projects, such as the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, are also disrupted by instability in Mali and Niger.

3. The sovereign and geopolitical threat: Algeria finds itself besieged by simultaneous crises along its borders. The shift in the regional balance of power in favor of opposing axes (the Sahel Tripartite Alliance and the Moroccan-Israeli rapprochement after 2020) has eroded Algeria's traditional influence in the region. Algeria considers Israel's increasingly strong relations with Morocco a threat to its national security.⁶

4. The Societal Threat: Multiple conflicts have contributed to waves of displacement and refugees, particularly from Libya and Mali, creating demographic and security

¹A Younsi, “Foreign Military Interventions in the African Sahel and Their Impact on Algerian Border Security,” *Abhath Journal* 10, no. 2 (2025) p 536.

²BBC News Arabic, “Details of the Attack that Killed Dozens of Wagner Fighters on the Algerian-Malian Border,” July 29, 2024, accessed April 20, 2026

³Algeria–Morocco... From Flexible Sovereignty to Firmness in Securing Borders,” *Echorouk Online*, February 15, 2026. (paras. 1–2)

⁴Tensions between Algeria and Morocco: The Beginning of a Cold Regional War,” *Middle East Institute (MEI)*, November 12, 2023. (paras. 1–2)

⁵Severing Relations between Algeria and Morocco... Heavy Losses for Both Sides,” *Al-Araby Al-Jadeed*, August 28, 2021. (paras. 1–3)

⁶Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco,” *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, Report no. 247, November 29, 2024. (paras. 4–5)

pressures on the eastern and southern border regions and facilitating the infiltration of smuggling networks.

Algeria's Strategy for Addressing Regional Conflicts

The Algerian strategy is based on the principle of a “comprehensive approach” that combines hard and soft power dimensions. This strategy can be broken down into four main axes. It is noteworthy that Algeria “adopts a defensive strategy that seeks to protect its national interests, ensure its national security, and secure its borders in light of the transformations in the regional and international environment.”¹

1. The Military-Intelligence Axis: Algeria has invested heavily in modernizing its military capabilities, strengthening its defence system along its three borders (western, eastern, and southern). The 2020 constitutional amendment enshrined the possibility of the People's National Army deploying beyond the borders “whenever national security is threatened,” thus granting the military establishment greater strategic flexibility.² Algeria's defence budget has reached record levels in recent years, exceeding \$20 billion annually, remaining the largest in Africa.³

2. The Diplomatic Axis: Algeria upholds the principles of “positive neutrality and mediation” as a consistent approach in its foreign policy. Regarding the Libyan conflict, it has led a regional mediation effort that rejects a military solution. Regarding the Western Sahara issue, Algeria “affirms that a settlement to the conflict can only be achieved through direct and sincere negotiations between the Polisario Front and the Kingdom of Morocco,” and continues to garner African and international support for this position.⁴ It has recently been keen to emphasize its readiness to support “any mediation initiative between Morocco and the Polisario.”⁵

¹SamahSahailia, “Algerian National Security Strategy in Light of New Security Threats,” *Al-Risala Journal for Humanities and Research*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2023)p 91.

²FouadKhoualdia, “Algeria's Security Doctrine in the Face of Security Threats in the Maghreb and the African Sahel,” *Algerian Journal of Law and Political Science*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2021)p 860–862.

³Algeria Strengthens Its Army to Face Regional Threats,” *ADF Magazine* (published by U.S. Africa Command), May 13, 2025. (paras. 1–2)

⁴Algeria Thwarts a Moroccan Maneuver at the UN Security Council and Reinforces Direct Negotiations,” *AkhbarDzair* (akhbardzair.dz), October 31, 2025. (paras. 1–2)

⁵“Algeria: The UN Security Council Has Not Recognized Morocco's Alleged Sovereignty over Western Sahara,” *DW Arabic*, November 18, 2025. (paras. 5–6)

3. The Developmental and Economic Axis: Algerian decision-makers firmly believe that addressing the root causes of instability requires a developmental approach. In this context, Algeria announced initiatives to establish free trade zones with neighboring countries and sought to finance infrastructure projects in northern Mali and Niger, based on the premise that economic development is a fundamental pillar for achieving stability.¹ 4. The Axis of Regional and International Cooperation: Algeria is keen to emphasize the “independence” of its security approach, as it “insists on the value of independence in its vision for the regional security architecture,” according to a researcher at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies.² Nevertheless, it is an active partner in collective African mechanisms—such as the African Union and the African Intelligence and Security Committee (CISSA)—and does not object to cooperating with international partners (the United States, Russia, and the European Union) in the areas of counterterrorism and intelligence sharing, provided that its sovereignty and decision-making independence are respected.³

III.2.2. International political pressures

Algeria, by virtue of its geostrategic location in North Africa and the Sahel region, faces a multitude of complex security challenges. These challenges stem not only from its turbulent regional environment but are also fuelled by growing international political pressure. This pressure, which takes various forms ranging from political conditionality and economic sanctions to human rights campaigns and military interventions in neighbouring countries, seeks to reshape the state's national choices in accordance with the international interests of major powers. In this context, a key question arises: How do international political pressures affect Algerian national security, and what strategies has Algeria adopted to counter them? This study aims to analyze the patterns of these pressures and their impact on Algerian security in its

¹ToufikBousti, “The Algerian Strategy to Confront New Security Threats in the Sahel-Sahara Region,” *Abhath Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2021)p 810–812.

²Houssam Hamza, “Algeria and Security Threats in the Sahel: Perception and Mechanisms of Response,” *Arab Policies* (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies), no. 21 (July 2016)p 108.

³“Algeria and Washington Discuss the Situation in the African Sahel and the Sahara Region,” *Anadolu Agency* (aa.com.tr), April 29, 2026. (paras. 1–2)

various dimensions, and then to evaluate the strategy Algeria has developed to address them, drawing on a range of academic sources and specialized studies.

III.2.2.1. Patterns of International Political Pressure on Algeria: The forms of international political pressure exerted on Algeria by major powers and international financial institutions are numerous and can be categorized into the following patterns: Direct Political Pressure and Adaptation to the International System The international transformations of the early 1990s contributed to an increase in political pressure on Algeria. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of what became known as the "New World Order" reshaped the international environment, directly impacting countries that belonged to the socialist bloc or adopted policies inspired by it, including Algeria.¹ This manifested itself in the demands of Western powers for Algeria to adopt multi-party politics and abandon the one-party system, culminating in the 1989 constitution, which opened the door to political pluralism. This transformation posed a significant challenge to the continued application of the most important principles of Algerian foreign policy doctrine, established since independence.²

However, these transformations were not merely negative pressures; they also presented an opportunity to reposition Algerian diplomacy. Algeria's current diplomatic efforts are an inevitable response to the new directions of its foreign policy, given the security challenges facing the country and its regional environment. This has prompted President Abdelmadjid Tebboune's administration to embody a new concept of an active and proactive Algerian foreign policy, enabling it to regain its vital role in international forums and position itself as an influential regional power.³

III.2.2.2. International Economic Pressures Structural Adjustment Programs and Conditionality: International financial institutions, primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, constituted a major channel of pressure on Algeria. Following the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s, Algeria

¹HamidaBaouni, Lectures on the Algerian Political System (Algiers: University Press, 2020),p 145.

²RabahZaghouni, "The Crisis of Algerian Foreign Policy between the Legacy of Principles and the Logic of Interests," Siyassa Arabiya Journal, no. 22 (September 2016)p 67.

³ Middle East Center for Strategic Studies, "New Trends in Algerian Foreign Policy" (2023)p 6.

suffered a severe debt crisis. Its external debt reached \$26 billion in 1986, then rose to \$28.81 billion in 1989, and reached \$29.48 billion in 1994.¹In this context, Algeria resorted to borrowing from the IMF, which, in turn, imposed a structural adjustment program (1994-1998). The expanded financing program from which Algeria benefited was tied to a set of conditions in the form of imposed economic policies.² The privatization of industrial enterprises in Algeria was launched in 1995 under the structural adjustment program applied to an economy that was in default.³The program concluded between Algeria and the International Monetary Fund extended over three years, from May 22, 1995, to May 21, 1998, and was based on austerity measures that included lifting subsidies on basic commodities, liberalizing foreign trade, and privatizing public enterprises.⁴ These policies had profound political dimensions, as they were linked to weakening the state's economic and social role and reducing the role of the public sector in the national economy, which had direct repercussions on internal stability and, consequently, on national security.⁵

III.2.2.3.Human Rights and Value Pressures: Algeria is facing increasing international pressure regarding human rights and civil liberties, taking various forms such as reports issued by international NGOs, statements from Western governments, and direct diplomatic pressure. Reports issued by the US State Department have documented significant human rights issues in Algeria, including credible allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by members of the security forces.⁶

The issue of religious freedoms stands out as a prominent tool of human rights pressure on Algeria, with criticism of this area having intensified recently. Three international NGOs—Euro Med Rights, Human Rights Watch, and MENA Rights

¹ University of Mila, “Lectures on the Structural Adjustment Program in Algeria (1994–1998)p” 4–5, <https://elearning.univ-mila.dz>

² University of Mila, “Lectures on the Structural Adjustment Program in Algeria (1994–1998)p” 7.

³RatibaSaadoun, *La privatisation des entreprises industrielles en Algérie: analyse, histoire et développement* (PhDdiss., Université Lumière Lyon 2, 2012)p 45.

⁴ International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Algeria: Stabilization and Transition to Market*, Occasional Paper No. 98/013 (1998)p 14–17.

⁵AntarBoutiara and El HachemiBenouadah, “An Econometric Analysis of Unemployment Rates in Algeria (1990–2015) under Government Policies and Programs,” *Ijtihad Journal of Legal and Economic Studies* 8, no. 1 (2019)p 416.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Algeria 2022 Human Rights Report* (2023)p 1–2

Group—sent a joint letter to the Pope, urging him to raise human rights and religious freedom issues with the Algerian authorities. They expressed concern about legal and administrative restrictions affecting minorities, including Protestant Christians.¹ International human rights organizations also call on the Algerian authorities to end excessive restrictions on civil society organizations and enact a new law regulating associations.² These human rights issues are sometimes used as a tool to undermine the state's reputation and pressure it to change its domestic policies, indirectly impacting national security by weakening internal cohesion and fueling social tensions.

III.2.2.4. Media and Diplomatic Pressures: In addition to the aforementioned pressures, Algeria faces what can be described as international media pressure. The Algerian Minister of Communication, **Mohamed Meziane**, stated that more than 9,000 journalists worldwide are working to tarnish Algeria's image, sparking widespread controversy within media circles.³ These statements reflect an official awareness of organized media campaigns aimed at damaging Algeria's reputation and weakening its negotiating position on the international stage. On the diplomatic front, pressure on Algeria to change its stances on certain regional issues has posed a significant challenge. International and regional actors have attempted to pressure Algeria into abandoning its traditional foreign policy principles. This was recently exemplified by the Malian Foreign Minister's accusations that Algeria "harbors terrorists" and allows armed groups to use its territory—accusations that reflect the extent of the pressure facing Algerian diplomacy in the Sahel region.⁴

The Impact of International Pressure on Algerian Security The interaction between these forms of international pressure has multifaceted effects on Algerian security. **Economic pressures** leading to austerity and privatization policies, contributing to growing social discontent that provides fertile ground for extremist

¹ Human Rights Pressure on Algeria Ahead of the Pope's Visit Revives the Issue of Religious Freedom," Sift Platform, April 11, 2026, <https://sifreports.com/ar/>

² "Algeria: Unjustified Restrictions on Associations Must Be Lifted," MENA Rights, September 25, 2025, <https://menarights.org/> accessed April 23, 2026

³ More than 9,000 Journalists Worldwide Distort Algeria's Image," Al-Quds Al-Arabi, February 12, 2025, <https://www.alquds.co.uk/> accessed April 23, 2026

⁴ With Rising Chaos in Mali: The Growing Role of Algeria," Assahifa, 2026, <https://www.assahifa.com/> accessed April 23, 2026

groups **Exploitation of human rights pressures** by internal and external actors to undermine the legitimacy of the state, weakening home front cohesion and its ability to withstand threats.

Transformation of political and economic challenges into comprehensive security challenges affecting the very core of state stability and its capacity to perform essential functions¹.

International interventions in the Sahel region (the former French military presence and the growing Russian-Western rivalry) that create chronic instability on Algeria's borders and give rise to new threats: transnational terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration²**Cyber security threats** that are transnational in nature, where cyberspace is used as a new arena for conflict, including attempts to control and disrupt defense systems, disable weapons systems, and breach national security, with the identity of perpetrators often unclear, making response complex.³

International pressures on internal political stability, especially pressures for rapid democratic transition without regard for national specificities (as occurred in the early 1990s, plunging the country into a spiral of bloody violence), and continued human rights and political pressures that create uncertainty and hinder difficult strategic decisions⁴

Algeria's Strategy for Countering International Pressures and Ensuring its Security: Faced with these multiple and intertwined pressures, Algeria has developed a comprehensive and phased strategy based on a set of principles and mechanisms that combine the defence of national sovereignty, the strengthening of its own capabilities, and active diplomacy, according to the following axes:

1.Adherence to national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs: A- A foundational principle in the constitution and diplomatic practice; the first line of

¹Souhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy," opcit p 89.

²Younsi, "Foreign Military Interventions," opcit p540

³Bemrah, "Algerian Defense Strategy to faced Cyber Threats," Al-Risala Journal 10, no. 1 (2025)p 876–877.

⁴Souhailia, "Algerian National Security Strategy," opcit p94.

defense against pressures.¹B-Rejection of mediation in national and bilateral crises, adopting political and negotiated solutions²

2.Strengthening indigenous military and security capabilities: A-Development of the People's National Army, modernization of equipment, diversification of armament sources to achieve strategic independence.B-Three principles: non-interference in others' affairs, non-deployment of the army outside national territory except in specific cases (2020 Constitution), internal management of regional security (rejecting any external interference).C-Adoption of pre-emptive deterrence and independent military decision-making.³

3.The development-security approach (addressing root causes of threats):

A- An integrated strategy combining security measures (enhanced surveillance and proactive operations), diplomatic efforts (rejecting foreign intervention and supporting peaceful settlements), and development programmers in the South.

B- Affirmation that sustainable solutions require African-African cooperation free from foreign tutelage ⁴

4.Preventive diplomacy and mediation as an alternative to military intervention:

A-An alternative model to military intervention, exemplified by leading the international mediation in the Malian crisis and the signing of the "Algiers Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali" (2014-2015).B-This has earned Algerian diplomacy regional and international credibility as an indispensable "stabilizing force."⁵

¹ Algeria Reaffirms Its Commitment to the Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of States,” Radio Algeria, October 12, 2021, <https://radioalgerie.dz> accessed 1May, 2026

²AlaaAssilBoualnawar, “The Principle of Rejecting Mediation in Algerian Foreign Policy,” El Wassat Newspaper, October 26, 2025, <https://elwassat.dz> accessed 1May, 2026

³Geneva Institute, “Algerian Border Security Strategy: Security Challenges, Global Strategy, Leadership,” April 13, 2025, 2.

⁴Younsi, “Foreign Military Interventions,”opcit p 543.

⁵ Algerian Diplomacy and International Crises in Light of President Tebboune’s Directives,” Sawt Al-Ahrar, 2022, <https://www.sawtalahrar.dz/> accessed 1May, 2026

5. Adapting to cyberspace and enhancing information security:

A-National Cyber security Strategy 2025-2029 (announced 3 March 2026) aiming to "provide a comprehensive framework ensuring national cyber resilience and protecting the state's digital infrastructure and data."¹

B-A proactive and anticipatory approach including secure digital infrastructure, national personnel training, stringent cybercrime legislation, and strengthening digital sovereignty.²

5. Building balanced and multipolar international partnerships:

A-Openness to rising powers (China, Russia) while maintaining traditional relations with the EU and the US, providing greater diplomatic maneuvering space. Commitment to OPEC and OPEC+ membership as pillars of global oil market stability, while preserving decision-making independence.³

B-Diversifying economic and military partnerships (Chinese cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy, Russian partnership in military and technological fields, balanced C-relations with the EU) to enhance state resilience and reduce the possibility of external parties using economic or technological leverage.⁴

III.3. Economic and external strategic challenges External economic and strategic challenges are embodied in the structural disruptions to energy markets and excessive exposure to global exchanges, which undermine the reinter resources that form the cornerstone of financing social stability through government support mechanisms.

¹ Algerian Ministry of National Defense, "Information Systems Security Agency Publishes the National Cybersecurity Strategy," March 3, 2026, <https://www.mdn.dz> accessed 1May, 2026

² National Cybersecurity Strategy 2025–2029 in Algeria," Dyma One, March 27, 2026, <https://dyma-one.com/>

³ Algeria Reaffirms Its Commitment to OPEC and OPEC+ as Pillars of Global Oil Market Stability," RT Arabic, 2026, <https://arabic.rt.com/> accessed 1May, 2026

⁴Algeria and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Wikipedia, accessed May 3, 2026, <https://ar.wikipedia.org/>

III.3.1. Global Energy Price Fluctuations and Their Impact on the Algerian Economy

Global energy markets are characterized by sharp and continuous fluctuations, which are exacerbated during international crises. Oil and gas prices are subject to a complex interplay of factors, including geopolitical tensions, supply and demand volatility, decisions by producing organizations such as **OPEC+**, and the shift towards renewable energy. Recent decades have witnessed several major oil shocks, most notably the price collapse in June 2014 when oil prices fell by more than 50%, delivering a severe blow to reinter economies.¹

It is noteworthy that international crises amplify these fluctuations. During the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022), natural gas prices soared to record highs, creating opportunities for gas-producing countries like Algeria, where "pipeline gas flows increased by 22 percent in January 2026"². However, this also generated inflationary pressures on importing countries. In 2026, energy markets became volatile again with escalating tensions related to Iran and the resulting supply disruptions, particularly the threat of the Strait of Hormuz being closed. These developments cast a long shadow over global oil and gas traffic.³ The International Energy Agency also warned of a "**Black April**" after attacks on energy facilities exacerbated the global energy supply crisis.⁴

The Algerian economy suffers from structural fragility in the face of hydrocarbon price shocks, as it is a reinter economy where state revenues depend on the hydrocarbon sector for more than 60% of budget revenues and more than 90% of export earnings.⁵ This fragility was clearly demonstrated during the crisis. In 2014, Algeria faced a major crisis that severely impacted state revenues and led to a dangerous depletion of its foreign currency reserves, with a record budget deficit of

¹ Abdelkader Bahih, "Challenges of the Algerian Economy in the Face of Oil Price Shocks (1986–2015)," *Journal of Finance and Business Economics* 2, no. 1 (2018) p396.

² Experts: Algeria Facing a Strategic Opportunity," *El Khabar*, April 21, 2026.

³ "Algeria at the Heart of the Energy Crisis: Can It Meet Growing Demand?" *Al Jazeera*, April 6, 2026.

⁴ International Energy Agency Warns of a 'Black April' after Targeting 75 Energy Facilities," *Energy Platform*, April 7, 2026.

⁵ Focus Economics, "Algeria Archives," March 4, 2019, <https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/algeria/> accessed 1 May, 2026.

nearly \$25 billion recorded in 2015.¹ Data indicates that Algeria is among the countries that have not paid sufficient attention to other sectors, such as agriculture, industry, and alternative energy sources, since independence, leaving it vulnerable to the negative consequences of successive oil price collapses.² Foreign exchange reserves declined from approximately \$180 billion in 2013 to significantly lower levels in subsequent years, prompting the government to impose strict import restrictions.

III.3.1.1. Economic dependence on foreign markets

The fragility of the Algerian economy is not limited to the volatility of hydrocarbon prices; it extends to a near-total dependence on foreign markets in several vital sectors. Algeria imports enormous quantities of basic foodstuffs, intermediate goods, and equipment, making it highly susceptible to global price fluctuations and supply chain disruptions.³ The figures reveal the marginality of national exports outside of [the country]. Hydrocarbons, where the economic fabric suffers from deep structural imbalances.⁴ In 2024, hydrocarbons accounted for approximately 84% of exports and 48% of public revenues.⁵ This dependence is particularly evident in the food sector, where "continued.

The fact that a significant portion of Algerians' food supply comes from foreign markets makes food sovereignty a strategic issue that transcends its economic dimension.⁶

This dependence has had serious repercussions on the national economy, manifested in "weakened competitiveness of local products, a rising import bill, and a widening trade deficit outside of hydrocarbons," as well as "an imbalance between imports and exports, which deepens dependence on foreign countries and makes the national economy hostage to international fluctuations."⁷

¹Bahih, "Challenges of the Algerian Economy" opcit p 396.

² Ibid p 397–398

³Coface, "Algeria: Country Risk Assessment," January 8, 2026

⁴Ali, "Available Alternatives for Diversifying Rentier Economies under Hydrocarbon Price Fluctuations: The Case of Algeria," *Journal of Economics and Human Development* 7, no. 3 (2016)p 108.

⁵Coface, "Algeria: Country Risk Assessment." opcit

⁶"Food Sovereignty in Algeria: The New Battle for Independence," *Al-Mustathmir*, April 20, 2026.

⁷"The Reality of Foreign Trade Liberalization and Its Impact on the Algerian Economy," *Algerian Journal of Social and Human Sciences* (2017).

III.3.2. Manifestations of International Competition for Energy Resources in the Region International competition for energy resources:

Is one of the most prominent contemporary geopolitical phenomena that directly affect Algerian national security. The Sahel and Sahara region of Africa is one of the most prominent arenas of this competition, "given its vast energy resources, which have formed one of the axes of conflict and competition among the major powers over this region."¹

While "the United States has adopted an approach of geostrategic redeployment in the African continent and specifically in the Sahel region, France is seeking to rebuild its relations with the countries of the region to maintain its position and influence in its former colonies, this in light of growing Chinese influence in the region."² This competition has fuelled internal conflicts, particularly in the Sahel region of Africa, where most countries suffer from instability and weak development. The competition for energy in the Sahel is also the primary driver of the French and American presence in the region.³

The manifestations of this competition extend to the Mediterranean basin as well, where major powers are vying to secure energy supplies, making Algeria a focal point for international actors. This is evident in the unprecedented international diplomatic momentum Algeria has recently witnessed, where the intense diplomatic activity confirms its role as an actor reshaping its position within the international balance of power.⁴

Algeria's Geographical Location: Opportunities and Challenges

Algeria is situated at the heart of one of the world's most dynamic and complex geopolitical environments, where geography intersects with politics, economics, and

¹Mostafa Beshraoui, "International Competition over Energy in the African Sahel and Its Impact on Algeria's Energy Security," *Algerian Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2019) p 95.

²Beshraoui, "International Competition over Energy," *opcit* p96.

³Amina Boubessla, "International Competition over Resources: The Case of the African Sahel-Sahara Region," *Academia Journal* 7, no. 1 (2024) p 225.

⁴"Unprecedented International Diplomatic Momentum: Consolidating Algeria's Role as a Regional Hub," *Al-Youm News*, 2026.

security to create a wide network of challenges and opportunities. The location stretching from the Mediterranean coast to the heart of the African Sahara makes Algeria a country with a multidimensional sphere of influence.¹

Algeria's geographical location is of paramount strategic importance on several levels:

A-Energy level: Its geographical proximity to the European market makes it a preferred energy supplier, as "Algeria's importance is not only related to its share of the European market, but also to its geographical proximity to Europe, a crucial factor during times of crisis."²

B-Security level: Its extensive borders with fragile Sahel countries make it vulnerable to the repercussions of regional instability, including terrorism, smuggling, and organized crime.

C-Economic level: Its position as a gateway between Africa and Europe offers opportunities for trade and investment; however, weak logistical infrastructure limits the exploitation of these opportunities.

However, this location also presents complex challenges, as "the vital space for national security is distributed across three strategic axes: the Mediterranean, the African hinterland, and the eastern and western spaces," thus requiring Algeria to manage a delicate balance between the requirements of security and development.³

¹Abdelkader Brich, "Algeria between Geographical Pressures and Geopolitical Transformations: A Geo-Strategic Reading of the State's Position and Regional Role," *Akhbar Al-Watan*, November 30, 2025.

²"Why Is Algeria Becoming More Important amid the Current Energy Crisis? An American Report," *Algeria Now*, March 10, 2026.

³Brich, "Algeria between Geographical Pressures."

III.3.3. The Impact of International Competition on and Economic Security

International competition for energy resources in the region has direct repercussions on Algerian energy security on several levels:

1-Threats to energy interests: The military and security presence of major powers in the Sahel region poses a potential threat to Algerian energy interests, especially in resource-rich border areas.¹

2-Pressure on economic sovereignty: "Algeria often tries to be an active and influential player, given that this region constitutes a strategic depth for Algeria, considering the sensitivity and complexity of the region and the problems that may arise from it."²

3-Repercussions for national security: State weakness in neighbouring countries facilitates the activities of terrorist groups and smuggling networks targeting Algerian energy and economic facilities.

4-Market competition: Algeria faces increasing competition in European energy markets from other producers such as Qatar, the United States, and Nigeria, which puts pressure on its market share.³ Algeria's strategy in addressing economic and external challenges

A strategy for economic diversification and liberation from hydrocarbon dependency: Recognizing the dangers of excessive dependency on hydrocarbons, Algeria adopted an ambitious strategy years ago to diversify its economy and liberate it from oil revenues. This strategy was embodied in the "Economic Recovery Plan 2020-2024," which aims to "extricate the country from near-total dependency on hydrocarbons."⁴ The pillars of this strategy include:

1-Promoting non-hydrocarbon exports: Algeria launched its largest export campaign to foreign markets, targeting 19 countries, which raised questions about

¹Beshraoui, "International Competition over Energy," opcit p 100–102.

² Ibid p 97

³ "Algeria Moves to Strengthen Its Role in the Turbulent Global Energy Market," Asharq Now, April 20, 2026.

⁴ "Economic Recovery: Roadmap to Get Out of Hydrocarbon Dependency," Algeria Press Service, December 30, 2020.

Algeria's ability to move away from oil dependency towards a diversified and productive economy.¹ These efforts resulted in a significant increase in the country's non-hydrocarbon exports.²

2-Investing in renewable energy: A plan was approved aiming to reach 15,000 megawatts of renewable energy generation capacity by 2035.³

3-Supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs): as a key driver of economic diversification and job creation.

4-Developing the agricultural and industrial sectors: with the goal of achieving food security and reducing imports.

The Algerian banking system suffers from chronic structural flaws that have rendered it incapable of fulfilling its developmental role. This is not limited to the sector's outdated and bureaucratic nature, but extends to a range of dysfunctions, most notably: the absence of : digitalization, the weak link between bank loans and productive investment, the dominance of the informal sector in transactions, and the banks' lack of an active presence on the international financial stage ⁴ This sector can be described as falling short of being a "banking system befitting the mission of economic growth," and is instead governed by an "outdated tax system"—characteristics that point to a structural backwardness incompatible with the ambitions of a country seeking to play influential regional and international roles.⁵

The weak banking presence as a decisive factor in the rejection of **BRICS** membership In August 2023, Algeria was shocked to be excluded from the list of six countries invited to join the **BRICS** bloc, despite the significant diplomatic efforts led by President **Tebboune**. The reasons for the rejection revealed the strict criteria adopted by the bloc. Multiple sources confirmed that among the main reasons for

¹“Can Algeria Break Free from Hydrocarbon Dependency by Exporting to 19 Countries?” Independent Arabia, April 24, 2026.

² *ibid*

³ “Energy Transition Challenges in Oil-Dependent Countries,” Longreads TNI, 2025.

⁴ Algeria on the Threshold of BRICS: A Path of Aspirations and Opportunities,” Middle East Council, 2023, <https://mecouncil.org/>.

⁵Ziad Alam, “La candidature tant rabâchée par Tebboune aux BRICS est rejetée. Les 6 raisons du plus retentissant fiasco de l’histoire des ratages algériens,” Le Collimateur, July 13, 2023.

exclusion were "a lack of economic competitiveness, a weak banking presence in the economy, and a predominance of hydrocarbon exports," in addition to "a lack of prominence on the international financial stage and deficiencies in the banking system."¹.

Algerian policy had heavily relied on its political weight and geostrategic location, but the founding BRICS members, particularly India and Brazil, approached the matter with strict economic pragmatism. The weak banking presence and the "old banking system" were decisive reasons for the exclusion. This rejection came as a shock, prompting an internal review that resulted in the issuance of the Monetary and Credit Law to modernize the system, followed by formal accession to the BRICS New Development Bank in May 2025 in an attempt to build international financial credibility.²1. Modernizing the banking sector and simplifying bureaucratic procedures to "pave the way for foreign investment," with the enactment of new laws such as the Monetary and Credit Law to free the system from its stagnation. ³

2. Securing accession to the **BRICS** New Development Bank in May 2025, a move that reflected an understanding that the path to integration into the new global economic order necessarily involves building the financial and institutional credibility of the national banking sector, even if immediate membership in the political bloc was not feasible. ⁴ 3. Working to digitize the financial sector and reduce the size of the informal economy, which weakens the effectiveness of banks and distances them from the real production cycle.

To conclude, this chapter reveals that the Algerian nation is no longer threatened solely by traditional threats, but now faces a complex web of interconnected and hybrid external challenges. As previously mentioned, the Libyan Sahel region and its surrounding areas are the most dangerous, where the risks of transnational terrorism, organized crime in all its forms (arms and drug trafficking, and illegal immigration),

¹Africa News Agency, "Algeria: BRICS Membership Rejected," July 2023. See also note 1 above.

² Algeria Officially Joins the BRICS New Development Bank," Al Arabiya, May 22, 2025. accessed 2May, 2026

³"Algeria on the Threshold of BRICS."

⁴"Algeria Officially Joins the BRICS New Development Bank," Al Arabiya, May 22, 2025. accessed 2May, 2026

foreign organizations, and international competition for influence intersect. The analysis also showed that these threats are no longer merely physical, but have extended into cyberspace, which has become an arena for psychological warfare and the manipulation of innovation.

To counter this complex web, Algeria has developed a multifaceted strategy based on three pillars: First, deterrence, achieved through the modernization of the armed forces and border police. Second, its long-standing role has been defined by its mediation efforts in neighbouring countries (Mali, Libya, and Niger) and its promotion of development as a tool to achieve its objectives. Third, cybersecurity, which we have chosen to focus on, is vital and resilient against psychological warfare.

Thus, Algeria affirms that protecting its sovereignty is no longer solely based on hard power, but has demonstrated its ability to adapt to a new military landscape and to maintain a balance between firmness and diplomatic acumen. To the extent that Algeria can carefully interpret these developments and engage with us with flexibility and restraint, it will remain impervious to infiltration and immune to covetous ambitions. It will remain committed to ensuring the stability of its citizens and forming the first line of defence for national sovereignty.

Conclusion

This study, which examined Algeria's security strategy in the face of internal threats and external challenges, revealed that security is no longer a static concept solely linked to border protection. Rather, it has become a dynamic process where hard and soft threats intersect, and where internal dynamics meet external pressures. The added value of this work lies in its demonstration that the effectiveness of Algeria's security strategy is measured not only by its deterrent capabilities but also by its ability to anticipate profound transformations, particularly those arising in the gray areas between the internal and external spheres, and between the military and the economic. This constitutes a necessary analytical framework for understanding the nature of this strategy. The study reached a number of key conclusions:

1-Algeria has proven successful in adopting a hybrid security strategy based on two complementary pillars—a rigorous material approach to combating terrorism and organized crime, and a cautious pragmatism in managing external challenges, grounded in a diplomatic legacy that rejects foreign intervention and safeguards its geostrategic position

2-Algeria has achieved tangible progress in combating terrorism and organized crime by developing its military and security capabilities and strengthening coordination among its various agencies. It has also sought to address non-military threats through development and social policies aimed at reducing internal vulnerabilities and addressing the root causes of crises, reflecting a sophisticated understanding of the nature of contemporary threats.

3-Regarding external challenges, the study indicated that the regional and international environment surrounding Algeria is characterised by a high degree of complexity and instability, given the escalation of armed conflicts in the region, the growing phenomenon of transnational terrorism, and the intensifying international competition for resources and strategic locations. Algeria has addressed these challenges by adopting a principle of non-intervention, promoting political and diplomatic solutions, and strengthening its defence capabilities and protecting its borders.

Conclusion

4-Despite strategic efforts and apparent cohesion, the Algerian strategy suffers from structural deficiencies that weaken its long-term sustainability

The most prominent of these is:

A-The continued relative reliance on a traditional security approach at the expense of proactive and preventative measures. Responding to crises remains faster than resolving them, a situation linked to the delayed digitization and restructuring of strategic intelligence. This makes some monitoring mechanisms dependent on adversaries' actions rather than on dismantling threat structures before they form. The study also revealed a fundamental shortcoming:

B-An excessive dependence on energy revenues. This makes national security vulnerable to the fluctuations of global markets beyond Algeria's control, which in turn affects its ability to finance long-term security policies. Furthermore, the strategy suffers from excessive centralization in decision-making and a slow integration of academic expertise and independent think tanks in formulating strategic alternatives. This sometimes deprives it of the necessary flexibility in a highly volatile regional environment.

5-Based on these findings, the study emphasizes that enhancing the effectiveness of Algeria's security strategy necessitates adopting a comprehensive vision that shifts from a "resilience strategy" to a "transformation strategy." This begins with diversifying the national economy to reduce dependence on foreign entities, strengthening the integration of security and development, and developing strategic foresight mechanisms, as economic security is the solid foundation for any military defence.

6-This vision also requires developing a proactive security doctrine that leverages artificial intelligence and big data analytics to detect cyber threats and disinformation campaigns in their infancy. Externally, economic and scientific diplomacy must be strengthened as a complementary arm to political diplomacy, transforming geographical location from a burden into a lever for balanced partnerships.

Conclusion

7-To address excessive centralization, it is essential to open the door to a broader "strategic community" that includes universities and research centres, because Algeria's security in a world of multiple crises is no longer the sole domain of the military and security establishment, but has become a collective national responsibility.

8-The Algerian security strategy suffers from a qualitative gap in the field of human security. The focus on the military and deterrent dimensions has overshadowed addressing the challenges associated with social fragility and widespread unemployment among young people in border and marginalized areas. This has created fertile ground for organized crime and other armed groups in the long term, despite commendable development efforts. The analysis revealed that spending on education in sensitive areas falls short of the level of soft power, thus weakening the state's ability to genuinely achieve "security through development."

9-The study concluded that the alignment between the central government and tribal or clan structures in the southern regions, and even there, represents a structural shift in the Algerian security strategy. While the state relies on national sovereignty, local governance continues to fill the gap in its administrative and political power, creating a situation of "shared, non-subordinate sovereignty." This weakens the state's ability to enforce a monopoly on force, forcing it into indirect formal negotiations with non-subordinate actors, thus creating a vulnerability that can be exploited by more competing forces.

10-There is a strategic lag in the area of water and food security, stemming from a broader concept of national security. Despite Algeria's experience of increasing tension, its strategic security approach has yet to integrate certain positions that have led to conflict over shared resources (especially with neighbouring countries to the south) as a threat that could be linked to social mobility or climate change. This absence of a climate-security dimension leaves the state ill-prepared to face complex crises that could combine drought and irregular migration, relying instead on tribal considerations.

Conclusion

11-Regarding the technological dimension, the study concluded that the Algerian strategy does not prioritize cyber security as a mere technological addition, but rather as an integral pillar of its defence doctrine. Despite the establishment of cyber security structures, a lack of awareness among institutions and the public regarding the nature of hybrid warfare (which combines military disinformation, hacking, and digital extortion) is a major contributing factor. Algeria and its president are preoccupied with securing external benefits that are entrenched in society without any deterrent or proactive responses.

This study confirms that Algeria possesses significant strategic assets that enable it to confront various threats. However, the effectiveness of this strategy remains contingent upon its ability to continuously adapt to internal and external transformations, and its success in achieving a delicate balance between security requirements and the necessities of development in a world characterized by unprecedented complexity and interconnectedness.

The Algerian strategy consistently poses the pivotal question: how can a country of Algeria's size, location, and historical legacy construct a coherent security doctrine without reducing security to its hard instruments, and without making it dependent on external factors beyond its control?

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10

الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 11

29 رمضان عام 1415 هـ

- وبناء على الأرضية المتضمنة الوفاق الوطني حول المرحلة الانتقالية، لا سيما المواد 5 و 13 - 8 و 25 و 26 (الفقرة 5) منها،

- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66 - 155 المؤرخ في 18 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمن قانون الاجراءات الجزائية، المعدل والمتمم،

- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66 - 156 المؤرخ في 18 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمن قانون العقوبات، المعدل والمتمم،

وبناء على ما أقره المجلس الوطني الانتقالي،

يصدر الأمر التالي نصه:

المادة الاولى : وفقاً لأحكام المادتين 52 و 92 من قانون العقوبات، يحدد هذا الأمر تدابير الرحمة وكذا القواعد والشروط والكيفيات المطبقة على الأشخاص المتابعين بجرائم الارهاب أو التخريب والذين سلموا أنفسهم تلقائياً للسلطات المختصة وأشعروها بتوقفهم عن كل نشاط إرهابي أو تخريبي.

الفصل الأول تدابير الرحمة

المادة 2 : لا يتابع قضائياً، من سبق أن انتمى الى إحدى المنظمات المذكورة في المادة 87 مكرر 3 من قانون العقوبات ولم يرتكب أية جريمة من الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المادة 87 مكرر من قانون العقوبات، أدت الى قتل شخص أو سببت له عجزاً دائماً، أو مست بالسلامة المعنوية أو الجسدية للمواطنين أو خربت أملاكاً عمومية أو خاصة.

المادة 3 : لا يتابع قضائياً أيضاً، الشخص الذي يكون حائزاً لأسلحة ومتفجرات أو وسائل مادية أخرى وقام بتسليمها تلقائياً الى السلطات.

* **المادة 87 مكرر 8 :** لا يمكن في كل الحالات أن تكون عقوبات السجن المؤقتة الصادرة، تطبيقاً لأحكام هذا الأمر، أقل من :

- عشرين (20) سنة سجنًا مؤقتًا عندما تكون العقوبة الصادرة، عقوبة السجن المؤبد،
- النصف عندما تكون العقوبة الصادرة، عقوبة السجن المؤقتة."

* **المادة 87 مكرر 9 :** يجب النطق بالعقوبات التبعية المنصوص عليها في المادة 6 من قانون العقوبات لمدة سنتين (2) الى عشر (10) سنوات في حالة الحكم بعقوبة جنائية تطبيقاً لأحكام هذا الأمر.

فضلاً عن ذلك ، يمكن مصادرة ممتلكات المحكوم عليه."

المادة 2 : تلغى جميع الأحكام المخالفة لهذا الأمر، لا سيما المرسوم التشريعي رقم 92 - 03 المؤرخ في 30 سبتمبر سنة 1992 والمتعلق بمكافحة التخريب والارهاب ، المعدل والمتمم،

المادة 3 : ينشر هذا الأمر في الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية.

حرر بالجزائر في 25 رمضان عام 1415 الموافق 25 فبراير سنة 1995.

اليمن زروال

أمر رقم 95 - 12 مؤرخ في 25 رمضان عام 1415 الموافق 25 فبراير سنة 1995، يتضمن تدابير الرحمة.

إن رئيس الدولة،
- بناء على الدستور، لا سيما المادتان 74 (الفقرة 8) و 115 منه،

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Image 2 :Ordinance No. 95-12 of 25 February 1995 on Mercy Measures (Preamble and Articles 1-

12	الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 11	29 رمضان عام 1415 هـ
ترفع بالإضافة الى ذلك، العقوبة المستحقة الى اقصى عقوبة مقررة لهذه الجريمة. المادة 12 : ينشر هذا الأمر في الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية. حرر بالجزائر في 25 رمضان عام 1415 الموافق 25 فبراير سنة 1995. اليمين زروال	بجريمة ارهاب أو تخريب من أحكام هذا الأمر ومن الاعذار المنصوص عليها في قانون العقوبات. المادة 11 : لا يستفيد الأشخاص المذكورون في المواد 4، 8 و9 من هذا الأمر الذين ارتكبوا بعد محاكمتهم جريمة موصوفة بجريمة ارهاب أو تخريب من أحكام هذا الأمر ومن الاعذار المنصوص عليها في قانون العقوبات.	

28	الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 14	8 صفر عام 1427 هـ 8 مارس سنة 2006 م
يتابع الناجحون في هذه المسابقة تدريباً تطبيقياً بأحد مكاتب المحضرين القضائيين مدته تسعة (9) أشهر.	المادة 65 : تواصل المجالس التأديبية، المنشأة بموجب القانون رقم 91-03 المؤرخ في 22 جمادى الثانية عام 1411 الموافق 8 يناير سنة 1991 والمتضمن تنظيم مهنة المحضر، الفصل في الملفات التأديبية المحالة عليها إلى غاية تنصيب الهيئات التأديبية المنصوص عليها في هذا القانون.	المحضر، سارية المفعول إلى حين نشر النصوص التطبيقية لهذا القانون، باستثناء ما يتعارض منها مع أحكام هذا القانون.
المادة 66 : تبقى النصوص التطبيقية للقانون رقم 91-03 المؤرخ في 22 جمادى الثانية عام 1411 الموافق 8 يناير سنة 1991 والمتضمن تنظيم مهنة	المادة 67 : تلغى جميع الأحكام المخالفة لهذا القانون، لا سيما القانون رقم 91-03 المؤرخ في 22 جمادى الثانية عام 1411 الموافق 8 يناير سنة 1991 والمتضمن تنظيم مهنة المحضر.	المادة 68 : ينشر هذا القانون في الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية.
حرر بالجزائر في 21 محرم عام 1427 الموافق 20 فبراير سنة 2006.	عبدالعزیز بوتغلیقة	حرر بالجزائر في 21 محرم عام 1427 الموافق 20 فبراير سنة 2006.
مراسيم تنظيمية		
مرسوم رئاسي رقم 06-106 مؤرخ في 7 صفر عام 1427 الموافق 7 مارس سنة 2006 ، يتضمن إجراءات عفواً تطبيقاً للأمر المتضمن تنفيذ ميثاق السلم والمصالحة الوطنية.	إن رئيس الجمهورية،	27 فبراير سنة 2006 والمتضمن تنفيذ ميثاق السلم والمصالحة الوطنية، يستفيد عفواً كلياً للعقوبة، الأشخاص المحبوسون المحكوم عليهم نهائياً، عند تاريخ إضفاء هذا المرسوم، بسبب ارتكابهم أو مشاركتهم في ارتكاب فعل أو أكثر من الأفعال المنصوص عليها في المواد 87 مكرر و 87 مكرر 1 و 87 مكرر 2 و 87 مكرر 3 و 87 مكرر 4 و 87 مكرر 5 و 87 مكرر 6 (الفقرة 2) و 87 مكرر 7 و 87 مكرر 8 و 87 مكرر 9 و 87 مكرر 10 من قانون العقوبات وكذا الأفعال الأخرى المرتبطة بها.
- بناء على الدستور، لا سيما المادتان 77 (6) و 156 منه،	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66-156 المؤرخ في 18 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمن قانون العقوبات، المعدل والمتمم،	المادة 2 : يستثنى من الاستفادة من أحكام هذا المرسوم، الأشخاص المحبوسون المحكوم عليهم نهائياً الذين ارتكبوا أفعال المجازر الجماعية أو انتهاك الحرمات أو استعمال المتفجرات في الأماكن العمومية أو شاركوا فيها أو حرّضوا عليها.
- وبناء على الرأي الاستشاري الذي أبداه المجلس الأعلى للقضاء طبقاً لأحكام المادة 156 من الدستور،	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 06-01 المؤرخ في 28 محرم عام 1427 الموافق 27 فبراير سنة 2006 والمتضمن تنفيذ ميثاق السلم والمصالحة الوطنية، لا سيما المادتان 16 و 17 منه،	المادة 3 : ينشر هذا المرسوم في الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية.
يرسم ما يأتي :	المادة الأولى : تطبيقاً لأحكام المادتين 16 و 17 من الأمر رقم 06-01 المؤرخ في 28 محرم عام 1427 الموافق	حرر بالجزائر في 7 صفر عام 1427 الموافق 7 مارس سنة 2006 .
عبدالعزیز بوتغلیقة		

3	الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 46	29 ربيع الأول عام 1420 هـ
قوانين		
يصدر القانون الآتي نصّه :	قانون رقم 99 - 08 مؤرّخ في 29 ربيع الأول عام 1420 الموافق 13 يوليو سنة 1999، يتعلّق باستعادة الوثام المدنيّ.	
الفصل الأوّل		
أحكام عامّة	إنّ رئيس الجمهورية،	
المادّة الأولى : يندرج هذا القانون في إطار الغاية السامية المتمثلة في استعادة الوثام المدني، ويهدف إلى تأسيس تدابير خاصة بغية توفير حلول ملائمة للأشخاص المورطين والمتورطين في أعمال إرهاب أو تخريب ، الذين يعبّرون عن إرادتهم في التوقف، بكل وعي عن نشاطاتهم الإجرامية، بإعطائهم الفرصة لتجسيد هذا الطموح، على نهج إعادة الإدماج المدني في المجتمع.	- بناء على الدستور، لاسيّما المواد 77 - 7 و120 و122 و126 منه،	
وللاستفادة من أحكام هذا القانون يجب على الأشخاص المذكورين في الفقرة أعلاه إشعار السلطات المختصة بتوقفهم عن كلّ نشاط إرهابي والحضور أمامها.	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66 - 155 المؤرّخ في 12 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمّن قانون الإجراءات الجزائية، المعدّل والمتمّم،	
المادّة 2 : يستفيد الأشخاص المذكورون في المادّة الأولى أعلاه، وفقا للشروط التي حدّدها هذا القانون، وحسب الحالة، من أحد التدابير الآتية :	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66 - 156 المؤرّخ في 12 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمّن قانون العقوبات، المعدّل والمتمّم،	
- الإعفاء من المتابعات،	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 72 - 102 المؤرّخ في 25 ذي الحجة عام 1391 الموافق 10 فبراير سنة 1972 والمتضمّن قانون تنظيم السّجون وإعادة تربية المساجين،	
- الوضع رهن الإرجاء،	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 75 - 80 المؤرّخ في 12 ذي الحجة عام 1395 الموافق 15 ديسمبر سنة 1975 والمتعلّق بتنفيذ الأحكام القضائية الخاصة بحظر وتحديد الإقامة،	
- تخفيف العقوبات.	- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 95 - 12 المؤرّخ في 25 رمضان عام 1415 الموافق 25 فبراير سنة 1995 والمتضمّن تدابير الرّحمة،	
الفصل الثاني	- وبعد مصادقة البرلمان،	
الإعفاء من المتابعات	المادّة 3 : لا يتابع قضائيّا من سبق أن انتمى إلى إحدى المنظمات المذكورة في المادّة 87 مكرّر 3 من قانون العقوبات داخل الوطن أو خارجه، ولم يرتكب أو يشارك في أيّة جريمة من الجرائم	

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Image 5 :Excerpt from Law No. 99-08 on Civil Concord – Provisions on Exemption from Prosecution

4. الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 46 / 29 ربيع الأول عام 1420 هـ	
أدت إلى قتل شخص، أو تقتيل جماعي أو اعتداءات بالمتفجرات في أماكن عمومية أو أماكن يتردد عليها الجمهور أو اغتصاب.	
المادة 8 : بغض النظر عن أحكام المادة السابعة (7) أعلاه، يمكن أن يستفيد من الوضع رهن الإرجاء من سبق أن انتموا إلى إحدى المنظمات المذكورة في المادة 87 مكرر 3 من قانون العقوبات والذين لم يرتكبوا التقتيل الجماعي ولم يستعملوا المتفجرات في الأماكن العمومية أو الأماكن التي يتردد عليها الجمهور، والذين أشعروا جماعياً وتلقائياً في أجل ثلاثة (3) أشهر، ابتداء من تاريخ صدور هذا القانون، السلطات المختصة بتوقيفهم عن كل نشاط إرهابي أو تخريبي وحضروا أمام هذه السلطات، والذين يكون قد سمح لهم بالمشاركة، تحت سلطة الدولة، في محاربة الإرهاب.	المنصوص عليها في المادة 87 مكرر من قانون العقوبات، أدت إلى قتل شخص أو سببت له عجزاً دائماً أو اغتصاباً أولم يستعمل متفجرات في أماكن عمومية أو أماكن يتردد عليها الجمهور، والذي يكون قد أشعر في أجل ستة (6) أشهر ابتداء من تاريخ صدور هذا القانون، السلطات المختصة بتوقيفه عن كل نشاط إرهابي أو تخريبي وحضر تلقائياً أمام هذه السلطات المختصة. المادة 4 : ضمن نفس الشروط المنصوص عليها في المادة 3 أعلاه، لن يتابع الشخص الذي كان حائزاً أسلحة أو متفجرات أو وسائل مادية أخرى وسلمها تلقائياً إلى السلطات المختصة. المادة 5 : بغض النظر عن جميع الأحكام المخالفة لأحكام هذا القانون يحرم المستفيدون من أحكام المادتين الثالثة (3) والرابعة (4) أعلاه في كل الحالات من الحقوق المنصوص عليها في المادة الثامنة (8) البند الثاني (2) من قانون العقوبات وذلك لمدة عشر (10) سنوات ابتداء من تاريخ قرار الإعفاء من المتابعات.
يجب على الأشخاص الذين انتموا إلى إحدى المنظمات المذكورة في الفقرة أعلاه القيام بتصريح، يشهدون على صدقه، بالأسلحة، والمتفجرات والذخيرة والوسائل المادية الموجودة في حوزتهم وتسليمها إلى السلطات التي حضروا أمامها.	
يجب أن يشمل هذا التصريح زيادة على ذلك الأعمال التي ارتكبوها أو التي شاركوا في ارتكابها. توضّح كفاءات تطبيق هذه المادة، عند الحاجة، عن طريق التنظيم.	الفصل الثالث الوضع رهن الإرجاء
المادة 9 : يترتب على انقضاء الإرجاء الممنوح تطبيقاً للمادة الثامنة (8) من هذا القانون تحريك الدعوى العمومية، مع الاستفادة من أحكام المادة الثامنة والعشرين (28) من هذا القانون.	المادة 6 : يتمثل الوضع رهن الإرجاء في التّأجيل المؤقت للمتابعات خلال فترة معينة بغرض التّأكد من الاستقامة الكاملة للشخص الخاضع لها.
المادة 10 : إذا تمّ، خلال تأجيل المتابعات، التّأكد من وقائع غير مصرّح بها ضدّ شخص أو عدّة أشخاص خاضعين للإرجاء، يلغى فوراً تأجيل المتابعات الجزائية ويتمّ حينئذ تحريك الدعوى العمومية وفقاً لقواعد القانون العام.	المادة 7 : يستفيد من تدبير الإرجاء وفقاً للمدد والشروط المحددة فيما يأتي، الأشخاص الذين سبق أن انتموا إلى إحدى المنظمات المذكورة في المادة 87 مكرر 3 من قانون العقوبات، والذين، في أجل ستة (6) أشهر ابتداء من تاريخ صدور هذا القانون، أشعروا السلطات المختصة بتوقيفهم عن كل نشاط إرهابي أو تخريبي وحضروا تلقائياً أمامها فردياً أو جماعياً.
المادة 11 : بغض النظر عن كل الأحكام المخالفة ينجر عن الوضع رهن الإرجاء بقوة	يستثنى من الاستفادة من أحكام هذه المادة، الأشخاص الذين ارتكبوا أو شاركوا في ارتكاب جرائم

Image 6: Presidential Decree No. 06-106 of 7 March 2006 on Pardon Measures under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.

11	29 رمضان عام 1415 هـ الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية / العدد 11
يجوز اخضاع الأشخاص المذكورين في هذه المادة لفحص طبي بناء على طلبهم. المادة 7 : يحول الأشخاص المذكورون في المواد 4 ، 8 ، 9 ، 10 و 11 من هذا الأمر فوراً الى المحكمة المختصة لتقديمهم أمام وكيل الجمهورية. يجب على وكيل الجمهورية، فوراً، تحرير محضر معاينة وتحريك الدعوى العمومية. يجوز اخضاع الأشخاص المذكورين أعلاه لفحص طبي بناء على طلبهم.	المادة 4 : في حالة ارتكاب الأشخاص المذكورين في المادة الأولى أعلاه، جرائم تسببت في قتل شخص أو في إصابته بعجز دائم، فإن العقوبة المستحقة تكون : - السجن المؤقت لمدة تتراوح بين خمس عشرة (15) سنة وعشرين (20) سنة، إذا كانت العقوبة المنصوص عليها في القانون عقوبة الاعدام. - السجن المؤقت لمدة تتراوح بين عشر (10) سنوات وخمس عشرة (15) سنة، إذا كانت العقوبة المستحقة السجن المؤبد، - في كل الحالات الأخرى، تخفض العقوبة بنصفها.
الفصل الثالث أحكام خاصة المادة 8 : إذا كان الأشخاص المذكورون في المادة الأولى من هذا الأمر قصراً، تتراوح أعمارهم بين ست عشرة (16) سنة وثمانية عشرة (18) سنة وارتكبوا جرائم موصوفة بجرائم إرهاب أو تخريب، تكون العقوبة القصوى المستحقة السجن المؤقت لمدة عشر (10) سنوات.	المادة 5 : بالإضافة الى تدابير الرحمة المشار اليها أعلاه، يمكن الأشخاص المذكورين في المادة الأولى من هذا الأمر، الاستفادة كذلك من تدابير العفو المنصوص عليها في الدستور.
المادة 9 : إذا كان الأشخاص المذكورون في المادة الأولى من هذا الأمر تتراوح أعمارهم بين ثمانية عشرة (18) سنة واثنتين وعشرين (22) سنة وارتكبوا جرائم موصوفة بجرائم إرهاب أو تخريب، تكون العقوبة القصوى المستحقة السجن المؤقت لمدة خمس عشرة (15) سنة.	الفصل الثاني الاجراءات المادة 6 : يجوز للأشخاص المذكورين في المادتين 2 و3 من هذا الأمر، الحضور تلقائياً أمام السلطات القضائية أو الادارية، المدنية أو العسكرية، مرفقين عند الاقتضاء بولي أمرهم و/ أو محاميهم. يسلم لهم فوراً، وصل يسمى وصل الحضور، تسلم السلطات القضائية، خلال أجل لا يتجاوز ثلاثين (30) يوماً من تاريخ تسليم الوصل للمعني، وثيقة تتضمن عبارة " مستفيد من تدابير الرحمة " المنصوص عليها في هذا الأمر.
المادة 10 : لا يستفيد الأشخاص المذكورون في المادة الأولى من هذا الأمر الذين ارتكبوا بعد تسليمهم الوثيقة المشار اليها في المادة 6 أعلاه، جريمة موصوفة	يجوز، عند الضرورة وبطلب من المعني بالأمر، للسلطات المختصة اتخاذ تدابير مؤقتة لحمايته بدنياً. في كل الحالات يجب تبليغ السلطات القضائية.

Image 7 : Presidential Decree No. 06-106 of 7 March 2006 on Pardon Measures under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation

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8 مارس سنة 2006 م

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- تسعة عشر (19) شهرا إذا كان باقي عقوبتهن يساوي أربع (4) سنوات أو يقل عنها،
- عشرون (20) شهرا إذا كان باقي عقوبتهن أكثر من أربع (4) سنوات ويساوي خمس (5) سنوات أو يقل عنها،

- واحد وعشرون (21) شهرا إذا كان باقي عقوبتهن أكثر من خمس (5) سنوات ويساوي عشر (10) سنوات أو يقل عنها،

- اثنان وعشرون (22) شهرا إذا كان باقي عقوبتهن أكثر من عشر (10) سنوات ويساوي خمس عشرة (15) سنة أو يقل عنها،

- ثلاثة وعشرون (23) شهرا إذا كان باقي عقوبتهن أكثر من خمس عشرة (15) سنة ويساوي عشرين (20) سنة أو يقل عنها،

المادة 5 : تطبق إجراءات العفو المنصوص عليها في هذا المرسوم على العقوبة الأشد في حالة تعدد العقوبات.

المادة 6 : تطبق أحكام هذا المرسوم على النساء المحكوم عليهن نهائيا للاستغيدات من نظام الإفراج المشروط ونظام التوقيف المؤقت لتطبيق العقوبة.

المادة 7 : لا تطبق أحكام هذا المرسوم على النساء اللاتي حكمت عليهن المحاكم العسكرية.

المادة 8 : ينشر هذا المرسوم في الجريدة الرسمية للجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية.

حرر بالجزائر في 7 صفر عام 1427 الموافق 7 مارس سنة 2006 .

عبد العزيز بوتفليقة

مرسوم رئاسي رقم 06-107 مؤرخ في 7 صفر عام 1427 الموافق 7 مارس سنة 2006 ، يتضمن إجراءات عفو بمناسبة عيد المرأة.

إن رئيس الجمهورية،

- بناء على الدستور، لا سيما المادتان 77 (6 و 7) و 156 منه،

- وبمقتضى الأمر رقم 66-156 المؤرخ في 18 صفر عام 1386 الموافق 8 يونيو سنة 1966 والمتضمن قانون العقوبات، المعدل والمتمم،

- وبناء على الرأي الاستشاري الذي أبداه المجلس الأعلى للقضاء طبقا لأحكام المادة 156 من الدستور،

يرسم ما يأتي :

المادة الأولى : تستفيد النساء المحبوسات وغير المحبوسات المحكوم عليهن نهائيا عند تاريخ إمضاء هذا المرسوم، من إجراءات عفو بمناسبة إحياء عيد المرأة الموافق يوم 8 مارس، طبقا لأحكام هذا المرسوم.

المادة 2 : تستفيد عفوا كليا للعقوبة، النساء غير المحبوسات المحكوم عليهن نهائيا اللاتي يساوي باقي عقوبتهن ثمانية عشر (18) شهرا أو يقل عنها.

المادة 3 : تستفيد تخفيضيا كليا للعقوبة، النساء المحبوسات المحكوم عليهن نهائيا اللاتي يساوي باقي عقوبتهن ثمانية عشر (18) شهرا أو يقل عنها.

المادة 4 : تستفيد النساء المحبوسات المحكوم عليهن نهائيا تخفيضيا جزئيا لعقوبتهن على النحو الآتي :

مراسيم فردية

(أ) الإدارة المركزية :

1 - حفيظة هلال، زوجة قارة سليمان، بصفتها نائبة مدير للدراسات القضائية، لتكليفها بوظيفة أخرى.

(ب) سلك القضاء :

2 - عبد الجواد بونورة، بصفته رئيس محكمة إيليزي وبصفته قاضيا، بسبب الوفاة، ابتداء من 8 أكتوبر سنة 2005،

3 - ابراهيم خلافي، بصفته قاضيا، بسبب الوفاة، ابتداء من 12 نوفمبر سنة 2005.

مرسوم رئاسي مؤرخ في 19 محرم عام 1427 الموافق 18 فبراير سنة 2006، يتضمن إنهاء مهام بعثوان وزارة العدل.

بموجب مرسوم رئاسي مؤرخ في 19 محرم عام 1427 الموافق 18 فبراير سنة 2006 تنهى مهام السيدة والسيد الآتية أسمائهم بعثوان وزارة العدل :

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تتناول هذه الدراسة استراتيجية الأمن الجزائرية في سياق التهديدات الداخلية والتحديات الخارجية، وتهدف إلى تقييم فعالية النهج الهجين القائم على الجمع بين أدوات القوة الصلبة والناعمة، وذلك ضمن بيئة إقليمية مضطربة، لا سيما في منطقة الساحل الأفريقي .

يستعرض القسم النظري الأسس المفاهيمية لتطور مفاهيم الأمن والاستراتيجية والتهديد، مع التركيز على نظرية التسييس الأمني والنهج الموسع للأمن. ثم ينتقل إلى تحليل التهديدات الداخلية المتمثلة في الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة والهجرة غير النظامية والهشاشة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية، مسلطاً الضوء على آليات الاستجابة الجزائرية القائمة على الردع العسكري والمصالحة الوطنية وسياسات التنمية. كما يُخصص جزءاً من التحليل لدراسة التحديات الخارجية، وأبرزها الإرهاب العابر للحدود والتدخلات الأجنبية والمنافسة الإقليمية والضغط الاقتصادي، موضحاً ثوابت العقيدة الأمنية الجزائرية

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجزائر، الاستراتيجية الأمنية، التهديدات الداخلية، التحديات الخارجية، الساحل، النهج الشامل، التسييس الأمني، التدخلات الخارجية.

RESUME

Cette étude examine la stratégie de sécurité de l'Algérie face aux menaces internes et aux défis externes. Elle vise à évaluer l'efficacité d'une approche hybride combinant puissance dure et puissance douce dans un contexte régional turbulent, notamment au Sahel.

La partie théorique analyse les fondements conceptuels de l'évolution des notions de sécurité, de stratégie et de menace, en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la politisation de la sécurité et l'approche élargie de la sécurité. Elle analyse ensuite les menaces internes, à savoir le terrorisme, le crime organisé, les migrations irrégulières et la fragilité socio-économique, en soulignant les mécanismes de réponse de l'Algérie fondés sur la dissuasion militaire, la réconciliation nationale et les politiques de développement. Une partie de l'analyse est également consacrée aux défis externes, en particulier le terrorisme transnational, les interventions étrangères, la concurrence régionale et les pressions économiques, mettant en lumière les constantes de la doctrine de sécurité algérienne.

Mots-clés : Algérie, stratégie de sécurité, menaces internes, défis externes, Sahel, approche globale, politisation de la sécurité, interventions étrangères.

Abstract:

This study examines Algeria's security strategy within the context of internal threats and external challenges. It aims to assess the effectiveness of a hybrid approach that combines hard and soft power tools within a turbulent regional environment, particularly in the Sahel region of Africa. The theoretical section reviews the conceptual foundations of the evolution of security, strategy, and threat concepts, focusing on the theory of security politicization and the expanded approach to security. It then analyzes internal threats, namely terrorism, organized crime, irregular migration, and socio-economic fragility, highlighting Algeria's response mechanisms based on military deterrence, national reconciliation, and development policies. A portion of the analysis is also dedicated to external challenges, most notably transnational terrorism, foreign interventions, regional competition, and economic pressures, clarifying the constants of Algeria's security doctrine.

Keywords: Algeria, security strategy, internal threats, external challenges, Sahel, comprehensive approach, security politicization, foreign interventions.